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[For comparisons of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic of January 30, 1937 as amended through November 21, 1949 with other constitutions of the Soviet Union, see 70: American Russian Institute, R1 Soviet Union, category 116.]

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RD1 Ukraine RD1

The Different Areas of Ukraine, their Nationality and Political Position

●64a 177 ,64 Let us review briefly the political development in the various areas of Ukraine between the two World Wars. Ukrainians within the Soviet Union were mainly distributed, as we have seen, between the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic (RSFSR) where they had no national rights, and the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic. By the constitution of July 6th, 1923, Soviet Ukraine is a member of the USSR which adjoined "voluntarily as a member of the union with the formal right to leave it when it likes".

The constitution of Soviet Ukraine was adjusted to that of the USSR. The Congress of Soviets, the Central Executive and its president are the supreme organs of authority. The Council of Commissaries functioned as the Executive Body and it was subject to the authority of the Congress of Soviets and the Central Executive Committee. Three categories of members were comprised in the Council of Ukrainian People's Commissaries: 1. commissaries for agriculture, justice, internal affairs, education, health and social welfare, who acted on their own authority in the provinces under their jurisdiction; 2. "unified" commissaries who had to function according to instructions from the central government, and 3. delegates from the general commissariat of the Union, appointed by different central agencies and dependent on them.

The independence of the various federal republics mainly existed merely on paper, as representatives of the RSFSR were in the majority in the supreme agencies of the USSR. The decisive feature of the organisation was that the composition of all agencies throughout the USSR was regulated by the communist party, which filled all posts with its own members. It, too, was completely centralised and took its orders from the head office of the party in Moscow which it then implemented in the various republics. The expansion of the communist party's function and the limitation of the rights of the individual republics formed the foundation of the growth of the USSR from the very beginning. Numerous amendments to the constitution which

642 reached a climax in Stalin's Constitution of December 5th, 1936
177 helped to liquidate the idea of federation; the principles on which
.64 the Soviet Union had been constituted in 1923 were denied, the
rights of the federal republics being reduced to a minimum: only 4 Republican People's Commissariats remained (commissariat for education — minus universities; social welfare; local industry; communal management) and all other state functions now fell to the "unified" commissariats of the Central Government (now called unionist-republican). As the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities have, since 1936, been elected by direct and universal franchise, Russian influence gained the upper hand in these corporations, too. It is true that Stalin still recognised the right to leave the Union in principle, but at the same time he publicly stated: "It is obvious that we have no republics who would seriously entertain the idea of leaving the USSR"

While the Central Government was supreme, its relation to the Ukrainian state and nationality underwent numerous and profound changes. At first, communist leaders were inclined to ignore the Ukrainian question. But then they realised that the national movement in Ukraine was an instrument of power and that a respect for minorities was a condition of the growth of bolshevism in countries outside Russia, where the question of nationality had not been solved, the communist party began to display a readiness to make concessions. The educational system of Ukraine was organised, the activity of scientific institutes and the All-Ukrainian Academy in Kyiv supported and Russian officials instructed to learn the Ukrainian language in a short time. Considerable concessions were made to Ukrainian economy and if at the time of the New Economic Plan (NEP 1922-23) centralism was not extinct by any means, it seemed as if a tolerable modus vivendi was emerging.

But in 1929-30 when this system of political economy was liquidated in favor of the first Five Year Plan, there was a complete change. When the collectivist system was introduced it was no longer necessary to pay the respect to Ukrainian peasantry that had hitherto resulted in compromises. From now on,

attention was concentrated on building up a system of social 642
economy within Russia, so that it was no longer necessary to 177
bear in mind national movements in western countries, for the .64
world revolution had been postponed for the meantime. The change in Ukraine took place gradually and in contradiction to public expressions of loyalty. The economic needs of Ukraine were ignored already in the first Five Year Plan, the educational system was restricted and the Academy of Learning came completely under communist influence. Ukrainian officials were replaced by Russians and the standing of Ukraine suffered. Russian, as the language of the Revolution, of Lenin and Stalin, was to be the language of one people which had hitherto used several languages, a fact that had concealed the inner unity that had actually existed.

This development caused a fresh outbreak of national resistance on the part of the Ukrainians. 668 The movement of the rebels which had at first led to guerilla warfare, ceased about 1921-1922: factors responsible for the cessation of hostilities were the appointment of Ukrainian officials to the administration and the fact that the United Ukrainian Church was tolerated. When this also was forbidden and when the collectivist movement in the country met with the spontaneous resistance of the peasantry, a campaign of terrorism was re-started. "Nationalist" differences appeared even within party organisations: bolshevist dignitaries themselves could not keep clear of the Ukrainian movement. Thus in 1925 Shumskyj, commissary for education in the USSR, a very influential communist, was dismissed; in 1933 Skrypnyk, who held the same office and who was a personal friend of Lenin's, comitted suicide because he was unwilling to confess his "nationalist sins" to the party; his example was followed in 1937 by Lubtshenko, long president of the Council of People's Commissaries, in order not to fall into the hands of the GPU. The number of lesser communist dignitaries who were killed as nationalists or separatists is very great, and still greater is the host of those who did not belong to the communist ranks and who suffered the same fate in the struggle for national rights and political independence.

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country. The Soviets and all sorts of other similar organizations 668 which were supposed to voice the aspirations of 'great masses' had been organized in the same way. Hrushevsky and Vinnichenko, [646] however, attained their first object, since 'the Ukrainian Conference' elected from its midst members of 'the Ukrainian *Rada*' which was to constitute a sort of Parliament for the Ukraine. These events caused considerable displeasure to the Provisional Government in Petrograd and it was not long before a struggle developed between the Provisional Government and the Ukrainian *Rada*.

'Self-determination of nationalities' had always formed part of 668 the moral and political stock-in-trade of the various brands of 642 'liberals', 'democrats' and 'socialists' who composed the Provisional Government. But the realities of the situation in which they found themselves imposed on these ideologues a certain moderation in the application of their super-liberal principles. Harassed on all sides by self-constituted revolutionary and nationalist groups and factions, and themselves clinging nervously to the forms of an authority which was being rapidly dispersed by the cold winds of rising anarchy, the Provisional Government had recourse to their usual method of 'persuasion' and they asked the *Rada* to await the end of the war and the decisions of an All-Russian Constituent Assembly.

'Persuasion', however, was hopeless with opponents so skilled in political struggles and intrigue as Hrushevsky and Vinnichenko. Aware of the weakness of the Petrograd Government, the politicians of the *Rada* based their tactics on manœuvring for a gradual enlargement of the powers which they had attributed to themselves, while they avoided provoking the cabinet of Prince Lvov by premature demands of too drastic a nature. The *Rada* secured, for instance, the consent of the Provisional Government to the formation of Ukrainian national troops. In this case they could appeal to the precedent which had been created by the formation of Lettish, Georgian and Armenian national detachments.

Professor Paul Milyukov, a prominent member of the Provisional Government, describes the relations of Petrograd with the *Rada* in the following words: 'The Provisional Government was still continuing to plead with the Ukrainians not to detach themselves from the Motherland, not to go the fatal way of dividing liberated Russia, and not to introduce dissensions into the Army at a moment of great national danger. Weak and devoid of backbone, having itself laid down its arms, the Government could not but register *post factum* the triumphs attained by the Ukrainians. Hrushevsky's tactics consisted in proving that "nothing decisive" was taking place. The fiction that the Government was sanctioning the *Rada's* doings was

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668 ●642 kept up to the end. Summing up all the *pourparlers* one sees how false they were at the core: an enforced fiction on one side and deliberate deception on the other.'

Hrushevsky, according to his own words, put forward only a moderate programme: wide national and territorial autonomy within the Russian Federative Republic; but it was not long before he was shifting his ground and declaring that 'the adherents of an independent Ukraine consent to remain on a common platform with Russians' but that 'the colours of an independent Ukraine would be folded only for a time'.

With the resignations of Milyukov and Guchkov, who were regarded as the firm adversaries of Ukrainian separatism, 'the colours of an independent Ukraine' were duly unfolded. The *Rada* chose from among its members a 'General Secretariat' which was to function as a sort of Ukrainian cabinet. Always in pursuance of their tactics, Hrushevsky and Vinnichenko declared that the authority of both the *Rada* and the Secretariat was of a 'purely moral order' and that the organs set up in Kiev were purely 'national organizations'.

Soon, however, Vinnichenko, who had taken upon himself the role of 'Ukrainian Prime Minister', judged that the moment had arrived to proclaim that 'the limits between moral and public legal authority had been effaced' and that 'our moral authority has grown to such an extent as a logical result of events that painlessly, without a struggle, it has transformed itself into the legal rule of a national republic'.

All these manœuvres culminated in the publication of the first 'Universal' of the 'Central *Rada*' on 23 June 1917, according to which the 'Autonomous Ukrainian Republic' came into being, and the 'Central *Rada*' arrogated to itself the right to formulate legislation which would require the sanction of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly only as 'a matter of form'. In this way two authorities came into being claiming sovereign rights in the territory of the Ukraine: the 'moral' authority transformed into the 'legal rule' of the *Rada* on the one side, and on the other the former legitimate authority of the Provisional Government—which was losing ground every day, but which had not completely disappeared.

Under these circumstances several members of the reconstructed cabinet of the Provisional Government hastened to Kiev—Kerenski, Tereshchenko, Nekrasov and Tsereteli. At the time Kerenski was preoccupied with the South-Western Front, where a renewed Russian offensive was to prove to the Allies that the Provisional Government remained faithful to the idea of 'war to a successful end', and it is probable that the *Rada* had chosen this conjunction of [721]

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circumstances to extract the maximum concessions from the harassed 668
liberal leaders who could not risk a political crisis in the rear of the 642
South-Western Army.

When the offensive ended in catastrophe with a loss of over 721
100,000 casualties and 47,000 prisoners, the complete demoralization 642
of the Front and the appearance of thousands of fugitives in Kiev, the ministers of the Provisional Government had no alternative but to capitulate to the *Rada*. On 17 July, in the presence of Hrushevsky and Vinnichenko, the existence of 'the General Secretariat' was proclaimed and legalized.

The disaster at the Front was followed during July by the outbreak 669
of riots and disorders in the interior of Russia. The Soviets openly declared themselves against the Provisional Government, while the Bolshevik faction, after the arrival of Lenin, began to gain strength and made their first attempt to gain power by armed insurrection.

The *Rada* began to concentrate what Ukrainian military elements 642
it was able to attract round Kiev; two regiments, named respectively 669
'Bohdan Khmelnytsky' and 'Polubotok', were in process of formation. Both regiments consisted of undisciplined and disorderly deserters and mutineers. An attempt by the Russian Command to send the 'Ukrainian Regiments' to the Front provoked a real mutiny in the ranks of the 'Bohdan Khmelnytsky Regiment', who considered their presence in Kiev 'for the protection of the *Rada*' more necessary than in the firing line. After an encounter at the Central Railway Station at Kiev with a squadron of the Cuirassiers of the Guard, the Ukrainian troops surrendered and were deprived of their weapons.

Petrograd in the meantime was rejoicing over the suppression of the Bolshevik rising; Lenin had fled to Finland.

This success of the Provisional Government tended to calm both 642
troubled and conspiratorial minds and, under the influence of the 634
German offensive which had begun and which threatened both Kiev and Petrograd, the ministers of the Kerenski Government adopted a firmer attitude in their discussions with the representatives of the *Rada*, who had come to Petrograd to discuss the terms of the Statute which was to regulate the position of the Ukraine. Instead of the Statute only new 'instructions' to the General Secretariat were conceded. The territory of the Ukraine was to consist now of only five Governments: three on the right and two on the left bank of the Dniepr. The Government of Kharkov and the three New Russian Governments were excluded, although the delegates had tried to insist that, in addition to the nine Governments already claimed, Bessarabia and the greater parts of the Governments of Kursk and Voronezh should also form part of the Ukraine.

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Petlyura (who had constituted himself a specialist in military affairs) 668
were resisting fairly well in northern Podolia, but were certainly unable 728
to secure the return of the *Rada* to Kiev. Trotsky's dramatic gesture had, however, simplified the problem. On 17 February the 721
German Government denounced the armistice and ordered the armies of the Eastern Front to begin their advance. It was the only way of breaking the stubbornness of the Bolsheviks and of saving the *Rada* and the peace which it had signed with the promise of a million tons of supplies. (4, 5)

§3. THE GERMANS IN THE UKRAINE: HETMAN SKOROPADSKY

On 18 February, the German troops, without meeting any resistance, occupied Dvinsk on the road to Petrograd and Lutsk on the road to Kiev.

But it was no easy matter for the Austrians to resume the offensive. The Austro-Hungarian armies had been broken during the first two years of the war in the great battles with the Russians; in 1917 it had only been with German aid that they had succeeded in throwing back the Italians. No danger from without threatened the Habsburg Monarchy, but within the Empire dangers were growing with each day that passed. Hence on 17 February the Vienna Government had informed Berlin that Austro-Hungarian troops would take no part in the renewal of the war on the Eastern Front.

In the meantime, the Poles and Bohemians were in a state of agitation on account of the cession of the Kholm region to the Ukrainians. When the twenty-nine year old 'student' Sevryuk, who had signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Czernin and Kühlmann, made his appearance during a session of the Reichsrath on 19 February, Polish and Bohemian deputies met him with hoots and shouts of 'Clear out of here!' The Austro-Hungarian Government was compelled to put forward 'new conditions' in respect of Kholm.

The German troops continued their march through Volhynia in the direction of Kiev, and the Emperor Charles, fearful that the Austrians might fail to secure their share of the promised Ukrainian supplies, changed his mind. On 24 February the Austro-Hungarian divisions on the Eastern Front received the order to advance into the Ukraine. The Austrian decision had, however, already come too late, for on 1 March Kiev was occupied by the Germans and they alone reinstated the *Rada*.

By 3 March the rapid attainment by the Germans of the line 642
Narva-Pskov and their seizure of the districts of Vitebsk, Mohilev 728

•642 and Homel, enabled Lenin to impose what he cynically described as
728 his 'shameful peace' on his colleagues of the Soviets. Clause 6 of the Treaty obliged the Soviet Government 'to conclude peace at once with the Ukrainian People's Republic and to recognize the Treaty of Peace between that State and the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance'.

727 The occupation of the Ukraine was organized on the basis of a special agreement between Germany and Austria-Hungary. The Germans left about 500,000 men on the whole of the Eastern Front. Of these, apart from the troops which were stationed in Poland and Lithuania to protect lines of communication, there were about 12 Infantry and 2 Cavalry Divisions occupying the Front against Soviet Russia from Narva to Homel (the 8th and 10th Armies). The remaining 15–16 Infantry and 4 Cavalry Divisions were quartered in the Ukraine (with the exception of a few battalions which were sent to Poti for the protection of the new Georgian Republic from Germany's ally Turkey). The troops in the Ukraine constituted the *Heeresgruppe Kiev* and consisted of the 1st and 20th Army Corps, the 27th (Saxon) and the 22nd and 41st Reserve Corps, together with several independent divisions and detachments. These troops had little in common with the magnificent German armies which had invaded Russia in the first years of the war. The *Heeresgruppe Kiev* contained a veritable mosaic of different battalions—the majority of which consisted of elderly men belonging to Landwehr and Landsturm formations. During the whole period of the German occupation of the Ukraine there was a continuous process of transfer of single battalions and even of small detachments to the Western Front—and this became more noticeable after 8 August, the day which may be said to have marked the turning-point in France. Only the Cavalry Divisions and Artillery approached the standards of the German armies which had formerly been held on the Russian Front. Thus the legend that the military occupation of the Ukraine was 'a mistake', in the sense that important forces were engaged there which might have been decisively employed on the Western Front, seems to be without foundation. Out of all the *Heeresgruppe Kiev* it would have been difficult to select three or four fighting infantry divisions, and less could have been found among the miscellaneous collection of elderly and invalid troops which constituted the so-called 8th and 10th Armies.

The Austro-Hungarian forces in the Ukraine amounted nominally to 250,000 men; but their total in reality was far below this and the number of deserters grew every day.

The Germans from the first began to play the leading role in Kiev.

728 Pest. In April the situation somewhat improved, but it was evident
439 that there was no hope of receiving by the end of July any substantial proportion of the goods which had been stipulated under the Peace Treaty. It became clear that the enthusiastic delegates of the 'Popular Republic' had greatly exaggerated the agricultural wealth of their country. They had had in view 'potential possibilities', but they had quite failed to take into account the actual state of affairs in the spring of 1918. During the whole of the preceding year agrarian disorders had been taking place. The peasants had appropriated lands, and the countryside had been swarming with ex-soldiers who had completely lost their morale and who, although they had quitted the front, had no wish whatever to return to peaceful occupations. Under such conditions the harvest of 1917 had not been gathered as it would have been in normal times; and, furthermore, no one knew to whom what had actually been gathered really belonged. The cattle of the landowners had been in great part slaughtered or driven off when the Red Guards made their appearance in the Ukraine during the winter of 1917; the sugar factories were standing idle. At the same time, the well-to-do peasants had quickly learned to hide their grain and other produce, and they were no more willing to deliver to the Germans than they had been to the Bolsheviks.

As a result of all this, during the whole period of the Occupation, the Germans only succeeded in exporting 9293 wagon-loads of grain; 23,195 wagon-loads of fodder, sugar, cattle, eggs and other products; and 4567 wagon-loads of minerals (coal, manganese)—as a whole 37,000 wagons under the auspices of the *Wirtschaftstelle* and 5000 through 'private initiative'. This tonnage amounted to scarcely a fifth part of what had been expected before 31 July 1918. And even the quantities which Germany succeeded in securing were delivered after the Government of the *Rada* had given place to that of Hetman Skoropadsky, and for the most part during the first three months of the latter régime.

642 The failure of the *Rada* in 'the economic collaboration' with the
727 Germans was the reason for its downfall. When the Germans came into the Ukraine their inspection of stocks of supplies not only revealed the relative scarcity of these stocks but also the chaotic state of Ukrainian economy at that moment. The estates of the landowners had almost completely disappeared, and the peasants had appropriated the land. This action of the agrarian proletariat had, however, received no legal sanction, and the *Rada* had not yet elaborated any land laws. To the Command of the *Heeresgruppe Kiev* the practical and not the legal state of affairs was important. Field-Marshal Eichhorn therefore issued an 'Order to the Ukrainian popu-

727 April 1918. The capital of the Ukrainian 'Popular Republic' had all the appearance of a big Russian town living an animated and even boisterous life owing to the presence of large numbers of Russian and foreign 'guests'. Except for the names of certain shops which were written up in Ukrainian and the picturesque uniforms of the *Rada* regiments, there was no indication of 'the beginning of a new life'. Ukrainian was only spoken in Government offices and during the sittings of the *Rada*. This official language imported from Galicia was not always easily understood by the inhabitants of Russian Ukraine.

In the environment of the Union of *Khliboroby* and of the fashionable fugitives from the north the Command of the *Heeresgruppe Kiev* easily found a convenient person who could be the head of the administration which was to replace the Government of the *Rada*.

General Paul Skoropadsky had the advantage of being a descendant of that amiable and pliable Hetman who had been chosen by Peter the Great to succeed Mazeppa. An officer of the Chevaliers Gardes Regiment, he had distinguished himself during the war, first in command of a Guards Brigade and later of a Guards Division. Of Ukrainian origin and property, he belonged to a wealthy and distinguished family. Furthermore, General Skoropadsky was endowed with the necessary ambition, and had no objection to undertaking an important political role even if it should be a difficult one. He had many connections with the Union of Cornraisers and had established excellent relations with the German Command, which now designated him as their chosen 'Head of the State' when the propitious moment for his elevation should arise.

727 642 [579] That moment arrived when at last the *Rada* learned about the Order issued by Field-Marshal Eichhorn, and peasant riots—provoked by the Order—broke out in the southern parts of the Governments of Kiev and Poltava. The members of the *Rada* were in a state of agitation; not only Petlyura and the extremists were urging opposition to the German measures, but also some of the cabinet ministers —including Lubinsky, that incorrigibly eloquent 'student' of the Congress of Brest-Litovsk. The German Command was well aware of the movement of opinion in the *Rada* and on 24 April they signed a formal agreement with Skoropadsky. Lüdendorff approved the choice of 'a man with whom one can work well' (Lüdendorff, *War Memoirs*, p. 624). On the same day the *Rada* declared the Order of Field-Marshal Eichhorn to be illegal and non-existent. Two days later, during a sitting of the *Rada*, a detachment of German soldiers entered the hall under the command of an officer who gave the abrupt order, 'Hands up!' The outraged deputies were searched for

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arms, after which they were allowed to go home with the exception 727
of a few of their number, including several cabinet ministers, who 642 ●
were arrested on the spot. On the following day, during a meeting of the Union of Cornraisers, Paul Skoropadsky was proclaimed 'Hetman of the Ukraine'.

Skoropadsky remained Hetman for about seven-and-a-half months 727
and resigned when the Germans were evacuating the Ukraine. Those 439
seven months can be divided into two distinct periods: the first until the middle of August and the second until the end of November.

During the first period the Germans found that their manœuvre had been crowned with comparative success. In July, particularly, supplies of grain and coal were delivered at a regular and rapid tempo. The Germans, again, succeeded in securing thousands of horses of which they were badly in need, not so much for the cavalry as for the artillery and transport services. In Berlin and Vienna bread reappeared and meat and sugar was to be had in considerable quantities. Skoropadsky's Government turned out to be much more capable than that of the *Rada*, perhaps for the reason that the Hetman did not bother about any ideology whatever. The Foreign Minister, Doroshenko, was not over-burdened with work, but the energetic Minister of the Interior, Igor Kistyakovsky, and the Minister of Commerce, Gutnik, had plenty to do. Berlin and Vienna placed at the disposal of the Government the quantity of Marks necessary to cover the issue of 400,000,000 *karbóvantsi* (about 300,000,000 Marks) issued by the Hetman; and for this reason the *karbóvantsi* enjoyed a greater credit with the people than had the 'paper' of the *Rada*. In the meantime 'a real General', General Ragoza, formerly commanding the 4th Russian Army, undertook the task of organizing the Hetman's army. Not only officers of Ukrainian origin, but officers from all over Russia freely enlisted in it.

The historian of Brest-Litovsk justly remarks that in June 1918 727
'the Ukraine became for a short time a bourgeois Mecca and thither 642
flocked thousands of refugees from Soviet Russia' (Wheeler-Bennett, p. 323). Kiev rapidly lost even that 'shade of Ukrainism' which it had worn in the *Rada* days. Baron Mumm, the German Minister Resident, was depressed by this aspect of affairs when he wrote to Groener: 'I tried to insist with the President of the Council of Ministers Lizohub that the German Government desires his cabinet to have more of *couleur locale*.' Mumm altogether was not particularly pleased with the *coup d'état*, since the military men had not asked his opinion about it and had not even troubled to let him know before it was accomplished. In another report Mumm suspects the Hetman's Government of being 'pro-Russian', but adds that 'this should

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727 not be taken too tragically as the Hetman's Government is under my
•642 control and that of the German Staff'. The Austrian Command, which did not like the Hetman on account of his 'independent tone in relation to Vienna', accused Skoropadsky himself of being 'pro-Russian'. Compromising documents were produced from somewhere according to which the Hetman had, in July 1914, denied the existence of a Ukrainian nation, while in July 1917 he was supposed to have spoken of Kiev as a centre of Russian and not of Ukrainian culture. He had also been guilty of advocating the union of all Russian lands in a federal state. The position of the Hetman, however, was then very firm, because he had the sympathy of the military Command who had no interest in the ideological side of the Ukrainian Question.

Baron Mumm and the Austrians were of course very near the truth in their views on Skoropadsky's Government. The Hetman and his cabinet, even if they were Ukrainians by origin, were of less than moderate tendencies in relation to separatism. They only 'tolerated' the separation of Ukraine from Russia while Russia remained in the hands of Lenin and Trotsky. At this time Kiev not only looked forward to the early downfall of the Bolsheviks, but was certain that the excellent relations existing between the Hetman and the German Command was the prelude to German support for the restoration of the Russian Monarchy.

At this time the Ukrainian and Russian conservatives in Kiev were not the only elements who were anticipating a German march on Moscow. The success of the German offensive in France in the spring of 1918 had convinced the Russian factions of the invincibility of the German power. Even Paul Milyukov, the protagonist of the Triple Entente, got into touch with the German Command in Kiev through the Ukrainian Premier Lizohub, who had been a member of the Cadet Party. But the Germans continued to stand where they were, and even the murder of the German Ambassador in Moscow, Count Mirbach, did not induce them to expel from Berlin the Soviet representative Joffe, whose staff was at this time propagating
727 Communism in Germany with relative immunity.

Meantime a curious situation had been created on the Don, where the Germans had recognized the Don Cossack *ataman* General Krasnov as head of a separate state. In the north the *ataman* was fighting the Bolsheviks, while on the south he was collaborating with the Volunteer Army in process of formation by General Denikin, who was the favoured protégé of the Entente Powers as the allies of Imperial Russia. Skoropadsky, notwithstanding his dependence on the Germans and the German anxiety to conciliate the Soviet

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Government, managed, with the connivance of German officers, to 727
send some support in men and supplies to Krasnov and, through him, to Denikin.

As the summer advanced a serious deterioration took place in conditions in the Ukraine. The German and Austrian troops, weary of the war and in continuous contact with the anarchic and revolutionary incidents of the countryside, were becoming demoralized. After the German disasters on the Western Front at the beginning of August, their mood became mutinous, although it was not until October that open disorders broke out among the German troops in Kharkov, when certain battalions refused transfer to the Western Front.

The German official source (*Die Rückführung des Ostheeres*), published in 1936 with a Preface by Generals Blomberg and von Beck, describes the gradual demoralization of the Occupation troops in the Ukraine. The police functions which fell to the lot of the German troops undermined their morale in the existing situation. Too great temptations existed for soldiers employed in the collection of supplies. 'Illegal commerce and speculation flourished, and it was exceedingly difficult for the military authorities to prevent this on account of the troops being scattered over a vast territory and on account of the necessity of maintaining innumerable small posts. The conduct of isolated German detachments destroyed the prestige of the Occupation troops in the eyes of the local population. Even the authorized trading, the object of which was the despatch of parcels of food to their homes, brought the soldiers into undesirable contact with the population—especially with Jews who had most of this commerce in their hands. Jews were frequently the transmitters of Bolshevik propaganda' (*Rückführung*, pp. 5–6).

The same source gives a gloomy description of the Hetman's 642 ●
Government: 'Unfortunately Hetman Skoropadsky ruled in the Ukraine only with the support of German bayonets. His Government had neither the required authority nor the energy to take drastic measures for restoring law and order in the country. The majority of the population distrusted him on account of his monarchical and pro-Russian tendencies and on account of his support of important landowners. That population stood either for a Republic and friendship with the Entente or simply for the Bolsheviks. The peasants were clamouring most of all for a solution of the agrarian problem, the decision of which the Hetman's Government could not take upon itself. To judge by the beginning made, it was scarcely possible to form a Hetman's army. There were too many officers and too few soldiers—especially too few of those soldiers who later turned out trustworthy' (*ibid.* pp. 8–9).

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● 642 727 Already in the month of April, before the *Rada* fell, peasant risings had flared up in the Governments of Kiev and Poltava in answer to German expeditions in search of supplies. Under Skoropadsky the execution of Eichhorn's Order was carried through in a firmer fashion—with the aid of German detachments; but it was accompanied with extremely dangerous moral consequences, not only for the Occupation troops but also for the Ukrainian Government. In many cases landowners applied to the Hetman for the re-establishment of their rights of property or for the restoration of order in their localities, but the Hetman, who had no trusty police force nor army of his own, had to ask the Occupation authorities for the aid of their troops. This was not refused, since the interest of the landowners coincided with that of the German Command. Among the peasants were many ex-soldiers who had left the Front, but who had taken their rifles with them. Shots were fired sometimes, and heavy reprisals followed on the spot, or at least arrests and military tribunals. There is nothing more perilous for any Government than 'to enforce order' with the aid of foreign soldiers. After two or three months the rural population, including the more prosperous peasants, were unanimous in their hatred of the Hetman and the Germans. Attacks on small German posts guarding railway stations, bridges and depots became more frequent. German soldiers disappeared through shots fired round a corner or the sudden thrust of a knife. These incidents caused fear and anger among the German soldiers—not so much against the local inhabitants as against their own commanders. The Hetman's Government contributed to the 'revolutionizing' of the Ukraine and, indirectly, to that of the Army of Occupation. (6)

727 Eichhorn and Skoropadsky were criticized in some Austro-German circles. The Austrians were displeased in part that a Russian general and not an Austrian Archduke should have been put at the head of the Ukrainian realm. They were also suspicious of ultimate German designs on the Ukraine, since they considered that this territory should properly be regarded as within the sphere of Habsburg policy. On 13 June General Waldstetter wrote in a secret report to Vienna that 'Germany pursues in the Ukraine definite economic and political objectives. She wants to keep for ever a safe way open to Mesopotamia and Arabia through Baku and Persia. The way to the East goes through Kiev, Ekaterinoslav and Sevastopol and from there by sea to Batum and Trebizond.' Somewhat later the Commander-in-Chief of the Austro-Hungarian Occupation troops, General Kraus, reported to his Government: 'On the one hand the German Command is consciously upholding the Mon-

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soldiers were electing Soviets; and on the 11th that an armistice had been signed on the Western Front. 727 668

The question of the evacuation of the German troops immediately arose and it was clear that this would present enormous difficulties. Lvov was seized by Galician Ukrainians; Lublin and Warsaw by the Poles: neither were willing to let troop trains through. From Kiev only one line of railway remained: Kovel-Brest-Litovsk-Belostok.

The news of the crash of the German Front in the West and of the impending evacuation of the Ukraine by the Germans was naturally the signal for a Ukrainian movement directed against the Hetman's Government. On 20 November, during street riots in Kiev, twenty people were killed. A whole Ukrainian Division declared itself against the Hetman and began to march from Konotop on Kiev; it was stopped by German troops. Large bands of 'Reds' appeared near Kharkov. New Russia was swarming with brigands who had armed themselves with what the Austrians had left behind. This was only the beginning.

The principal politicians of the 'National Union' were also on the alert and each of them acted according to his disposition. Vinnichenko formed a 'Directoria' of five members from the different Ukrainian Socialist parties, while Petlyura hastened to Belaya Tserkov, where he easily raised a mutiny against the Hetman in the crack regiment which had been christened with the romantic name of 'The Zaporogian Sech Rifles' and which had been recruited largely out of the Russian war prisoners from Rastatt who had been given the 'special education in the Ukrainian spirit'.

§4. *DIE RÜCKFÜHRUNG DES OSTHEERES*

Between Petlyura and Vinnichenko dissensions immediately arose not only on questions of principle: they were personal enemies. Vinnichenko wanted the Ukraine to be proclaimed a 'State of Workers and Peasants', but not subject to Moscow. Petlyura turned out to be a politician of a more practical turn of mind: he understood well enough that it would not be long before the Moscow Soviets would swallow up Vinnichenko's Ukraine. He also understood that it was necessary for the 'Directoria' to conciliate the sympathy and interest of the Entente powers if the Ukrainian nationalists were to gain sufficient time to establish any sort of stable régime. Petlyura was not a bad organizer and his firmness made him popular with the soldiers. Therefore he was the master of the situation. 642●

Partly in consequence of Petlyura's 'Universal' and partly in response to Vinnichenko's proclamations which were plastered all over 669

669 the Ukraine—even in the streets of the Hetman's capital, but most of all because of the peasants' overwhelming desire 'to get rid of the Germans', armed groups and detachments appeared everywhere. These bodies paid no particular heed to the self-appropriated authority of the 'Directoria' but obeyed their improvised *atamans* and 'colonels'.

●642 Skoropadsky could not help realizing that his position had suddenly become desperate. His cabinet was powerless in every respect, and the last hope that remained was to get into touch with the victors in the war through the leaders of the 'White' Volunteer Army to which they were according their support. General Denikin had already issued an Order to the Volunteer Army in which he proclaimed that he assumed command 'of all the forces in the South of Russia'. This Order of course was intended to apply to 'the armed forces' in the Crimea and the Ukraine, and it was inferred that the thousands of Russian officers in Kiev and Odessa were now under the command of General Denikin's unofficial representative in Kiev, General Lomnovski. A 'South Russian Centre' consisting of several conservative professors and fugitive politicians who were all hoping and working for a united Russia was set up in Kiev. The trouble was, however, that neither the officers nor the politicians were able to protect the Hetman against the rising anger of the armed peasantry. The Volunteer Army was far away in Rostov-on-Don and the northern Caucasus and the Allied forces in Roumania were no nearer to the scared remnants of Skoropadsky's class régime in Kiev. In Odessa, it is true, the French Consul Hainnot soon made his appearance as the representative of the victorious Entente. He came in touch with Prince Dolgoruki, the Commander-in-Chief of the Hetman's troops, and promised him the speedy intervention of French forces in the Ukraine. At the same time Hainnot warned the German Command in Kiev that any leniency on their part towards the mutinous Ukrainian elements, 'especially any sort of agreement with them, would not be tolerated'. Hainnot went on to threaten the Germans with reprisals 'should any arms or munitions be given to the Ukrainians or if Kiev were surrendered to them' (*Rückführung*, p. 40). The French Consul, however, had no force at his disposal, and his promises and threats were made on his own initiative and on the advice of his Russian friends rather than as the result of instructions from his Government.

Skoropadsky and all the Russians in Kiev found themselves, as before, defended only by German bayonets. To make the situation still more paradoxical these German bayonets were now as a matter of fact at the disposal of the German 'Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies' which had been set up in Kiev and which openly sympathized with the Bolsheviks. Finally, on 28 November 1918, Skoropadsky, gambling on Hainnot's promises and on the understanding between the Entente and the Volunteer Army, issued a proclamation in which he declared the Ukraine to be a part of 'the great Russian realm'. He was too late to save either himself or the conservative interest in Kiev. 642

Ukrainian detachments were approaching Kiev from all sides. As early as 15–20 November all sorts of *atamans* and 'colonels' had occupied Kharkov and Poltava and even Rovno to the west of Kiev. On 19 November remnants of the army which remained loyal to the Hetman were defeated at Vasilkov by the 'Petlyurians'. Kiev would have been taken if the Germans had not been ready to defend it. 669 727

Notwithstanding the almost complete collapse of discipline among the troops of the German Occupation, some grounds for collaboration had been found between the Soldiers' Soviets and the Command. 'Only one impulse reigned among the troops, every soldier had only one thought: "Home! Home! Home!—at any price!"' (*Rückführung*, p. 40). The winter had set in, snow had fallen and the horrors of Napoleon's retreat haunted the minds of the Germans. The officers had little difficulty in persuading the men that it was necessary to hold Kiev for the time being as a centre from which the evacuation could be organized.

But the defence of Kiev and other large towns and important railway junctions by the Germans was interpreted by the population as a continued support of the Hetman. By spreading its propaganda against Skoropadsky the 'Directoria' was exciting the people against the Germans; in fact the association and exploitation of the two hatreds secured the maximum number of adherents for Petlyura. The peasants had many accounts to settle with the Germans, while considerations of a material order were eloquent enough. The rumour circulated that the Germans who were leaving the Ukraine were taking away with them a lot of money and great quantities of goods. There was an overwhelming desire not to allow them to do this and to take away from them all that they had appropriated. A logical development of this train of thought was the decision to deprive the Germans of their weapons and munitions: their artillery and machine-guns, rifles, lorries, carts, horses—and finally even their warm clothing and their money.

Attacks on railway stations began in many districts with the object of preventing the evacuation of the German troops. The German Command soon realized that under such conditions it had become an utter impossibility to organize the evacuation even along the lines

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669 which were still available after the events in Poland: Kiev-Kovel-
727 Brest-Litovsk (for the 20th Army Corps and the 22nd and 27th Reserve Corps); and Bakhmach-Pinsk-Brest-Litovsk (for the 1st Army Corps and the 41st Reserve Corps). It became an absolute necessity to come to an agreement with Petlyura, and such an agreement was concluded on 2 December in Kiev. An 'armistice' was arranged during the duration of which the 'Directoria' undertook to make itself responsible for the organization of transport facilities. But with all the goodwill in the world Petlyura and the members of the 'Directoria' were able to give little real assistance in that direction—and that little only in the immediate neighbourhood of Kiev. In other parts of the Ukraine the struggle against the retreating Germans continued to assume more and more violent forms. In Kharkov *ataman* Barbashev and his staff had to be arrested before the Germans could board the promised train. At the important junctions of Bakhmach and Kasatin, the gangs in control continued to refuse to allow trains to pass through *en route* for Kovel and Homel. 'It was simply by a miracle that, up to 12 December, we succeeded in despatching 126 trains' (*Rückführung*). By this time skirmishes between German detachments and the local population had spread all over the Ukraine.

The numerous Ukrainian bands in Volhynia became a real danger to the Germans. Fighting took place 'with changing luck' in Berdichev, where a Bavarian Brigade beat back successive attacks by strong 'Petlyurian' forces. At the station of Zhmerinka the 'Petlyurians' defeated two Landwehr cavalry regiments with a loss of more than 200 killed and wounded. The disorganized Germans were disarmed and driven away from the railway line in the direction of the Galician frontier. On 7–8 December hot encounters took place for the stations of Sarny, Iskorost and Birzula. The Germans took several thousands of prisoners, but it was difficult to know what to do with them for, if set free, they would join new bands and reappear in a few days.

On 6 December *pourparlers* with Petlyura were renewed, and on the 11th, at the station of Kasatin, a definite agreement was concluded. Petlyura insisted with some reason that if his troops were to obey him it was necessary for the 'Directoria' to return to its capital—Kiev. A peaceful continuation of the German evacuation could only be procured by the immediate surrender of Kiev to the Ukrainians.

●642 The first consequence of the Kasatin Agreement was the resignation of the Hetman and his Government. On 14 December, after a short affair with the remaining troops of the Hetman, the ragged bands of the 'Directoria' under the command of Colonel Konovalets 642 entered Kiev. In their wake, on the 19th, arrived the 'Directoria' with Petlyura and Vinnichenko at its head.

During the Kasatin *pourparlers* the German Command had considered it a question of honour to stipulate that the Russian officers and men who were serving the Hetman should be allowed to go free after surrendering their arms. This condition was only partly kept. Some officers, among them General Count Keller, who had tried to organize resistance in the town itself, were shot on the spot. Another five hundred officers were arrested and kept prisoners in the Kiev Museum. Later they were divided into groups and distributed among different prisons; a number of them, under pretext that they had tried to escape, faced firing squads; after 29 December those who remained alive were sent off to Germany (*Rückführung*, p. 52). 669 727

The surrender of Kiev resulted in a change for the better in the conditions of the German evacuation. The Germans had to accept certain limitations on the disposal of military stores: the troops were allowed to take with them only machine-guns for one company in every regiment; guns for three batteries in every artillery regiment, etc. The balance had to be 'delivered to the Ukrainian Army'.

By the end of December the Command of the former *Heeresgruppe Kiev* had migrated first to Kovel and then to Brest-Litovsk. The evacuation was proceeding almost normally, although in some localities the troop trains were attacked and disarmed, and often the Germans could only secure uninterrupted passage by the payment of large sums of money. By the middle of January the bulk of the Army of Occupation had quitted the territory of the Ukraine, and was concentrated in the railway triangle: Brest-Litovsk-Pinsk-Kovel. But troops in left-bank Ukraine were still having a difficult time because the Bolsheviks had appeared there as rivals to the 'Directoria'.

On 9 November, when the first news arrived of the German Revolution, Lenin had denounced the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. As a result, both the Ukraine of the Hetman and the Ukraine of the 'Directoria' found themselves in a state of war with the Soviets. The Bolsheviks had adherents enough in left-bank Ukraine and the industrial centres of New Russia: already in November they tried to take Poltava; at Ekaterinoslav, after the Austrians left, the Red Republic was proclaimed; and Soviets were set up in the mining towns of the Donets upon the departure of the Germans. At Kharkov the Staff of the 1st Army Corps and a certain number of German troops remained, but these could not protect the officials of the 'Directoria' when, on 3 January 1919, 8000 armed 'Reds' entered the city. The Germans in Kharkov found themselves in a parlous

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Volunteers in order to continue a joint struggle against the Bolsheviks 669
and, if need be, against the Poles. 648

The remnants of the 'Petlyurians' went off into Podolia, where 642 they renewed their brutal pogroms against the Jews. During the latter part of November and December they were decimated by a serious epidemic of black typhus which overtook them in the neighbourhood of Zhmerinka.

Having lost his army and almost alone, Petlyura betook himself to the Polish lines, where on 2 December he put his hand to a secret agreement, in the name of the 'Directoria', whereby he abandoned all claims on Galicia and 'recognized' Polish rule over Kholm, Polesia and Western Podolia—regions which were already in occupation of the Polish Army. On 24 December the 'Directoria' ceased to exist and gave over its phantom authority to a 'cabinet' formed by one Isaac Mazeppa, an ex-employee of the Union of Zemstvos.

In the meantime catastrophe had overtaken the Volunteer Army. 669 Having occupied Kiev and Chernigov during September, the 'Whites' had reached Kursk and even Orel by the end of October. Their line was now dangerously extended and the advance succumbed to a sudden flanking attack delivered to the north of Kharkov. A serious defeat at Kromy to the south-west of Orel forced them out of the whole area between Kursk and Kharkov. Their collapse was now even more rapid than their progress had been. Kiev was evacuated, and within a few weeks all the Ukraine, in circumstances which grew more perilous every day.

The Volunteer Army had never been popular among the peasantry. During the preceding three years the peasants had lived through an evil nightmare of change and upheaval. They distrusted 'the officers' army' and suspected it, not without reason, of being the instrument whereby 'the former order' would be restored. In many cases the officials hastily appointed by General Denikin had contributed to this distrust by an ill-considered restoration of the rights of property in districts which they had been sent to administer. Though the peasant had never found any benefit from 'the new order' he was stubbornly opposed to a return to 'the old ways'. This frame of mind was the principal cause of the chaos which reigned in the rear of the White Army and it was more conducive to the catastrophe of the autumn of 1919 than either the unfortunate strategy of General Denikin or the superior abilities of the Red Army chiefs.

'The struggle which in 1919 drenched the Ukraine in blood recalled by its cruelties the Cossack risings of the seventeenth

occupied Lvov, and advanced on Warsaw through Zamość by the 721
same route which the Cossack hordes of Khmelnytsky had followed 669
nearly three centuries before. But the Russians were checked at the gates of Warsaw (15 August), and their subsequent retreat was almost as rapid as their advance and the preceding Polish advance and retreat had been.

On 12 October an armistice was signed, and in the following 728
year the Peace of Riga was to stabilize conditions on the Russian borderlands for nearly twenty years. Poland retained most of the Ukrainian territory of which she had been in occupation prior to the attack on Kiev—large parts of Volhynia and Polesia as well as about half the area of White Russia. The much disputed Kholm district and all Galicia also remained in Polish hands, although the temporary occupation of these territories had only been authorized by the Paris Conference 'pending the solution of the Russian Question'. As a result of the activities of the tenacious Petlyura and the visionary politicians of the 'Directoria' the Poles received, therefore, about 150,000 square kilometres of Ukrainian territory and about 5,000,000 Ukrainian-speaking subjects.

Simon Petlyura, like so many of the picturesque figures of the Russian Revolution, retired to Paris where, some years later, he was killed by a revolver shot in the Boulevard St Michel. The shot was fired by a young Jew named Schwartzbrod, who stated at his trial that he was taking vengeance on Petlyura for the pogroms committed by the 'Petlyurians'. (8, 9, 10)

§6. THE SOVIETS AND THE GROWTH OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM

'The Ukrainian Soviet Republic' had been declared on 18 642
December 1918 in a proclamation of 'the Military and Revolu- 669
tionary Committee of the Red Southern Army' signed by Stalin 635
and Rakovski; the proclamation conferred all authority in 'the liberated territory' on 'the Ukrainian workers and the Ukrainian peasants'. On 3 January 1919, the day on which the Red Army entered Kharkov, then still occupied by part of the 1st German Army Corps, a proclamation of 'the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee' announced that all authority in the Ukraine was vested in this Committee which had 'the confidence of the working and peasant masses'. This document was signed by the President of the Committee, Manuilsky, and by the following members: Rakovski, Grinko, Zatonsky and Skrypnik. Rakovski was a professional revolutionary, a Bulgarian or Roumanian Jew by origin,

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•642 who had always lived in the *Quartier Latin* in Paris; Zatonsky and
669 Skrypnik were the first Ukrainian politicians to go over to the
635 Bolsheviks.

This same Committee, on 14 February, two or three weeks after the occupation of Kiev, announced the federation of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic with 'the All-Russian Republic of Workers and Peasants'. Subsequently, on 9 March, 'according to the Revolutionary order' 'the First Ukrainian Congress of Soldiers', Peasants' and Workers' Delegates' was called together. This body received for approval 'the Constitution of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic'. Seven months had not elapsed before nine-tenths of the territory of this first Ukrainian Soviet Republic had fallen into the hands of the Volunteer Army.

In spite of the ephemeral character of the first Ukrainian Soviet Republic it is worth considering the theoretical basis on which this state was founded, since its structure illustrates Lenin's conceptions as to the treatment of nationalities within the Communist State.

656 Following the November *coup d'état* two documents were
563 published in Russia which had an 'ideological' importance in
relation to the formation of national republics. The first was a 'Declaration of the Rights and Privileges of the Nations Forming Part of Russia'; it concluded as follows:

'According to the Will of the Congress of Soviets, the Council of People's Commissars has decided to adopt as a foundation for its activities in the question of nationalities the following principles:

(1) The equality and sovereign rights of all the nationalities of Russia;

(2) The right of self-determination of all these nationalities, including the right to form independent states;

(3) The abolition of all national and religious privileges and limitations;

(4) The free development of national minorities and ethnographic groups inhabiting the territory of Russia.'

The document bears the signature of Dzhugashvili-Stalin, Commissar for Nationalities, and of Ulianov-Lenin, President of the Council of People's Commissars.

The second document is a 'Declaration of the Rights of Oppressed Nationalities', dated 24 January 1918 and approved by the 3rd Congress of All-Russian Soviets. The setting up by this Congress of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.) was based on the following principles: 'Russia is proclaimed the Republic of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates. The Soviet Republic is constituted on the basis of a free union of free

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731 conditions for peaceful labour had somewhat improved, since the war had come to an end and only reprisals and 'the settling of accounts' were going on, the weather contributed to make the new harvest catastrophically poor. The absence of any sort of organization but that of the police and the army, and the general exhaustion of the economic structure of Russia, produced conditions which were unparalleled in modern history. European charitable organizations, with all the goodwill in the world, proved inadequate to cope with the calamity. In the Ukraine it is estimated that not less than three million people died from hunger or from diseases resulting from it. Incredible horrors formed a background to this human tragedy; there were, for instance, numerous cases of cannibalism authenticated.

656 The ruin of the famine; the naval mutiny in Kronstadt with all its formidable implications; the stubborn armed struggle of the peasantry against the Soviet régime in the Tambov and adjoining Governments—all these factors induced Lenin, himself in 1922 a very sick man, to embark upon the New Economic Policy. It was a compromise between 'the Communism of the war period' and 'small bourgeois elements'—a compromise imposed by the dire necessity of the moment.

656 The same causes which imposed the New Economic Policy
563 inclined the Soviet leaders towards a policy of conciliation in regard
669 to 'the minority nationalities'. In the Caucasus it had been necessary to concentrate three Army Corps to suppress the insurrection of the Mussulman mountaineers of Daghestan during the winter of 1921–2; the Georgian Social Democratic Republic had recently been overthrown as the result of a six weeks' campaign in which four Army Corps were engaged, and the Armenian mountaineers of Karabagh were waging a guerilla war which was only terminated by an amnesty at the end of 1922; in Turkestan the savage Basmachi movement continued to devastate the country until 1926.

656 The Declaration of 30 December 1922 preceded the formation of
●642 'the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' (U.S.S.R.), the Constitution of which was published on 6 June 1923. This declaration confirmed in a different form the decision of the 3rd Congress of Soviets of 24 January 1918. It affirmed that the U.S.S.R. had been 'constituted by the free and voluntary union of free and equal Socialist Republics'. 'Representation of the different nationalities' in the central organ of government was provided in a kind of 'second chamber' which consisted of 114 members.

668 In the Ukraine the Bolsheviks were more successful than in
656 Caucasia in recruiting to their ranks many of the former separatists

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661/ bands in the Ukraine. At the time of the 'purge' he occupied the highest military post in the Ukraine: that of Officer Commanding the Kiev Military District. The drama in the Ukraine did not end with the execution of Yakir; during the years 1935–7 several thousands of persons occupying important posts in the Red Army and in the Soviet administration were arrested and shot or exiled to concentration camps in Siberia and the North of Russia. This whirlwind of arrests and executions even carried away with it Postyshev and Kossior, the former instruments of 'the Revolution against the peasants'.

701 186 In the meantime the last remnants of the national Ukrainian Army, which had flourished in the years 1923–9, disappeared. Units of the Ukrainian Army, based on the system of 'territorial Divisions' in the Red Army, had been quartered in the Ukraine alongside the troops 'of the Union'. The struggle with the peasantry had made it desirable to abolish the territorial system in the Ukraine as well as in other parts of the Union. The Ukrainian units were broken up and distributed to other parts of the country and their place was taken by regiments recruited in Great Russia. After the execution of the staff of the Kiev Command and the senior personnel of many of the Ukrainian regiments, nothing remained of the Ukrainian Army except the names of certain 'Red' regiments which were retained for the sake of form; but the Ukrainian language continued to be used in units where the rank and file were predominantly of Ukrainian origin.

Stalin's Constitution of 1936—which evoked such enthusiasm
● 642 among European Communists and which was even hailed in the capitalist Press of Western countries as a laudable 'return to democratic institutions' in contrast to the dictatorships of Central Europe—was a cynical accompaniment to the slaughter of so many thousands of Party members which was going on at that time within 'the Soviet Paradise'. Stalin's Constitution marked the final abandonment of the theory that the minority nationalities ranked as equal partners with Great Russia within the Soviet Union. The 'union of different states' was now transformed into one integral state (Paragraph 13: 'The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a unified state'). According to Paragraph 14 all authority on questions relating to international affairs, the declaration of war and the conclusion of peace, the organization of defence and the command of the armed forces, foreign trade, the safety of the state, the management of all banks, all forms of transport, the principles of land distribution, the basis of public instruction, hygiene, and criminal and civil laws, was reposed in the Central Government.

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Section (*c*) of the same Paragraph reserved all questions of finance, including the local budgets of the constituent republics, to the discretion of the Central Government. 692

Paragraph 60 provided that the Parliaments of the Republics could make changes in their respective constitutions, but that these changes must correspond to the spirit of the Constitution of the Union. Under Paragraph 69 the Central Government retained the right to veto any decisions taken by the governments of the local republics. As has already been stated, Stalin did not consider it necessary to deprive the national republics of the illusory right of opting out of the Union. At the same time he not only retained the conception of the Constitution of 1923 which provided for a special representation of the minority nationalities in the central legislature, but his pleasing sense of the ridiculous in regard to the automatic reactions of his admirers in foreign countries induced him to give orders for the members of this body to be elected. In this Chamber of Nationalities the Ukrainians have rather less than 200 representatives out of 574—a figure which corresponds probably to the relative numerical importance of their population in relation to the other nationalities in the Union. Any advantage which might theoretically accrue from this representation is lost at the joint sittings of 'the two Chambers of the Superior Council', when the delegates of the nationalities find themselves in a minority among 1143 of their colleagues.

Stalin would have been but a poor Marxist if he had forgotten that the laws regulating the political existence of the Soviet Ukraine would only correspond to the actual state of things if they expressed 'economic realities'. Though strengthened by the new Constitution of the Union, the link between the Ukraine and Great Russia would still remain only theoretical, in the Marxist view, if the Soviet Government had not succeeded in absorbing the economic life of the Ukraine into that of the rest of the Union and welding out of the two an indestructible whole. (11, 12)

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES AND ADDITIONS TO CHAPTER VI

(1) *The Austrians and Russians in Galicia*

A full documentation of the Austrian repression of the *Promoskovity* in Galicia is to be found in the Telerhof Almanack published in several series by the Galicians after the war (*Telerhofsky Almanakh*, 1–4, Lvov, 1926–9). 113

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with the period March–November 1917. A series of interesting articles on 113 the subject from the pen of Milyukov has been published recently in the Parisian Russian daily newspaper *Posledniya Novosti* (The Latest News), 19 March–1 April 1939. For the Ukrainian point of view see D. Doroshenko, *Istoriya Ukrainy* (1917–23), Uzhhorod, 1935; Vinnichenko, *Vozrozhdenie Natsii* (The Resurrection of a Nation), vols. I–III, Vienna, 1925.

(4) *The Ukrainians at Brest-Litovsk*

A vivid description of the course of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations and of the part played by the delegates of the *Rada* is given in the scholarly work of J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, *Brest-Litovsk: The Forgotten Peace*, London, 1938. An Appendix gives the text of the Peace Treaty with the Ukraine, and a valuable Bibliography is included.

The reminiscences of the leading personalities at Brest-Litovsk have been published in English translations: Hoffmann, *War Diaries and Other Papers*, London, 1929; Czernin, *In the World War*, London, 1919; Trotsky, *History of the Russian Revolution to Brest-Litovsk*, London, 1919; *My Life*, London, 1935.

(5) *The First 'Siege' of Kiev by the Bolsheviks*

This 'siege' continued for about ten days—from 30 January to 8 February 669 1918. The first Bolshevik detachments approached the city from the left bank of the Dniepr. The city is situated on the high right bank and presented a perfect target for the Red artillery. Most of the damage was done by an armoured train mounting naval guns, which destroyed, among other architectural features, the block of flats built by Professor Hrushevsky when he decided to settle in the city. When other Bolshevik detachments and the 'Ukrainian regiments' which had gone over to them appeared on the right bank, further resistance became impossible. The brunt of the defence was borne, not by the supporters of Holubovich and Vinnichenko, but by volunteer detachments consisting of officers, students and even schoolboys; many young lives were lost.

(6) *The Austro-German Occupation of the Ukraine and the Régime of Skoropadsky*

Most interesting material is revealed in the documents published by the 727 Soviets in an anonymous book entitled *Krakh Nemetskoy Okkupatsii na* 642● *Ukraine: Sbornik Dokumentov izdannykh Gosizdatom* (The Crash of the German Occupation in the Ukraine: Collection of Documents published by the State 113 Publishing Organization), Moscow, 1936. There is no reason to doubt the authenticity of these documents which fell into the hands of the Bolsheviks after they occupied Kiev (some of the documents are reproduced in facsimile). It will be difficult, however, for the reader to agree with the deductions made by the Soviet editor. He affirms, for instance, that the Occupation troops were unable to deal with the resistance of 'the great popular masses', and that whole German divisions were employed in putting down workmen's strikes and peasant risings. These assertions are not confirmed by any document. In the documents reference is only made to the assassination of

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727 isolated landowners and to the sending of punitive detachments to certain districts.

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113 The principal reason for the downfall of the German occupation of the Ukraine was, of course, the defeat of the German Armies on the Western Front. The 8th of August is the date which marks a break in the frame of mind of the German Command in Kiev. This can be noted in the documents published in Germany: *Die Rückführung des Ostheeres*, Berlin, 1936.

Wheeler-Bennett describes the situation in the Ukraine in these terms: 'The early months of the Skoropadsky regime were marked by a substantial economic revival; the landowners, industrialists and bourgeois being anxious to co-operate with the new government and the agencies of the Germans and Austro-Hungarians.... Passive resistance in certain districts was coupled with acts of sabotage in others. In Odessa an aeroplane factory was set on fire, numerous munition dumps were exploded and trains wrecked.'

See also on the same subject: Pierre Brégy and Prince Serge Obolensky, *L'Ukraine—Terre Russe*, Paris, 1939, pp. 207–8. (Eng. translation, London, 1940.)

(7) *Activities of the Bolshevik 'Peace Delegation' in Kiev*

727 The German authorities were well informed of the subversive activities of the Soviet 'Peace Delegation' in Kiev, but they ignored them—as they ignored the assassination of their Ambassador, Count Mirbach in Moscow, and of their Commander-in-Chief, Field-Marshal Eichhorn in Kiev, in order to avoid the precipitation of a further conflict with the Soviet Government at the moment of crisis on the Western Front. In order to produce incontrovertible proof of the Soviet activities, the Hetman's Minister of the Interior, Igor Kistyanovsky, had recourse to a very original mode of action. With the aid of the Ukrainian police, he arranged 'a brigands' attack on the train in which Rakovski and Manuilsky were returning to Moscow. In order to give reality to the attack 'the brigands' confiscated all the valuables and personal possessions of the two delegates, together with the mass of compromising documents which Kistyanovsky desired to lay hands on and which he afterwards presented to Baron Mumm for perusal. The revelations failed, however, to change the German attitude.

(8) *Revolution and Civil War in the Ukraine*, 1919–20

113 Ukrainian historians of the Revolution and Civil War are often exceedingly biased in their accounts of military operations; see, for instance, Doroshenko, *Istoriya Ukrainy*, quoted above. General Denikin, also, cannot set aside his prejudices in writing of the 'Petlyurians' who not infrequently fought on his side against the Soviet forces; see General A. Denikin, *Ocherki Russkoy Smuty* (Sketches of the Russian Trouble), vols. I–V, Berlin, 1925–9.

Much interesting material concerning the Volunteer Army is to be found in the almanack published in Berlin: *Beloe Delo* (The White Cause), vols. I–VI, 1924–7. In the Soviet periodical, *Voyna i Revolutsia* (War and Revolution), 1932–5, many episodes of the fighting against the 'Whites', the 'Petlyurians' and the Poles are described.

For the Anglo-French intervention see James Bunyan, *Intervention, Civil War and Communism in Russia*, 1918, Baltimore, 1936.

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CHAPTER ONE

The Background of the Communist Triumph

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No idea could be more erroneous than that the triumph of Communism in Ukraine and the destruction of the Ukrainian National Republic, which had declared its independence on January 22, 1918. was the choice of the Ukrainian people themselves. It did not suit their desires or their interests, and the methods which Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin adopted to master Ukraine were essentially the same as those by which the iron curtain has been pushed steadily to the west. Ukraine was the testing ground for the development of the Communist methods of conquest, just as it has been the testing ground for all the Communist methods of control of their helpless satellites.

From the moment when he arrived in Petrograd in April, 1917, Lenin commenced a policy of disintegration. The collapse of tsarist Russia had destroyed all of the organized forces of law and order throughout the empire, and it was no easy task to restore these in an area where there had not been allowed for centuries a popular government resting upon the will of the people and staffed by experienced democratic administrators. Under such conditions, Lenin's propaganda of self-determination for all the peoples of the empire fell upon ready ears, as did his efforts to promote class conflict on every hand. At the same time his promises to the Great Russians constantly called, under one guise or another, for the restoration of Russian unity even while his talk of internationalism and the Communist International seemed to imply a world Communist regime in which all peoples would be equal. It was this policy of lying and deceiving until the moment for successful armed intervention came that gave him the dominating position.

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648 He enjoyed an immense advantage in the fact that the civil war between the Whites and the Reds was largely fought on Ukrainian territory and thus compelled the young Ukrainian government to fight upon two fronts throughout the entire period, while for some time the new republic was forced also to oppose the Poles in the [131] west. Lying as Ukraine did on the shore of the Black Sea, the armed forces of General Denikin, who was heading the effort to create an anti-Communist monolithic Russian government, could only reach Moscow by crossing Ukrainian territory. It was only across Ukrainian territory that the supplies sent to him by the Western nations after the ending of World War I could be delivered and it was his policy to allow no manifestation of Ukrainianism in any form, for he intended to continue that denial of Ukrainian existence that had characterized the old tsarist regime.

His efforts in this direction were aided by the unfortunate failure of the Western democratic powers which had triumphed in the war to understand either the nature of Bolshevism or the desires of the various national movements. At the same time his success was rendered impossible by the refusal of the West to back him in his efforts to restore all or most of the social and political order which had vanished with the abdication of the Tsar.

Thus with the White Russians and the Ukrainians locked in a desperate struggle, the way was open for Lenin to move with relative freedom on his path of disintegration and of conquest. He did not fail to take advantage of every opportunity, and the advances and retreats during the period from 1917 to 1920 and even later were but a preliminary for the later tactics of Communism.

On the other hand it cannot be denied that there existed in Ukraine certain factors which also worked to his advantage. The political and social system prevailing up to 1917 had not given any training in self-government to the Ukrainian people and in the midst of war and revolution they had to start on the most elementary tasks of popular education, while at the same time they corrected fundamental abuses in the economic situation and created and administered a government. Let us, therefore, look briefly at

CHAPTER TWO

The Foundation of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic

186 642 665 As the power of the Provisional Government in Petrograd declined and more and more responsibility was assumed by the Central Rada in Kiev, relations between Petrograd and Kiev grew rapidly worse and the conception of Ukrainian independence gained strength in all circles, except among the Russian population of Ukraine. The seizure of power in Petrograd by Lenin could not fail to hasten the progress of separation.

During the summer and autumn of 1917 Lenin had advocated the widest application of the principle of self-determination and encouraged the non-Russian peoples to demand separation from the Provisional Government. He and his friends had hardly come into power, when he showed at once the cynicism and hypocrisy of his entire policy. The Central Rada in Kiev and the vast majority of the soviets in Ukraine repudiated the demand for the confiscation of all property, the expropriation of the land and the turning over of the control of all industry to the workers, although in the Third Universal it did provide for "state control over production in the interests of Ukraine and Russia" and declared that all land not worked directly by the owners was to become the property of the workers. For all intents and purposes, the Third Universal which was issued on November 20, 1917, did its best to separate Ukrainian affairs from Bolshevik control without as yet resorting to a declaration of formal independence.

This produced a very unsatisfactory situation, for the Bolsheviks attacked the efforts of the Secretary of the Rada for Military Affairs to effect an understanding with the old Russian Army

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186 Headquarters at Mohylev and with the other national groups which 642 were rapidly making common cause with the Central Rada in 665 their opposition to the extreme measures of the Petrograd Soviet. The Council of Commissars in Petrograd claimed to speak for the whole of the former Russia in its efforts to make peace with the Germans. When the Rada denied this and approached the other non-Russian peoples, the Bolsheviks in Petrograd formally accused the Rada of withdrawing Ukrainian troops from the front, of disarming Bolshevik units in Ukraine and of allowing the Don Cossack forces to retire to their homeland across Ukrainian territory. On December 17, it hypocritically recognized the right of Ukraine to independence but threatened war on the Rada if it did not meet the conditions of the Council of People's Commissars.

At the same time the Bolsheviks in the Kiev Soviet arranged an All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets in the hope of putting pressure on the Rada. The attempt missed fire for the Congress proved to be under the influence of the anti-Bolshevik parties and adopted resolutions declaring that the Ukrainians had not thrown off the power of the Tsar to accept the domination of the Commissars. The Bolshevik spokesman Zatonsky was unable to make himself heard above the opposition and only 80 members supported the Soviet demands.

As a result of this failure Vasili Shakhray and Zatonsky left Kiev for Kharkiv where they joined a Congress of Soviets largely from the Donets basin and Kryvy Rih. There, on December 20, they established a new Ukrainian Rada under Russian Communist control and set up a Ukrainian Soviet Republic. They were joined by a group of Ukrainian Bolsheviks including Neronovych and George Kotsyubynsky, the son of the well-known Ukrainian author who had been a friend of Gorky.

[701] The so-called Ukrainian army loyal to this new regime was composed almost exclusively of Russian troops and was under the open command of a Russian officer, Michael A. Muravyev. This force occupied Kiev on February 7, 1918 and held the city for about three weeks. Its actions showed clearly the nature of the government. Under the pretext of liberating the Ukrainians from

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the control of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie and the Rada, it abolished 186
all Ukrainian newspapers and its disorderly elements not only 642 ●
executed members of the Ukrainian and Russian bourgeoisie but 665
also Ukrainian Communists and radicals who used the Ukrainian language in their hearing.

In the meantime the Bolsheviks had opened negotiations with 648
the Germans in Brest-Litovsk where Trotsky claimed to speak for 186
the entire former Russian Empire. To circumvent this, the Rada 642
formally declared the full independence of Ukraine and sent dele- 665
gates to the peace conference. As a balance to this, Trotsky intro-
duced into the conference the representatives of this new Ukrainian [728]
Soviet Republic who claimed to be the spokesmen for the Ukrainian peasants and proletariat. Their arguments did not convince the Germans and Austrians, who saw greater possibilities of profit by recognizing the Ukrainian National Republic, so as to secure without fighting a large part of the Ukrainian grain supplies. The Ukrainian National Republic signed this agreement with misgivings, for, in fact, it threw the Rada into the power of the Germans and ended all chance of assistance from the Allied democratic powers which had previously regarded Lenin as the tool of the German General Staff. Now, with the conclusion of this peace, they extended their ill-will to the Ukrainian Central Rada.

The immediate result was German assistance to the Rada and the Soviet forces were quickly forced out of Ukraine and back into Great Russian territory. The leaders of the Ukrainian Soviet government were members of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and could not raise the question as to whether or not their new state was actually independent, and whether it could be, if it did not have its own Communist Party associated on a par with the Russian Party in the Communist International.

This brief Communist interlude in Ukraine should have been most instructive to both the Allied powers and the Germans, but neither drew the true lessons from it. The Allies, who were still opposed to the principles of Bolshevism and were annoyed by the speeches of Zinovyev and Chicherin, became more friendly disposed to the Russian Whites and gave up their efforts to win through

648 invoking the democratic principles of self-determination the support
186 of any of the non-Russian peoples. The Germans, on the other
642 hand, after aiding the Rada to return, dispersed it on the ground
665 that it was too radical, but when a more conservative regime was
set up under Hetman Skoropadsky, they did not give this honest support. They sought only for Ukrainian supplies and by their actions they weakened the power of the Hetman and strengthened discontent against his regime without allowing him to do anything that would weaken the power of the Communists.

The situation became almost ridiculously complicated. Germany, anxious to secure troops for the Western Front, was, by the spring of 1918, at peace with both the Commissars of Moscow and the government of Ukraine. It was therefore opposed to both the White Russians and the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. Even the Czechoslovaks on their way to Vladivostok, thanks to the negotiations between President Masaryk and Muravyev, were on friendly terms with the Ukrainian Communists and had difficulties with the Ukrainian government and the Germans. As soon as they crossed into the Russian Soviet Republic, they had difficulties with the Russian Communists and the Germans and found their support among a part of the White Russians. It was the same situation as in the far north where the Germans backed the White Finnish forces under Mannerheim against the red Finns who were the favored party of their friend and associate, Moscow. Yet all the time there was no Ukrainian Communist Party, for the Ukrainian Communists owed their prime allegiance to the Russian Communist Party which was, in theory at least, on the opposite side in the general disturbed situation.

To the Communists, as Skrypnyk, Shakhray and George Pyatakov who had played an important role in the Communist occupation of Kiev, this seemed a serious gap and at a meeting in Tahanrih in April they triumphed over the Communists from Katerynoslav who had insisted upon remaining merely a part of the Russian Communist Party. Their victory was of short duration, for when there came an organization meeting in Moscow on July 5, the Russian authorities definitely made it clear that they would not tolerate

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the existence of a Ukrainian Communist Party. Bela Kun warned 648
that in the international civil war that was to be begun, great 186
efforts were to be made not to allow it to assume anything of a 642
national character, but to keep it restricted and fought on class 665
lines. They were also informed that they could in this new struggle have no relations with Mensheviks or any Ukrainian Social Revolutionists or Social Democrats. A few months later Stalin was elected to the Central Committee of the Ukrainian branch of the Russian party as a symbol of the dependence in which the party was to be kept.

The first people to appreciate fully the dilemma in which the Ukrainian Communists found themselves were the Ukrainian Communist leaders who had established, with Russian help, the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. They were quickly taught that as long as the control of their Party was not in their own hands, they were completely helpless and at the mercy of the Russians.

Shakhray, who had endeavored to argue at Kiev in December, 1917 that the Ukrainian Communists were to be counted as Ukrainians, very soon in Russia became so disgusted that he resigned from the Russian Communist Party and retired to Saratov to establish a Ukrainian Communist Party of Bolsheviks. He criticized the extreme policy of centralization carried on by the Russian Communists.

Along with S. Mazlakh, he published a book entitled *The Wave—What is being done in Ukraine and with Ukraine.* This book, which was often quoted later by Skrypnyk and his associates, was the theoretical basis for Ukrainian Communism. Shakhray tried to foster discontent against the regime of Hetman Skoropadsky by stressing his relations with both the German forces in Ukraine and the White Russian refugees who had taken shelter in that country. He declared that Ukrainian independence could only be consistently won by the Ukrainian Communists, for they, as the Ukrainian proletariat, were the only people who could advocate and carry through a real revolution in view of the treachery of the bourgeoisie. On the other hand, he attributed the Communist failure in Ukraine to the fact that the Party was entirely under

648 Russian control and looked at the cause of the Communists through
186 the eyes of the Russian colonists in Ukraine who were, in accord-
642 ance with the Russian imperialistic tradition, working not for
665 Ukraine but for Moscow.

He soon left Saratov for Kuban and here he was captured and killed by the Denikin forces. Mazlakh, who had remained a member of the Russian Communist Party, was later shot by them for nationalism. The third Commissar for War, Neronovych, became disillusioned and on the entrance of German troops into Ukraine he gave up politics but he fell into the hands of the Ukrainian National Army and was shot. Thus, the first attempts of the Russian Communist Party to seize Ukraine and expel the Ukrainian National government ended disastrously and relatively few of the early leaders survived. Most of them paid the penalty for their actions to one of the contending forces, with the Bolsheviks executing then or later the larger number.

During the summer of 1918 while Hetman Skoropadsky remained in power, the chief work which the Communists could hope to do in Ukraine was through their mission in Kiev under the leadership of D. Z. Manuilsky. This was ostensibly engaged in negotiations for a definite peace treaty between the Ukrainian National Republic and the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic. In reality, Manuilsky was almost openly intriguing with the tacit consent of the Germans who had no desire to see their own position in Moscow jeopardized, as their armies were being driven back on the Western Front. Manuilsky was also able to notice the constant splitting of the leftist Ukrainian parties, which, in their hostility to the policies of the Hetman, tended to move nearer to the Communist position.

The disintegration in both the Social Revolutionist and the Social Democrat ranks became steadily more marked during the summer of 1918. When the German armies collapsed and the Hetman could no longer retain his post, a Directory of five men, including Petlyura and Vynnychenko, set themselves up at the news of the abdication of the German Emperor and they soon recovered Kiev. At the same time the left wing of the Social

Revolutionists (Borotbisty) refused to recognize the new Directory and drifted rapidly toward the Bolshevik position. 648 186

The Kremlin, sensing the great change in the Ukrainian situation, at once refurbished the idea of a Ukrainian Soviet Republic. 642 665 Its real head was now Christian Rakovsky, a Rumanian with Bulgarian citizenship who had never been in Ukraine, but its nominal leaders were Pyatakov and George Kotsyubynsky. These moved from Kursk along the railroad lines into Ukraine at the end of December but Chicherin, in his telegrams to the Directory, categorically denied that the Russians were supporting this movement in any way. He laid all the responsibility upon the Ukrainian Communists. The ruse did not work and finally on January 16, 1919, the Directory, in which Vynnychenko's star was sinking, declared war.

This was opposed by the left wing of the Social Democrats who were very influential in the Directory. On January 10-12, the two wings definitely parted and the left adopted the name of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party (Independent) and insisted upon the establishment of a non-Communist Soviet Republic. The right wing, in view of the weakness of the Ukrainian proletariat, advocated instead a Congress of Workers which would include both peasants and the city proletariat. When war actually started, the left wing split again between those who were willing to stand for an independent Ukraine and those who refused to act against Russia under any circumstances. The latter took the name of USDRP (Independent Lefts).

It was not long before the Borotbisty and the USDRP (Independent Lefts) began negotiations for merging. Both were convinced of the superiority of the Soviet form of democratic government and both were convinced that any Communist government would inevitably recognize the essential rights of the Ukrainian people. In this respect they were far more naive than were the leaders of the first Ukrainian Communist regime who had already become completely disillusioned at the contrast between the theories and the practice of Lenin and his associates. They refused to cooperate with Petlyura and the Directory and, in effect, they with-

648 drew from its support a considerable section of the Ukrainian in-
186 tellectuals at a crucial moment.

● 642 On the other hand, with their own armies they fought against
665 the White Russians of Denikin, because they saw in these merely an attempt to restore the old order. Yet they declined to be included in the organized army of the Directory and by their independent actions they made more difficult the burden of the army commanders. They encouraged the formation in the country of independent military bands which added to the growing chaos. To emphasize their position they again changed their name to the Ukrainian Communist Party (Borotbisty) and constantly sought to ingratiate themselves with the Ukrainian branch of the Russian Communist Party which had again succeeded in reoccupying Kiev and in forcing the Directory to flee.

On the other hand, the USDRP (Independents), almost as true admirers of the Soviet system but far more critical of the Russian influence, did merge their forces for the fighting against Denikin with the forces of the Directory. In the summer of 1919, this group, under the influence of the Khmelevtsevs of Kobilyaky in Poltavshchyna, commenced again to review their position. After the death of their leaders in a crossing of the Dnieper and after the defeat of Denikin, they decided to adopt the appellation of Communists and to rename themselves the Ukrainian Communist Party without any additional description title. Thus, they took the name of Ukapisty and as such they dragged on an independent existence for some years, confidently expecting that they would ultimately receive national and international recognition from the Comintern, the Communist International.

This endless splitting and regrouping of the various parties proved a headache to the Directory which was trying to organize the country for defense against both of the Russian invaders. The individual armed forces, acting independently, aided in wrecking the economy and this inspired peasant leaders of various kinds to seek the control of their own native regions. Some of these men proved themselves able, if short-sighted, leaders. Some, as Nestor Makhno, were unadulterated anarchists who saw no need of any

central regime. Others were mere adventurers thrown into prom- 648
inence by the course of events and willing to shift their principles 186
for the sake of a momentary personal advantage. Others were 642
patriots with no broader vision than their home districts. 665

As a result, throughout 1919 there were some 328 revolts against the extending power of the Russian Communist forces which were fanning out over Ukraine, slaughtering and robbing as they went but still unable to secure a definite control of the villages.

As opposed to this welter of conflicting ideals, the policy of the Russian dominated Ukrainian branch of the Russian Communist Party was simplicity and clarity itself. This supported the paper independence of the Ukrainian Soviet regime and openly avowed its intention of subjugating the country and of exploiting it for the benefit of Moscow. Their purposes were even openly avowed at the Moscow Soviet of Workers' Deputies on March 22, 1919, when Shlikhter, a Ukrainian German and one of the commissars appointed by Moscow to collect grain, declared: "You all remember how Ukraine began to become Soviet; with every day of the advance of the Red Army, we and you felt more easy; the rich grain-producing Ukraine is ours. We have four central military divisions collecting and on them we rest all our hopes. We have a mass of workmen sent in (from Moscow to Ukraine), who know how to search all the Ukrainian villages. We always remember that the eyes of the proletariat of Russia are turned toward Ukraine."

These remarks represented the cynical attitude of Lenin and the Communists. They ignored the statements as to a Ukrainian Soviet Republic that were being made by Lenin and others to woo the various leftist Ukrainian parties. They were safe speeches made to reassure the Great Russians that the Bolsheviks still had a monolithic outlook, even though they were prepared to go to almost any lengths to create a paper regime which would insure and facilitate the plundering of the rich grain-producing Ukraine. They told, more or less, the truth, that was not recognized by the more idealistic theoreticians, that the Ukrainian Communists were, in fact, the dupes and victims of the Moscow regime which cared nothing for the Ukrainian people, or even the Ukrainian proletariat.

Ukraine Under the Soviets

648 By the end of 1919 the Ukrainian Soviet regime was so satis-
186 fied with the success of its raiding and collecting parties that it felt
642 able to proclaim an amnesty and to disarm the population com-
665 pletely. To accomplish the latter purpose, new Russian forces were sent into the country, the villages were thoroughly searched and disarmed. The peasants were tiring of the apparently endless exactions of the independent commanders and they turned against many of the patriotic partisan bands and declined to give them further support. This broke the movement and even the alliance of Petlyura with the Poles and the short occupation of Kiev by the combined armies in the spring of 1920 did not suffice to restore the old enthusiasm for the hard-pressed Directory.

By the end of 1920, when the Russian and Ukrainian Soviet delegations met the Poles in Riga in October, 1920, the fighting was nearly over. The Poles signed a treaty of peace without consulting their Ukrainian allies of the Ukrainian National Republic. There was nothing for the forces of the Directory to do but to retire abroad and continue their unsuccessful efforts to secure Western assistance. This was not forthcoming. The French were interested in aggrandizing Poland as a bulwark against Germany; the other allies were openly supporting Denikin through a misinterpreted friendship with the Russian people and there did not seem to be left even a spark of the principles enunicated but a short time before in Wilson's attitude toward self-determination and the rights of people to govern themselves. The struggle was ended and the Ukrainians were left at the mercy of their Russian overlords, now back in a new guise.

471 industry and factories by the workers and they did their best to inflame the workers and peasants against the great landlords and the factory owners and administrators. In this they succeeded admirably and the already low standard of living in the Russian Empire began to drop lower and lower.

Under such conditions it became more and more necessary for the Soviet leaders in Moscow to make renewed efforts to master Ukraine and to inject some apparent vitality into their puppet, the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. In this they were finally successful, but even though the Communists came back into Ukraine, they did not venture to destroy the fiction of Ukrainian independence, although they had no intention of allowing it to develop.

642 From the moment of its formation and adoption of a Com-
648 munist Constitution on March 14, 1919, the Ukrainian Soviet Republic declared itself an independent and sovereign state. It was recognized with all due pomp and formality by Lenin, who again stressed it in his *Letters to the Workmen and Peasants of Ukraine* in his efforts to strengthen the opposition to Denikin. The Ukrainian Soviet Government was represented at the Conference in Riga that ended the Soviet-Polish War in the fall of 1920. The travesty was continued when, in December of the same year, Lenin concluded with the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic a formal treaty of alliance in which Ukraine, for purposes of defense, graciously handed over to Moscow the commissariats of war, navy, foreign trade, railroads, finances, labor, posts and telegraphs and the Supreme Council of National Economy. It still retained the right to have its own diplomatic representatives in Poland, Germany and Austria, countries which had recognized the Ukrainian National Republic, and there were still preserved Ukrainian military schools to train officers for the Ukrainian army in both Kharkiv, the capital of Soviet Ukraine, and Kiev.

Still all this was merely a sham arrangement, for the bulk of the forces that fought against the Ukrainian National Republic were Russian and they operated with no regard for the feelings even of the Ukrainian Communists. They moved at will over Ukrainian territory, collected supplies at will and shipped them to Russia and they behaved in every way as if they were in their own territory. 642 648

The key to this enigma[1] is to be found in the fact that the Ukrainian Communist Party was not regarded as an independent Communist Party with a seat in the Comintern, but was merely a branch of the Russian Communist Party. Its officers were therefore appointed at will and changed at the pleasure of the Russian Party. Its discipline and actions were controlled by Moscow and any independent Ukrainian development could be countermanded by a mere word from the centre. By this extremely simple device Lenin could maintain his hold over the Ukrainian Communists, even in the unlikely case that the Comintern was revitalized by the Communist seizure of power in another of the large states. 665

The policy did not fail to arouse criticism, even during the wars, by some of the Ukrainian members of the Party. In 1920, a "fraction of the federalists" was formed under Yu. Lapchynsky with the aid of S. Kirychenko, P. Slynko and E. Kasyanenko. It was naturally dissolved as soon as its importance was recognized, and its leaders were expelled from the Party. They accordingly joined the Ukapisty and only returned when that voluntarily liquidated itself some years later.

There were thus at the moment of the ending of the Civil Wars three Communist Parties in Ukraine, the official KP/b/U, the branch of the Russian Party, the Ukrainian Communist Party (Borotbisty) and the Ukapisty, i.e. the Ukrainian Communist Party.

The Borotbisty were the first to go. They had been formed out of the Left Social Revolutionists and were less sure of their Marxian knowledge but they contained many of the leftist Ukrainian intellectuals who valued the development of Ukrainian culture. The group had been praised by Lenin for its great part in the defeat of Denikin. In the spring of 1920, the proposal was made that they fully join the Ukrainian Branch of the Russian Communist Party. Shumsky and Blakytny led the affirmative. The spokesmen for the opposition were Poloz and Panas Lyubchenko, who was later to be the head of the UkSSR and to commit suicide in 1937. The

[1] [sham independence of Ukraine from 1919 on --Analyst]

leaders, like Rakovsky, had little appreciation of Ukrainian life. 517 Few of them understood the language and they preferred to work [645] through the Russians in the cities and the Donets basin. They were, however, still unable to deal advantageously with the villages where the Ukrainian population was chiefly congregated and they allowed the former Borotbisty to secure key positions in the People's Commissariat for Education. Thus it came about that the one commissariat which could exert the most direct influence on the cultural life of the country was the one in which the Ukrainian influence was strongest.

The time was not propitious for the publication of works of large size and of high artistic value. The years 1919, 1920 and 1921 were years of turmoil when nothing seemed to be real and permanent except death and violence of every kind. The mere struggle for existence was so intense that it absorbed the energy of almost the entire population and the economic decay spread like a creeping paralysis over the land. To the destruction of the civil wars [669] and of the fighting with Denikin were now added the ravages of the Communist detachments, which swarmed over the country seeking for food to take to the north to save the Russians.

In the early months it would be hardly fair to talk of a Com- 642 munist system of government, for while the theorists were debating [661] as to how they should build socialism and Communism, armed Communist bands organized under the Red Army or under the Cheka (the Extraordinary Committee for Suppression of the Counter-Revolution) indulged in mass terror, murder and robbery.

The measures adopted in Petrograd and Moscow for the dis- 423 tribution of the land were ill adapted for the Ukrainian situation[1] 369 It was only natural that these were applied with a certain amount of peasant approval at the expense of the larger Russian and Polish landlords, many of whom had cooperated with the Germans. This was the more natural because in pre-war days the bulk of the grain that had been exported from Ukraine had come from these estates and, as everywhere in peasant Europe, the confiscation and division of the land among the peasants reduced the amount of food stuffs available for the urban population.

[1] [of Ukrainian Soviet Republic, 1919 -- Analyst]

show profits. The very small shops and plants were in some cases 185
taken back by their former owners when they had survived and any 471
provisions about the use of hired labor were tacitly forgotten in the first flush of the New Economic Policy.

All of these measures were interpreted by the great mass of the Ukrainian people as a recognition of the validity of human experience. There were, of course, keen realists who gave full credence to the declarations of Lenin that the Soviets had never wavered in their objections and were using these concessions only as a means of reviving the life of the country and strengthening their own position. At first this did not seem to be true and it was only as conditions really settled down and a semblance of prosperity returned that it became possible to note the steadily increasing pressure which the government exerted.

In the same way the currency reforms were not without their 185
own influence. In 1923 the government introduced a new cur- 652
rency, the chervonets, which was ostensibly based on a gold stand- 435
ard, to take the place of the old depreciated paper. Nevertheless, the latter was allowed to circulate in the rural districts with the result that its value continued to fall and it became more and more difficult for the peasants to satisfy their needs for manufactured goods which were priced in the new currency. This produced the so-called "scissors," for with the restoration of industry, the value of manufactures continued to rise, while the prices of agricultural products continually fell.

The political system was still not clear.[4] The new regulations 642
were introduced in the Council of Commissars in Moscow and it 665
was emphatically stated that they were for the Russian Soviet 645
Federated Socialist Republic, but Ukraine and also the other Soviet Republics put into practice the same resolutions, often without any decree by the ostensibly independent government.

The key to this enigma lay in the nature of Communist discipline. In theory and on paper the Soviet regime was thoroughly democratic in the broad sense of the word. There was an elaborate scheme of elections to the village and the higher Soviets, and even though this was weighted very heavily to provide increased repre-

[During NEW ECONOMIC POLICY -- Analyst]

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● 642 sentation for the city proletariat where the Communists felt themselves strongest, it was always possible to defend the system.

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645 Yet this does not tell the full story, for though non-party men were elected to the lower and local Soviets, the number of Communists increased steadily in the higher. These Communists were themselves classified as members of the Ukrainian branch of the Russian Communist Party and they were bound by party discipline to obey all the instructions given by the Executive Committee of the Russian Communist Party.

There was thus, in reality, two governments in both Ukraine and the Russian Republic. There was first the republic government theoretically responsible to the people and thus transmitting the wishes of the people upward, even though the highest republic authorities were the direct appointees of Moscow. There was likewise the domination, more or less veiled, of the Communist Party, a government which only transmitted instructions from the top down. In the early days, and indeed for a considerable period, it is often difficult to determine whether certain measures came into effect because they had been approved by the Council of Commissars in Moscow or because they had the backing of the Executive Committee of the Russian Communist Party which was a monolithic organization, responsible only to its chiefs. It was in a sense a theoretical question for, by the period of the New Economic Policy, the Council of Commissars, the Executive Committee of the Russian Communist Party and the control of the Communist International rested in the hands of the same men who functioned in three different capacities but still formed a well-knit body. Even though the legal relations between Ukraine and Russia rested on the vague treaties and agreements made during the period of Militant Communism and the civil wars, the Ukrainian Soviet government could be practically overruled at any moment and on any point on which it disagreed with the wishes of Moscow.

665 Since all non-Communist organizations had been dissolved[1] the only possible opposition could come from the Ukapisty, the Ukrainian Communist Party. This was composed of a small number of brilliant men, confirmed Communists, who insisted upon preserving

[1] [After establishing Ukraine Soviet Republic, A19 --Analyst]

the independence of the Ukrainian Communist regime in the hope that sooner or later they would be admitted to the Communist International as an independent national Communist Party. They therefore willingly accepted the doctrines of the International, which was little more than the third facet of the ruling block. By 1925 the situation had so far developed that their aspirations for this were definitely checked and even this theoretical opposition was eliminated by compelling the Ukapisty to enter into the Ukrainian Section of the Russian Communist Party, or else. 665

This situation makes clear the relations that existed between Ukraine and Russia during the early years of the New Economic Policy. As agriculture and industry revived in Ukraine, it was suggested that the Ukrainian government send aid to its Communist brothers. That suggestion was a command, and just as the Muscovite bands under Militant Communism scoured Ukraine for food, so under the New Economic Policy, the so-called Ukrainian government began to drain off the wealth of the country for the charitable purpose of helping its Russian brothers. 661

The vagueness and the ambiguity of this system was partially cleared up by the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The treaty establishing this was signed on December 30, 1922, just as Lenin was becoming paralyzed and unable to function efficiently. It bound together the various Soviet Republics, while at the same time it paid lip service to the right of any of these Republics to secede. Of course, this was from the beginning an empty phrase, for the only people who had the power to declare the secession was the Council of Soviets of the Federal Republic and they were Communists assigned to their posts by Moscow and bound to obey the orders of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. In addition to this, a surprising number of the ruling group of the Russian Soviet Republic now took over the corresponding posts in the Union and thus added still a fourth facet to their varied activity. 631

The Constitution, which was formally adopted at a Union Congress of Soviets on July 6, 1923, went still further in providing for the government of the Union. The Commissariats were divided 631 642 645

631 into three classes: Union, Joint and Republic. Thus, those of
642 Foreign Affairs, Armed Forces, Foreign Trade, Communications,
645 Water Transport, Posts and Telegraphs, Heavy Industry, Light
Industry, Supply and Timber had full control over the corresponding sections in the federal republics. Those of Internal Trade, Labor, Finance and Workers' and Peasants' Inspection were nominally joint commissariats but, in case of a dispute between the Union and the Republic commissariats, the rights of the former were supreme. The remaining commissariats, Interior, Justice, Education, Health, Agriculture, and Social Welfare were still left under the Executive Committee of the Republic Supreme Soviet. It was thus very evident that, except in a few fields, the powers of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic to decide its own destiny were practically non-existent.

It goes quite without saying that it was these local commissariats which attracted the Communists of Ukrainian origin, whether or not they belonged to the Ukapisty or had joined the Ukrainian Section of the Russian Communist Party as former members of the Borotbisty. This was a very important development in the next decade in Ukrainian history and it was due to the relative freedom of the Commissariat of Education that the Ukrainian cultural renaissance took the form which it did.

655 At the same time, despite all the verbiage and the apparent
327 exceptions, it was abundantly clear from the very beginning that
185 the economic system of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic was to be
bound hand and foot to the Moscow regime and that its financial and industrial potentialities would be treated as Moscow wished.

It was relatively simple to deal with industry. The development of the coal and iron resources of Ukraine were simply transferred to Moscow control and it was practically impossible for the Ukrainians to express any opinion as to the form which that development would take. The Russian directors of the trusts could make such contracts as they desired and carry them out without regard to the wishes of the local population or the workmen.

432 Agriculture was a little more difficult. The decree of 1921,
241 which had started the New Economic Policy, provided for the
185

656 had profited by the operation of the Ukrainian land code which,
471 as we have seen, was less rigid than were the similar arrangements
661 in the RSFSR, where the land society was organized far more on
[427] the lines of a collective than it was in Ukraine. It was always possible to apply individually any of the laws against the leasing of land or the employment of hired help, for in both cases the provisions had been left vague and indefinite, so that the authorities could act whenever they so desired. As a matter of fact, as one of the first measures the administration of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic reduced the period on which a lease could be made from thirteen to six years and thus it was easily possible to upset many of the calculations that had been made by the richer and more progressive landowners.

[435] At the same time[1] the closing of the official markets rendered it possible for the government to force the peasants to dispose of their grain at the officially pegged prices which in the grain-growing districts were considerably lower than they were in the less fertile areas of the north. If this did not produce the desired results, it was equally possible to demand the grain tax in kind and to compel the peasants to turn over, free of charge and under the guise of payments, additional supplies. All these measures, which were introduced in many cases personally and not by districts, caused the peasants to feel themselves becoming steadily more impoverished and less able to resist the demands of the government.

631
● 642 On the other hand, the All-Union Commissariats which took precedence over those in the individual Soviet republics and which were, in reality, staffed only by Russian Communists, effectively broke the power of the localities or of the republics to have any special voice in the management of their own affairs.[1] This was, in its turn, skilfully explained by stressing the superior requirements of the Union which, on any closer analysis, turned out to be the interests of the Russian area. Thus, at the XVth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), a Russian who was at the time the chief of the Ukrainian State Planning Commission remarked in an unambiguous manner: "It seems to me that we must assign perfectly clear tasks, to emphasize that the national

[1] [1925, during relinquishment of NEP -- Analyst]

republics are to fulfill certain functions in the economic system of 631
our Union, and that on the basis of the fulfillment of a certain 642
mission, which is to be a part of the joint mission—the industrialization of our Union—is to be founded the growth of the economy of the national republics."

In the next few years the sense of these remarks was to become perfectly clear, although it was apparently not noticed even by the more ardent Ukrainian Communists. It was to the effect that the economy of the national republics was to be fitted into the general picture of the Union and that the planning committees were to coordinate their work in such a way that there would be little or no place left for the initiative of the authorities of any republic. This did not require any action by any of the various republican governments, for step by step the central regime in Moscow gradually made more and more of the local Commissariats mere operating agencies under the control of All-Union Commissariats as these were increased in number and in scope by the vote of the Presidium of the Union or by the decisions of the All-Union Communist Party.

In this connection the final liquidation of the Ukapisty as a 665
group in 1925 was significant. They had definitely cherished the hope that sooner or later they would be able to win recognition as a special Ukrainian Communist Party with their own seat in the Communist International. That was now becoming merely a subsidiary organ of the Russian Communist Party and there was no longer any reason for maintaining the fiction of an independent existence. The foreign Communist Parties had definitely sunk to being poor relations of the Russian Party or the All-Union Party. Their representatives were exiles from their native lands under Russian protection and under those conditions they speedily ceased to have any voice in the work of the Comintern, which existed only as a Russian propaganda organ abroad. It was therefore unrealistic for the Ukrainian Communists to build any real hopes on the Comintern or on the building of a separate Ukrainian Communism and the abolition of the Ukapisty was but a formal recognition of this fact.

186 Yet this obvious truth apparently was overlooked by Skrypnyk
631 and, to a lesser extent, even by Khvylovy, who was absorbed in his everwidening discussion of the cultural significance of Ukrainian Communism and the role and mission of the Ukrainian Communists. While these were talking and arguing about certain ideas, the central authorities in Moscow were cleverly laying plans for removing from the field of practical politics and administration the very basis of local government for which they were fighting.

631 In the same way, reform of the administrative divisions was under way with the concealed purpose of changing the boundaries of the local sub-divisions, so that they would have a purely economic basis. This was done by the elimination of the central areas, the *gubernias* and the *okrugs* and the introduction of a two-step system of administration, the *kray* or *oblast* and the *rayon* or region, which was designed on a purely economic purpose and was admirably adapted for the elimination of local and even republic feeling.

By these and other administrative measures the essential features of the New Economic Policy were eliminated but they were done so gradually and locally that a large part of the population only realized the situation when the process was too far advanced to be affected by any scattered protests.

665 At the end of 1927 Trotsky was expelled from the Communist
● 642 Party and this ended the long feud between him and Stalin for the control of the Party. Trotsky had quite consistently fought the New Economic Policy as a needless concession to capitalism and within a few months of his rival's defeat, Stalin reversed his policy and openly adopted a more rigid system of controls similar to those which he had attacked Trotsky for urging.

As a matter of fact the pretext for a distinction between the Soviet government and the Communist Party was wearing thin. It was a needless piece of propaganda, once the regime felt itself sufficiently strong. There was no longer the need of maintaining non-party men in places of apparent authority and with his practical sense, Stalin speedily allowed the system to lapse into the limbo of obscurity and made the Communist Party openly what it was, the dictatorial party dominated directly from Moscow.

The Five Year Plan

Once this was decided, the way was open for the establishment 642 ●
of the First Five Year Plan which was frankly drawn up so entirely 631
in the central offices that the local Commissariats of the different republics ceased to have their former significance in the state and became, for the most part, mere subsidiaries to be watched and checked at every turn or at every manifestation of a tendency toward independence.

There was no longer any talk of the independence of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic with its powers to maintain diplomatic representatives abroad or with the pretense that it was handling its own affairs under the guidance of the All-Union Communist Party. The role of the Russian element in the state kept on increasing and once more it was possible to revive the old arguments as to the need for definite russification.

It was relatively a simple matter for the government to administer industry as it wished. [475]
It had retained control throughout the period of the New Economic Policy of the leading factories and industrial enterprises and the workers had been deprived of any of the rights which they might have imagined themselves possessed when they took over the plants. They were by now completely dependent for their conditions of work and for their employment on the whims of the plant managers who were themselves directly under the central authorities in Moscow. The government built new plants where and as it wished and was not bound to consult any one as to its purposes and measures.

The peasants were less tractable, for especially in Ukraine 423
they still felt themselves the masters of their own fate. The new 474
philosophy[1] looked upon them, too, as the servants of the state and 661
determined[1] to collectivize them in one way or another and to force 425
them into collective farms, whether they wished it or not.

In this process the first step was to break the peasant power of resistance and the regime saw clearly that this was based upon the financial power of the richer and the middle peasants. Whereas Lenin and the earlier Soviet regime in Ukraine had grouped together the middle and the poor peasants and had supported them against the richer peasants and the large landowners, the

[1] [1927- Stalin made Party and Government synonymous -- Analyst]

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

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The Thirties

631 With the completion of the compulsory collectivization, the 642 ending of the famine and the destruction of the Ukrainian cultural renaissance, the country entered a new phase. The position in which it found itself was almost the opposite of the twenties. As, at the end of Militant Communism, the land was ruined and exhausted, so it was again. The number of domestic animals had dropped almost to the level of the earlier period, agriculture had been rendered, prostrate, and material well-being had disappeared as the peasants were forced to labor on the collective farms.

On the other hand, there was none of that excitement and desire for work that had accompanied the introduction and development of the New Economic Policy, when the relaxation of the restrictions and the end of the lawlessness of Militant Communism had restored the possibility of profit to the people and when they could hope to see the results of their own labor.

More than that, the earlier period had been marked by the belief of the Ukrainian Communists that they could find an independent place in the Communist International. Then there was a conflict between those who wished a development of Ukrainian ideals and traditions, a union of the old and the new, and those who adopted a strictly Russian point of view. Now there was only one dominating force—the Russian. It had been made clear that there was to be no open antagonism. The Russian point of view was the only one that could hope to find acceptance in Communism, the Communist International had become a mere adjunct of the Russian Communist Party, all Ukrainian sympathies and expressions were banned, and the Ukrainian spirit was forced on the

631 defensive and compelled to fight a rearguard action for maintaining
642 its existence.

Step by step, Stalin and the Russian Communist Party was changing the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics into a Russian empire with its non-Russian dependencies and, despite the Constitution of the Union and of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, it was becoming ever more and more clear that the latter was to be treated merely as a geographical colony of the new Russian-dominated union, with no attention to its wishes or its needs.[1]

This had been evident from almost the first days of the Five Year Plan. Whatever might have been the original blueprint of this, it early became evident that the Soviet Union could only carry out its work of industrialization and collectivization, if everything were forced into a single plan. In connection with this, the various republic commissariats had been reduced to All-Union commissariats and all independent power of judgment or planning had been removed from the local organs. If it were a question of developing a mine, of building a new factory, of introducing a new and more profitable crop, of constructing a new road or railroad, the authorities of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic had to refer the matter to Moscow and receive the permission to act from the central authorities of the Union. How could it be otherwise?

The central government had assumed the responsibility for the development of the country and it could not carry this on, if the local communities or republics had the power to meet any but the most primitive needs without consultation and permission. Moscow had decided how industry was to be developed, which branches were to be built in the RSFSR, which in Ukraine, which in the other republics. That plan was almost absolute and, warned by the fate of the fallen Communist leaders, the new successors were ultra-cautious in venturing to express an opinion.

[625] The OGPU had been remodelled into the NKVD, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, but this was placed under the same Yagoda who had been the head of the OGPU and he merely assumed greater powers and greater responsibilities for the safeguarding of the Soviet order.

[1] [1930's -After famine --Analyst]

369 511 They could also, if they still had preserved any valuables, dispose of them through the Torgsin stores which sold imported wares for foreign currency and precious metals.

[554] Of course, neither in city or village did any of these restrictions apply to the more important Communists who possessed their own stores at which the government supplied them with the necessary articles to allow them to live in comfort and luxury as a welcome investment for the regime. The line of demarcation between the poor and the rich, the ordinary people and the Communists, became steadily greater, until it was often wider than it had been in the old tsarist Russian empire.

● 642 631 All these measures which had been adopted in Moscow[1] were in theory supposed to apply to all sections of the USSR equally, but it was not long before the natives of Ukraine realized that however impartial the laws might seem, they were not sufficiently flexible to take account of local and republican differences. The central regime was interested in advancing and developing the Moscow industrial area and it expended on this in various grandiose efforts, as the Moscow subway, enormous sums of money. It is safe to say that the expenditures in that one area alone equalled the entire budget and money spent by the central government in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. It classified Ukraine as one of the regions where the supply of manufactured goods was less necessary.

The crushing of the Ukrainian Communists, the suicide of Khvylovy and Skrypnyk, no less than the complete altering of the land code of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the substitution of the new policy of collectivization, showed perfectly well where the real power of the USSR lay in the thirties and it was accompanied by such acts as the introduction of Russian as the [701] standard language of instruction and of the army. This was followed by the formal transfer of the Ukrainian divisions to the Red Army and a number of other acts which completed the subordination of the UkSSR. Already in 1930, during difficulties on the Soviet-Manchuria borders, the Red Army had not hesitated to

[1] [after 1933 - measures dealing with production, supply etc. —[illegible]]

greet the Communist Party with news of its victories and allowed 631
this even to take precedence over a notice to the Soviet govern- 642
ment which had hitherto claimed to be predominant.

To regularize all these changes of practice, Stalin ordered a new constitution and this was approved on December 5, 1936. It was a marvel of inconsistencies, for it was drawn up to express all of the old slogans and the modern facts.

Here was, in Article 17, the old talk of the right of free withdrawal of any Union Republic from the USSR but there was also a provision that the Supreme Soviet could annul any action of any Union Republic contrary to its wishes. There was a careful definition of the three classes of Commissariats but when the book is read critically it is easily seen that the only subjects within the competence of the Union Republics were Education, Local Industry, Communal Economy and Social Security and their decisions could legally be upset by Moscow. Article 15 provided for almost full independence, subject to Article 14, which made the Presidium of the Moscow Communist Party and of the USSR the almost undisputed master of the Union Republics, and Art. XIII, read in conjunction with this, made it possible for the Presidium to amend or change any article of the entire Constitution.

Along with all the democratic phrases in many articles was the confirmation of the unified state budget and the provision that any act of any subordinate Soviet could be easily nullified.

At the moment the democratic nations of the west were so preoccupied with the threat offered by the Nazis that they were thinking only of efforts to make a common popular front with the Soviets. They found a convenient possibility in the new Constitution and they were little disposed to pay any attention to all those phrases which formally and almost explicitly nullified all that they wished to see.

Thus, the legal basis was provided for the extension of the power of the Moscow government. Once the new Constitution was adopted and in force, the last rights of the Union Republics were nullified *de jure* as well as *de facto* and the central government was

631 given a free hand in its work of bending all the Union Republics to
642 its will. The stamp of state approval was set upon the new system of administration and with that accomplished, there was small reason why the regime should not go further with its work of russification and unification.

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

CHAPTER TWENTY

The German Attack on the Soviets

During the period from 1939 to 1941, the German 648
policy toward those Ukrainians who had escaped from the Soviet 563
occupation into the Polish Government General was not too severe. It was possible for the Ukrainians in Krakow and elsewhere to carry on a considerable amount of educational work, to form themselves into relief organizations and, in general, to work for the establishment of normal relations.

When the breach between the two totalitarian states came on 721
June 22, 1941, the Germans pushed ahead rapidly not only in the Baltic area but also in Ukraine. By June 30, they had occupied Lviv with the aid of some Ukrainian units, both from Carpatho-Ukraine and from Galicia.

During these days the Ukrainians had high hopes that the Germans would seriously liberate them from Bolshevik tyranny and wherever they had the slightest possibility, they endeavored to seize the cities so as to put a stop to the massacres which the Communists were perpetrating before they fell back. In some places
they were successful but in Lviv, the Communists killed over [661]
10,000 prisoners, before their bloody regime could be brought to an end.

In the first days of the war, although there were no clear 642
promises made to the Ukrainians, the impression grew that there would be established some form of a Ukrainian administration. The political leaders set up a Ukrainian government and appointed Yaroslav Stetsko as the first head of the state on June 30, 1941. A short time later this was broadened by the appointment of a Committee of Seniors under the leadership of Dr. Kost Levytsky, who had been the Prime Minister of the Republic of Western

642 Ukraine in 1918. These developments had the support of Metropolitan Sheptytsky, although he knew that they did not yet rest on organized public sentiment.

It was well recognized by the influential Ukrainians that the situation was very different from what it had been at the end of the Hapsburg monarchy, but they went through the motions of setting up a government on the possibility that the Germans would allow them some real concessions and that it would be mutually advantageous to be already prepared for all eventualities.

721 It is perhaps possible that a part of the German armed forces 648 looked with a certain toleration at these developments, for at least a part of the officer class realized that the task of the German government would be greatly facilitated, if they were able to normalize the situation and win some support from the population, as they had in the Polish Government General. This did not suit the Nazi element who believed that the advance of the German [661] forces was only to secure more *Lebensraum* for Germany. This faction struck and struck hard at the new regime and secured the arrest of Stetsko, Levytsky, Bandera and Melnyk, all of whom were taken to prison in Germany where they were kept for nearly four years.

The arrest of the leaders, while it was a crushing blow, still was not completely fatal. The advance of the German troops was so rapid on the way to Kiev that the Ukrainian leaders continued for some months to inspire the population not to resist the Germans, the more so as the western regiments of the Red Army surrendered in large masses. Thus when Kiev fell, some 675,000 of the Red Army surrendered with scarcely a blow.

On the other hand, the Soviets attempted to devastate the country before they withdrew, shooting the Ukrainian intelligentsia indiscriminately and trying to seize as many as they could for evacuation beyond the Urals. They demolished factories, tried to remove finished articles and mined the cities before they abandoned them. Then, when they exploded the mines, they spread the story that the total work of demolition had been carried on by the Germans.

CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE

Ukraine After World War II

At the conclusion of World War II, Stalin and the officials 000
of the USSR were ready for the next step. They had satisfactorily fooled the Western powers, they had entered the UkSSR and the Byelorussian SSR in the United Nations and they had secured from the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the British Commonwealth of Nations the right to return (by force, if necessary) persons with USSR citizenship. They had decorated the Allied leaders with medals commemorating the Russian conquerors of the past and they were ready to move ahead. They were sure that no one would care to ask about the fate of the unfortunate victims of the German slave camps because every American and Western civil or military authority of high rank had become convinced of the humaneness of Stalin and his group.

The Ukraine had been thoroughly devastated, as we have seen. 433
Its factories and its fields had been laid waste. That part of its 642
machinery which had not been wantonly destroyed by one of the 727
two contesting invaders had been carted to work outside of the UkSSR. But even so, Ukraine was not quiet.

The population, even that part which had been more favorably disposed to the Soviets because of the persecution by the Nazis, had hoped that with the return of peace and the Soviet victory there might be an improvement in living conditions, an increase of consumer goods, a relaxation of some of the austerity that had marked the years before 1941. They were almost at once to be disillusioned, for they very soon found that out of the scanty stores of food which they had preserved from the greedy Nazis they were supposed to make generous gifts for the benefit of Stalin and the elder

433 brothers, the Great Russians, the one people that were loyal through
●642 thick and thin to the authorities of the Soviet Union.

727 Yet instead of bringing in an era of peace and harmony, Stalin and his associates, emboldened by their successes in central Europe, immediately began a new campaign against the American "warmongers" and "imperialists" to prepare the people for still more rigid controls. It became clear almost at once that the return of the Soviet authorities was to usher in not a relaxation but a tightening of the old controls.

[668] These were bitterly resented. In Odesa and Kharkiv there were serious disturbances and while there may be some question as to whether these were directly inspired and organized by detachments of the U. P. A., it seems perfectly clear that they were suppressed not only by the forces of the MVD but by the Red Army.

631 On the other hand, as early as 1944 when the Nazi tide began
648 to ebb and the Western Sovietophile feeling was at its height, the Union Council of Commissars in Moscow passed a resolution authorizing the various Soviet Republics to enter into relations with foreign countries by having their own Commissariats for Foreign Affairs and their own national armies. Such devices completely fooled the Allied leaders. They did not notice or want to notice that the Ukrainian Commissar for Foreign Affairs, D. Z. Manuilsky, had long played a role as a Russian Soviet representa-
[701] tive in the Ukraine. Furthermore, the new Ukrainian and Byelorussian armies did not adopt the language of the country for which they were fighting. In theory after 1944 they were the only Soviet troops engaged against the Germans but even Stalin and the central authority did not pretend that there were no Great Russians in these armies. On the contrary, they boasted of this fact, whenever it was not necessary to hold before the world the shadow of Ukrainian and Byelorussian independence. The ruse worked and both Ukraine and Byelorussia were admitted to the United Nations, but both countries have declined to enter into diplomatic relations with any foreign country and have chosen, as was natural, to carry on all their negotiations through Moscow. Still later, in 1951, to carry this pretense of independence still further and deceive the

and the other non-Russian peoples that were conquered by the 000
tsars, reconquered by the Soviets and now in the name of Great Russian Communism subjected to a new period of russification.

At the same time, there is no new evidence that the regime of Malenkov is any more tolerant of the national differences or feelings of the non-Russian peoples than was the previous regime. The steady rise in influence of Khrushchov suggests the opposite and a still greater pressure upon Ukraine.

Since World War II, the attitude of the Kremlin toward the 642
Ukrainians has perceptibly hardened. The Ukrainian Soviet Social- 631
ist Republic is a member of the United Nations. It has its own government, its own flag, its own national anthem. Yet, by the orders of the Kremlin, no diplomat from outside the iron curtain is admitted to its capital of Kiev. Its government conducts all of its affairs through Moscow.

The Ukrainians are to-day the slaves of Moscow in their own country. They are liable to be deported across its boundaries at any moment and their places taken by Russians or persons from anywhere within the Soviet orbit. They are compelled to think Russian thoughts, to interpret their past, their present and their future in terms acceptable to their elder brothers, the Great Russians. The slightest deviation from that path is met with the grim charge of bourgeois nationalism, the gravest offence in the entire list of crimes.

That same process in earlier stages is taking place in all the 000
Soviet satellites. Step by step, the culture of the other countries is being remodelled on the Russian Soviet pattern. The Russian language is being introduced and forced into the dominant place. Step by step, their national traditions are being spurned, corrupted and altered, so that they will be worthy members of the Soviet Union under Russian Communist leadership. Their contacts with the outside world are being cut off, while the Moscow radio blares out day and night the statements that the Russians are the friends of peace while the nations outside are warmongers and imperialists.

We might be tempted to believe that Moscow is right but we

in 1917, through the instrumentality of the soviets, to draw the 186
villager into the revolutionary movement. At this point the Com- 668*
munists encountered the opposition of the Ukrainian nationalists. In the confusion and disorganization following the overthrow of the tsar in March, the Ukrainian nationalists had been able to pass from the stage of a quasi-legal group of parties, intent primarily on arousing an attachment to cultural nationalism, to a real, if shaky, political force. From the spring of 1917 to the 642●
summer of 1920, this force, though now no longer representing a single "movement," was able to maintain a series of Ukrainian governments on the soil of the Ukraine.

It is no purpose of this study to detail the nature of these governments which have been described elsewhere in comprehensive fashion.[17] For future reference, however, it is necessary at least to list them. The first, formed in April, 1917, was known as the Ukrainian Central Rada (*rada* means council and is the equivalent of the Russian word *soviet*), but during the first months of its activity it was really a semiautonomous administrative organ admitting the supremacy of the Provisional Government in Petrograd. Democratic and strongly socialist in its ideology, the Rada was the creation of the leftist intellectual groups which had predominated in the national movement before the war. It declared Ukrainian independence in January, 1918, but when it collided with the demands of the Germans, who occupied the Ukraine in February, 1918, the Rada was ousted. It was replaced by a quasi-monarchial regime under a member of the landowning aristocracy, Paul Skoropads'kyi, a descendant of a *het'man* or chieftain of the Zaporozhian Cossacks. After the armistice of November, 1918, this government, no longer supported by German troops, fell, and was replaced by a new regime, known as the Ukrainian People's Republic (Ukraïns'ka Narodna Respublika—UNR). This government lasted nearly two years, but was subject to extreme vicissitudes because of the strength of the Communist effort to conquer the Ukraine, attempts of the White anti-Bolshevik armies to reincorporate it in Russia, and the desire of Poland to extend her sphere of influence to the Dnieper. The administration, known as the "Directory," soon came under the

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[17] Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution.*

The administration, known as the "Directory", soon came under the
642 control of its most forceful member, Simon Petliura, who, through
186 his military command, acquired such fame in this period[1] that
668* among the less educated elements of the Ukrainian population his name has since been synonymous with the struggle for national independence.

Because they represented a measure of stability, the successive Ukrainian governments attracted the support of many persons who desired a regime independent of Communism. To be sure, many persons in the Ukraine who desired the establishment of a firm authority supported the conservative military commands of Denikin and Wrangel, the White generals. Before the latter became prominent, however, the equally conservative authority of the Het'man attracted the support of a considerable section of the upper classes of the tsarist society, including a number of military officers.[18] Once they had accepted the idea of an independent Ukraine, several of the officers, like Generals Vsevolod Petriv and Michael Omelianovych-Pavlenko, remained adherents of the nationalist Ukrainian regime which succeeded Skoropads'kyi, and were of valuable assistance because of their professional skill.[19]
186 On the other hand, except for Skoropads'kyi's group, the leader-
668* ship of Ukrainian nationalism remained predominantly in the hands of intellectuals throughout the revolutionary period, and even many of the Het'man's followers were writers and scholars. The educated youth of the Ukraine was divided between those who desired to join in the Bolshevik movement and those who chose the way of a left-wing nationalism. Victor Prykhod'ko, a

[1] [1918–1920 --Analyst]

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[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 158–59.

[19] The biographies of these officers are extremely interesting because of the light they throw on the process of Ukrainization of tsarist aristocrats. Thus General Petriv had more Norwegian and Finnish than Ukrainian ancestry, but his family had been settled in the Ukraine for several generations; it is said that "his national consciousness was awakened" by association with ardently nationalist Finnish and Swedish officers from the grand duchy of Finland while on duty in Warsaw in 1904. Actually, the fact that the division of which he was chief of staff when the October Revolution took place was 80 percent Ukrainian may have decided him to throw in his lot with the national movement (cf. *Za Ukraïnu*, January 28, 1945, p. 2, and February 1, 1945, p. 2). Omelianovych-Pavlenko was the son of a Don Cossack general and a Georgian princess, but being stationed in Odessa when the Bolshevik Revolution took place, he joined the Ukrainians. See Myroslav Martynets', "Gen.-Polk. M. Omelianovych-Pavlenko," (Colonel-General M. Omelianovych-Pavlenko), *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv 1. UD UNA*, August–September, 1952, p. 1).

nationalist who lived through the period, describes the former as 186
persons who thought on a "planetary" level, desiring to solve 668*
all the world's problems at once and regarding the claims of national affinity as "parochial." One, his schoolmate, was Volodymyr Zatons'kyi, who was later to become one of the most implacable of Communist officials in the Ukraine. Even before the war, he, according to the writer, refused to have anything to do with Ukrainian cultural activities, like the Prosvita [enlightenment] [575]
society in the city of Kamenets-Podolsk (Kamianets-Podils'k), where they were students. Rather, he associated with "foreigners," Russians and Jews, and was rapidly drawn into the revolutionary socialist movement.[20] The basis for a choice in this generation of young intellectuals appears to have been chance, or the psychological make-up of the individual, which was reinforced increasingly by the cumulative impact of associations formed after the initial choice was taken. Thus by the time the revolutionary conflicts drew to a close the educated classes in the Ukraine were deeply split. Even more divided was the real foundation of any 565
independence movement, the peasants. They—or at least those 668*
who were somewhat more prosperous than the average—had 641
initially welcomed the Ukrainian governments. The increasing impotence of the new regimes and their preoccupation with factional strife and unrealistic programs instead of practical measures caused much indifference or disaffection among the peasants. In the judgment of one of the ablest students of the revolutionary period, however, the Ukrainian peasant preferred a nationalist government to either a Red or a "White" administration supporting a central regime.[21]

That the Communists were victors in the physical struggle is 642 ●
no proof of greater popular support, for much of their strength

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[20] Vyktor (Victor) Prykhodko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 18–19, 1942, p. 2.

[21] William H. Chamberlin, *The Ukraine: A Submerged Nation* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944). Moreover, one of the best Communist historians of the revolutionary period in the Ukraine, M. G. Rafes, a former adherent of the Jewish Bund, says the "natural" development of the peasants (and workers, especially in the sugar refineries in the small towns) was to "national socialism," "the Ukraine for the Ukrainian peasants," although he of course adds that they were inspired by the "reactionary bourgeois intelligentsia"; see *Dva goda revoliutsii na Ukraine: Evoliutsiia i raskol "Bunda"* (Two Years of Revolution in the Ukraine: The Evolution and Division of the "Bund") (Moscow, 1920), p. 8.

642 came from the Russian workers of the cities, or from outside the Ukraine. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian government under Petliura was to a considerable extent discredited, because it had failed to devote sufficient attention to the needs of the peasantry and to [648] establish law and order. Moreover, by an eleventh-hour alliance with Poland, it had compromised its claim to represent the entire Ukrainian nation. This resulted from the fact that Galicia, which, upon the dissolution of the Hapsburg monarchy had formed its own West Ukrainian Republic, was surrendered to the Warsaw regime as a price for aid in the east, a solution in which most Galicians refused to acquiesce. Nevertheless, Poland and the Soviet Union made peace, and shortly afterwards the remnants of the Ukrainian army and bureaucracy retreated across the border for internment in Poland. From this sanctuary a group of a few hundred under Colonel George Tiutiunnyk sortied in October, 1921, for a last desperate raid into the Soviet-occupied Ukraine.[22]

186 After that the East Ukraine lay under Communist rule, which 665 could no longer be challenged by military force. For a time, however, it appeared as if the rising tide of nationalist sentiment—it rose even among those who had long been adherents of Marxist doctrines—might bring about what arms had failed to accomplish. To understand this situation it is necessary to recall that the Communists under Lenin had modified their original stand in order to appeal to the nationalism of the non-Russians. In January, 1918, soon after the Bolsheviks came to power, the Third Congress of Soviets asserted a theoretical right of all the nations of the tsarist empire to go their several ways, to secede from the Bolshevik government in Moscow. At the same time, it deprived this right of any content by insisting that it be exercised only by the "toiling masses." Although the Communist Party's stand was more ambiguously phrased, its insistence that the interests of the toilers were represented only by the Communist Party and that the non-Russian Communist Parties formed inseparable parts of the central Bolshevik organization, in fact rendered self-determination a fiction. During the following years, the central Party [661] leadership used armed force when possible to insure that these local Communist Parties, thus reduced to mere branches of a

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[22] Mazepa, III, 96–105.

German arrival.[10] In the less sheltered districts, however, Soviet 668* repression was horrible. According to German secret reports, [661] four thousand Ukrainian political prisoners were butchered in the NKVD cellars of L'vov alone, and several times as many were deported eastward. Many of the latter were killed later when their captors could no longer hurry them on ahead of the German advance.[11] Meanwhile tens of thousands of Soviet officials and their dependents, along with a considerable portion of the large Jewish population of Galicia, streamed eastward to escape a similar fate at the hands of the German totalitarians.

On June 30, in the midst of the disorganization caused by these events, the advance units of the Wehrmacht reached L'vov. With them came the first groups of Bandera's followers. Some of these came legally in "Nachtigall"; others, including Iaroslav Stets'ko, came illegally, though with the incidental assistance of some German front-line units.[12] Having arrived in the Galician capital, the OUN-B was in a favorable position. The months of isolation from the world outside the Soviet Union had prevented most of the citizens of L'vov from hearing of the internal conflict of the OUN. Moreover, the horror of the last days of Soviet [554] occupation made the Germans seem like providential deliverers; the close contact enjoyed by the Bandera leaders with uniformed Wehrmacht soldiers greatly enhanced their prestige in their compatriots' eyes.

Just what assurances the Bandera adherents gave of their 668* backing by the Germans, just how far they themselves believed 642● they could rely on German support, is impossible to determine. Whatever inducements they used, immediately after their arrival the OUN-B group named Dr. George Polans'kyi, a prominent citizen, mayor, and succeeded in having a national representation "elected"; this they called together the same evening. They had hoped to secure the L'vov state theater, a hall of appropriate size and dignity for the gathering, but, finding it requisitioned by the German army, they were forced to resort to the small meeting

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[10] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, August 6, 1941, p. 3.

[11] Report of the SP and the SD *Einsatzgruppen*, July 31, 1941, p. 13, NO 2151 (hereafter referred to as NO 2151).

[12] Interview 24.

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room of the Prosvita society.[13] When the group assembled, Stets'ko addressed it, saying that the congress of émigrés in Cracow had already laid the foundation for a Ukrainian government. He then proceeded to proclaim the Ukrainian state. It is worth presenting the contents of this proclamation in full since it provides an excellent indication of the thinking of Bandera's group.[14]

Act of Proclamation of the Ukrainian State

1. By the will of the Ukrainian people, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists under the direction of STEPHEN BANDERA proclaims the renewal of the Ukrainian State, for which a whole generation of the best sons of the Ukraine spilled its blood.

The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, which under the direction of its creator and leader EUGENE KONOVALETS' during the past decades of bloody Muscovite-Bolshevik subjugation carried on a stubborn struggle for freedom, calls upon the entire Ukrainian people not to lay down its arms until a Sovereign Ukrainian State is formed in all the Ukrainian lands.

The sovereign Ukrainian government assures the Ukrainian people of regularity and order [*lad i poriadok*], multi-sided development of all its forces, and satisfaction of its demands.

2. In the western lands of the Ukraine a Ukrainian government is created which will be subordinated to a Ukrainian national administration which will be created in the capital of the Ukraine —Kiev.

3. The Ukrainian national-revolutionary army, which is being created on Ukrainian soil, will continue to fight against the Muscovite occupation for a Sovereign All-Ukrainian State and a new, just order in the whole world.

Long live the Sovereign Ukrainian State!

Long live the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists!

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[13] *Ibid.;* Mirchuk, p. 30; Interview 21.

[14] The translation is from an early typewritten copy of the proclamation furnished me by Volodymyr Stakhiv. A printed version in Mirchuk (p. 32) is entitled *Act of Renewal of the Ukrainian State,* a significant change in view of the frequent ridicule of the proclamation by writers opposed to Bandera as an effort to "proclaim" a Ukrainian state which had been in existence since 1918. Other differences are not important.

Long live the director of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists—STEPHEN BANDERA!

The City of L'vov, June 30, 1941, 8 P.M.
Head of the National Congress
Iaroslav Stets'ko

The meeting at which the *akt*—as this proclamation has come to be known in Ukrainian polemics—was made was of comparatively small importance because of the hasty manner of its calling and the small number of people present. Nevertheless, the gathering was immediately dignified by the title of "National Assembly." Considerably more important than the initial proclamation was the fact that, in the confusion attendant upon the Red army's withdrawal and the German entry, the Ukrainians had been able to secure access to the L'vov radio station.[15] Consequently, soon after the *akt* was proclaimed, Stets'ko was able to broadcast it. Moreover, during the day, certain of Stets'ko's followers, including in particular the Reverend John Hryn'okh, chaplain of "Nachtigall," were able to gain access to the bedridden Metropolitan. Without going into details concerning their relations with Mel'nyk (they later asserted that Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi "must" have known about the conflict), they informed him of their plans for proclaiming the Ukrainian state and asked his support.[16] Apparently convinced that the group had the backing of the Germans, and hoping for a quick establishment of Ukrainian independence, the Metropolitan wrote a pastoral letter in which he exhorted the people to support the newly proclaimed government, saying that "the sacrifices which the final attainment of our goals require demand above all dutiful obedience to the just orders of the government which do not conflict with God's laws." Moreover, he declared:

> We greet the victorious German Army as deliverer from the enemy. We render our obedient homage to the government which has been

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[15] Interviews 21, 24, 63; Mirchuk, p. 30; Vasyl' Rudko ("R. Lisovii"), "Rozlam v OUN" (The Split in the OUN), *Ukraīns'ki Visti*, November 3, 1949, p. 3.

[16] Interviews 24, 63. They base their statement on the fact that Sheptyts'kyi was in close touch with Klymiv, the OUN-B chief in east Galicia.

erected. We recognize Mr. Iaroslav Stets'ko as Head of the State Ad- 668*
ministration of the Ukraine.[17] 642 ●

The pastoral letter was read over the radio by Father Hryn'okh the same morning. It appears to have removed any doubts which may have been lingering in the minds of most of the prominent Ukrainians in L'vov concerning the authenticity of the Stets'ko government.

The Bandera leaders went ahead rapidly to consolidate their 668*
victory. They felt the need of a name which would carry greater 642,
prestige than that of the young enthusiast Stets'ko, who had, as 645
Bandera's deputy, already declared himself chief of state. Consequently, they prevailed upon the aged Constantine Levits'kyi, who had been released from prison several months before the war broke out, to accept the post of president of a parliament or Council of Seniors. At the same time, the Bandera group prepared to establish a "cabinet," which was to have included men from a wide group of parties. Stets'ko himself was to be "premier," since he feared that a nonparty man might give way to German pressure. Bandera adherents were to be placed in such key posts as deputy war minister, which was to be held by Shukevych; minister of security, to be held by Lebed'; and minister of political coordination, to be held by Klymiv.[18]

The Bandera government, however, was not to live long 668*
enough to bring these plans to fruition. The proclamation of the government in the Prosvita hall had deeply disturbed the Wehrmacht officers who had organized "Nachtigall." They knew that it would induce a violent reaction among the ruling Nazis in Berlin, whereas the Wehrmacht group had hoped that by careful procedure they could secure the gradual development of a friendly, autonomous Ukrainian regime, at least in Galicia, without high party circles' realizing what was happening. Some of them were also alarmed at the possibility that the wide publica-

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[17] This quotation is taken from a contemporary leaflet copy of the pastoral letter.

[18] Interview 24; Mirchuk, pp. 35–36. Mirchuk lists Petriv as war minister, while a contemporary German SD report (NO 4529) has Iarii in that post. The same report lists Klymiv as minister of security, but the evidence available to me makes it appear probable that Lebed' held the post; possibly the latter's clandestine role made it necessary to keep his appointment secret.

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When the February Revolution broke out in St. Petersburg no political Ukrainian movement developed in the early stages. Quite naturally the intellectual circles obtained more liberty to spread their ideas, which were not anti-Russian.

The municipal elections undertaken at Kiev almost immediately after the February Revolution, and which had undoubtedly taken advantage of all the liberties which characterized the first days of all revolutions, gave a result which clearly shows the almost complete non-existence of a Ukrainian political movement. In fact, of ninety municipal councillors the so-called Ukrainian parties obtained only six places, and that was in the capital of the Ukraine itself.

All classes of society hoped that the Provisional Government which replaced the Monarchy would be able to maintain the front and would allow the country to convoke a National Assembly which would decide the future political regime on the whole territory of the former Russian Empire. As soon as the active members of the Ukrainian political organizations of Galicia entered the Russian Ukraine they organized a kind of Ukrainian committee at Kiev, which started its autonomist political work. On 24 March 1917 the Ukrainian Associations spread over the whole territory were called upon to send their representatives to Kiev to form the first nucleus of a future Ukrainian Parliament. Although only the representatives of such Associations which had declared themselves Ukrainian were invited to this assembly, and although the direction of the assembly was entrusted to Galician Ukrainians, under the Presidency of Professor Hrouchevsky, not only was the idea of separatism absent, but the autonomous aspirations were of the most mild kind. This first assembly of Ukrainian deputies took the name of ' Rada ' (the name

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of the Cossack Assembly of the time of Bogdan Khmel- 175
nitsky), which means 'Diet' or 'Council' in Ukrainian. 668
Once installed, it tried to establish relations with the 642
central Provisional Government, whose power became more and more fictitious. The menace of a Bolshevik *coup d'état* hung over the Government of St. Petersburg, a fact which allowed the Rada to justify its own establishment in declaring itself alone capable of protecting the Ukraine from Bolshevik invasion. This political manœuvre had many chances of success. The Ukrainian peasant was fundamentally hostile to Bolshevism, to the social levelling, and to the collectivization of the land. Nevertheless, anxious for the peace which the Bolsheviks had promised, the Ukrainian peasant lent them his ear. The leaders of the Rada, loyal to the principles of the 'Union of the Liberation of the Ukraine,' were also not opposed to the idea of an immediate peace and their promises to preserve the Ukraine from Bolshevism and to conclude peace with the central powers was their most important trump card. The Provisional Government, in a state of complete disintegration and without any remaining support, hastened to recognize the Rada as a political organization, although no election in the proper sense of the word had taken place at the time of its formation. A statute, known under the name of 'Universal,' was instituted on Ukrainian territory. After the agreement between the Provisional Government and the Rada, Ukrainian autonomy was recognized but was limited to questions of language and culture and to the organization of local administration.

All other important questions, including the agrarian question, were left to the future National Pan-Russian Assembly. The administrative activity of the Rada was, at the beginning, limited to the town of Kiev alone, where its assemblies took place. During the summer of

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1917 the propaganda agents of the Rada covered the whole country where they organized meetings and distributed pamphlets. They tried to persuade the proprietors of land that their aspirations would be more easily realized within the framework of an autonomous State and underlined the impotence of the Central Government in the face of a Bolshevik attack. The Ukrainian peasant, like that of the Volga and of Siberia and like the Cossacks of the Don, opposed the revolutionary theories, and it is in these countries that they met with the strongest opposition. The Rada could not have a better justification of its authority in the eyes of the Ukrainian peasant than the statement that the Bolshevik movement, of Great Russian origin, was imported into the Ukraine from the outside, which, moreover, was true. The title which the Ukrainian anarchist, Nestor Makhno, gave to his book on the Civil War, *The Russian Revolution in the Ukraine*, is singularly significant. The leaders of the Rada were careful not to proclaim their separatist ideas openly, knowing that such ideas would never find the support of the popular masses. Profiting, however, by the decay of the Provisional Government, they formed, with its consent, a sort of Ministry which took the name of 'General Secretariat,' and which declared itself the supreme power in the Ukraine on 29 July of the same year. The agrarian movement which spread over the whole territory of the Ukraine aimed especially at the great landowners, most of whom, especially in the west, were Poles. Thus the real popular movement took the form of the ancient quarrel between the peasants and the lords and developed quite independently of the Ukrainian movement represented by the Rada. When, in October 1917, the Provisional Government fell as the result of a Bolshevik insurrection, the only official

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authority existing in the Ukraine was represented by the General Secretariat of the Central Ukrainian Rada. 175 668 642

The peasants, hostile to Bolshevism, did not find any other political organization on which they could lean. Mistrusting the organizations of the Right (which were later to form the political nucleus of the White Armies) and equally fearing the local democratic municipalities where the intellectual and Jewish elements dominated, openly hostile to the working class which was almost entirely Bolshevized and consisted of non-Ukrainian elements, the farmers seemed to tend more and more towards the support of the Rada which seemed to be the only force capable of realizing their aspirations. Nevertheless the first clash between the elements which accepted the idea of an autonomous Ukraine and those which rallied to Bolshevism, was not to the advantage of the first. The agrarian question meant much to them. The Ukrainian Rada was unable to formulate a clear policy with regard to this most important question. Its resistance to the anarchical division of the lands, supported by the Bolsheviks, rapidly reduced the number of its supporters and the already small authority enjoyed by the General Secretariat in the eyes of the peasant mass. Nevertheless, on 20 November, the Rada proclaimed a democratic Ukrainian Republic. It is at this period that the allied military missions then resident at Kiev recognized *de facto* the Ukrainian Republic. At the same time the fourth 'Universal' was promulgated, one of the articles of which declared that the independence of the Ukraine was considered indispensable only because the rest of the Russian territory had fallen to the power of the Bolsheviks. It is necessary to remember this detail because it again proves that, even in politically favourable circumstances, the Rada did not dare openly to declare its separatism. This act did not increase the

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175 642 668 authority of the Ukrainian Government. No local municipal or other organization took the slightest note of its existence. Every department, every district, and every town governed itself and tried to resist the advance of the Bolsheviks. Not having any military forces or police organizations at their disposal, these local governments were unable to resist the attacks of the Red Guards and the armed soldiers, returned from the front and supported by Moscow. Soon the whole Ukraine elected local Soviet governments and the Rada, which hastened to proclaim, on 22 January 1918, the independence of the Ukraine, was obliged to flee on the 29th of the same month, seeking refuge at Jitomir. One of its most active members, Simon Petlioura, tried to organize anti-Bolshevik troops composed of peasants and prisoners of Galician origin. He succeeded in forming several units which, although unsatisfactory from a military point of view, cut a better figure than the bands of soldiers which were leaving the front. These military units, known under the name of '*haidamaks*,' formed small nuclei of resistance in the towns and villages and halted the Soviet offensive here and there. The more the Bolsheviks advanced towards the west, the more this resistance became effective, especially in Southern Podolia, where the Ukrainian organizations, supported by Galician prisoners, by Polish legionaries, and even by certain circles of purely Russian sympathies but hostile to Bolshevism, still retained some vestiges of power.

148 727 The insufficiency of technical, administrative, and intellectual personnel did not allow the Ukrainians to give their civil and military organizations the force necessary for defeating the revolutionary movement directed by the Communist Party. On 9 February the Ukrainian Government, acting as a sovereign government, and despite the firm opposition of a large part of

its members, especially of Petlioura, decided to send its 648
representatives to Brest-Litovsk to conclude a peace 727
with the central empires. This idea met with the sympathy of the Austro-German authorities whose negotiations for a peace with the Soviet Government had already lasted a long time.

The peace which was dictated by the German general staff was signed by the Rada. As compensation for the efforts of the central empires, who promised to protect the Ukraine from Bolshevism, the Rada accepted German occupation and agreed to supply 1,000,000 tons of grain of which Germany and Austria had immediate need. Under the threat of German bayonets the representatives of Lenin also had to recognize the independence of the Ukraine. Already the Austro-German troops were making their entry into Ukrainian territory while meeting with only a feeble resistance of the armed units of the local Soviet governments and the remnants of the fleeing Imperial Army.

The only aim of the Austro-German military command was to obtain the stores of grain and of other food products which they hoped to find in abundance in the
Ukraine. Yet, for political reasons, the Governments 727
of the central empires decided to support the fiction of Ukrainian independence under their protection. The entry of the troops was followed by the proclamation composed more or less in these terms: 'At the request of your Rada we have decided to enter your country in order to protect you from Bolshevik anarchy and to give you the possibility of developing in complete alliance with our two empires.'

One can say that no citizen took this declaration seriously and that the occupation was considered as an
invasion by enemy troops. The Ukrainian Government 642
was established at Kiev[1] and was composed of three 727

[1] [i.e. in 1919 --- Analyst]

642 727 political groups: the separatists of the right, the national democrats, and the federalist social democrats. Thus, as these names show, the Ukrainian Government formed by the Austro-Germans was not homogeneous in the matter of its partisanship of independence.

721 The Austro-Germans did not take this farce of political independence any more seriously than did the population. Their attitude was simply that of conquerors. 'For every German soldier killed, ten *Russian* soldiers, chosen among the population of the district where the crime has been committed, will be immediately shot,' the terrified inhabitants of Kremenetz (town of Volynia) (Order No. 2, town of Kremenetz, 28 February 1918) read on the posters signed by the commandant of the Austrian division a few days after the proclamation of official friendship. The 'friendly country' closely resembled a colonial conquest. The general staff of the army of General Eichhorn reported to the commander of the eastern front on 4 May 1918: 'The Austro-German troops would have no difficulty in maintaining order and public tranquillity from the moment we renounce the fiction of a friendly country. We are still obliged to obtain the permission of the Ukrainian commissioners, who are confused and irritated, for some of our actions.'

643 Meanwhile two points of view existed in Austro-German circles concerning the subject of the independence of the Ukraine. The army considered the Ukraine a conquered enemy country which had to furnish, with the least possible delay, agricultural produce in accordance with the terms of peace.

On the other hand diplomatic circles saw in the independence, fictitious though it was, the future of German diplomacy, based on the partition of the succession of the dismembered Russian Empire. Parallel to

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648 The Minister of the Reich at Kiev, Muhm, a subtler man, expressed himself differently though in the same sense: 'I am convinced that it is necessary to maintain the fiction of a friendly independent country in the Ukraine. . . . We shall completely destroy the little authority which remains with the Ukrainian Government if we were to show too coarsely that it is only a toy in our hands.'

191 177 Disarmed, enslaved by the great force of the army of the central empires, the Ukraine, was not in the position of an independent State. The Ukrainian language, imported from Galicia, was not spoken in the country. Only official documents and administrative notices were written in Ukrainian. Not a single private business ever used this language either for correspondence or advertising. In the schools and universities Russian continued to be used. The circulation of newspapers in the Ukrainian language was very small, while the Russian papers which agreed not to carry on open propaganda against the troops of occupation appeared everywhere and were actually the only ones read by the population.

727 642 The Ukrainian Government, composed of politicians having absolutely no administrative experience, soon proved to be incapable of organizing the supply of grain as promised to the armies of the central empires. The Germans then decided to change the regime. The organizations of landowners, small and big, which supplied corn and other agricultural produce to the forces of occupation, were favoured by the Austro-German authorities. It is unnecessary to point out that no Ukrainian political idea influenced the creation of these organizations. The Germans selected their association, known under the name of '*Zyizd Khliborobiv*,[1]

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[1] '*Khliborobiv*' means farmers in Ukrainian. '*Zyizd Khliborobiv*' means association of farmers.
-[i.e. in 1919. --- Analyst]

as a base for the new Government which had to replace 727
the Rada and which, in their opinion, would be better 642
capable of organizing the supply of agricultural produce. On 29 April 1918, on the day after the proclamation of the Constitution of the Ukrainian Republic, the German troops interrupted the session of the Rada in the building which it occupied and forced the deputies to leave the hall. The Rada was dissolved. The landowners, the *khliboroby*, in agreement with the Austro-German general staff, elected the Hetman of the whole Ukraine in the person of General Pavlo Skoropadsky, the leader of the popular Democratic Party and descendant of the genuine Hetman of the Ukraine, but in fact a brilliant officer of the Russian Imperial Guards.

The German authorities thought that the new Govern- 727
ment, from which the politicians were excluded, would 645
be more in tune with their interests. In agreement with the General Hetman they appointed the new Cabinet. This Cabinet was composed of landowners, some experts, and a representative of commercial and industrial circles of the country in the person of a rich Jewish industrialist of Odessa, Goutnik. All the Ministers were people of openly Russian sympathies. Thus the bluff of the independent Ukraine received the approval of the same State which had invented it. The German Minister in Kiev, Muhm, wrote in his report to the chief of the German general staff, Groener: 'I insisted, when speaking to M. Lizogoub, the Premier, on the fact that the German Government wanted to see a Cabinet with a greater *couleur locale*.[1] In another report Muhm says that the greater part of the Ministers of the
Hetman are not far removed from russophile ideas. 645
'Nevertheless,' he added, 'one must not take this too much to heart as the Government is continually under

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[1] In French in the original text.

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645 my control and under that of the German general staff.'

An amusing, but true, story described the political position of the Ministers of the Government of the Hetman. The anecdote concerns the General Ragoza, the War Minister, whose sympathies were in no way Ukrainian. In October 1918 the Russian newspaper *Goloss Kieva* published a so-called order of the day of General Denikine, Commander-in-Chief of the White Army, declaring himself supreme chief of the armed forces on Ukrainian territory. His representative Colonel B., adorning himself with the uniform of the Imperial Army, presented himself without the slightest regard for etiquette to General Ragoza to inform him of the order of General Denikine and requested that the War Minister of the Ukraine would put himself at his disposal. The Minister was so taken aback that he began to assure the envoy of his loyalty to Russia and hastily gave his signature to prove his sincerity. The Russian officers living in Kiev took advantage of this incident to appear in the streets in their most brilliant uniforms of the old Russian Army and invited the population to decorate the city with the Imperial colours. It is unnecessary to say that the order was enthusiastically received by the population. The joke is that it was only a trick played by a Russian newspaper in Kiev, as this order of General Denikine had never existed.

648 The personality of the Hetman himself was also not
642 very reassuring to the idea of Ukrainian independence. Here are the informations which were sent to Kiev on 30 May 1918 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Reich: 'In June 1914 Skoropadsky presented an *aide-mémoire* to the Imperial Government in which he denied the existence of a Ukrainian people, identifying them with the Russian people.' 'The whole Ukrainian

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movement is only the product of Austrian intrigues,' 648 he explained in this document. In July 1917, we are 142 also informed by this document, Skoropadsky published an open letter in which he called Kiev 'the centre of *Russian* culture,' and concluded that it would be necessary to take the initiative to 'unify all the *Russian* lands in a federal organism.'

All these testimonies show the illusory independence of the Ukraine under German occupation.[1] It is easy to understand that the Russian reactionary circles in the first place, and even other more moderate circles, should have considered the establishment of the Government of the Hetman, whose separatist convictions were more than doubtful, a happy event. The superficial Ukrainization, which continued more or less effectively under the fictitious power of the Rada, ceased almost completely under the Hetman. Only the official journal and some insignificant leaflets continued to be published in Ukrainian. Russian again became if not the official at least the semi-official language and the only one actually used in the administrative offices. The Russian circles considered the Government of the Hetman a provisional one which, supported by the Austro-German military forces and entrenched behind the fiction of an independent Ukraine, was able to protect the Ukraine from Bolshevism. In their eyes the Government of the Ukraine was only a political and economic base for the future anti-Bolshevik movement in the whole Russian territory, able to serve as a springboard to the White

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[1] All the documents which we quote here are contained in the book that appeared in Moscow in 1936 under the name of *The Failure of the German Occupation of the Ukraine*, a book which contains the secret correspondence of the Austro-German authorities in the Ukraine with their respective Governments. The Soviets of the soldiers of the Austro-German units in flight transmitted these documents of enormous value to the Soviet Government.

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

648 642 Army which was being organized in the territory of the Don Cossacks and in the Northern Caucasus. They were not far wrong. The Government of the 'Independent Ukraine,' considered to be anti-Russian, supplied the Volunteer Army,[1] on whose standards the device 'the one and indivisible Russia' was inscribed, with arms and ammunition. Entire trains proceeded to Rostov-on-Don, transporting officers, cadets, and civilians wishing to serve in the Volunteer Army. Even at Kiev the White military organization enjoyed a certain amount of liberty. A tacit collaboration developed under the half-sympathetic eyes of the central empires, between the command of the White Army and the Ukrainian Government of Kiev. This tolerance on the part of the Austro-Germans found its explanation in the imminence of their defeat on the western front. Thus Ukrainian politics and especially the support of Bolshevism which they considered an involuntary ally, having ranged Russia among the neutrals, no longer had any sense. The Austro-German authorities began to take an interest in the opponents of Communism and of Ukrainianism and even looked to the Don Cossacks with a view to collaboration, those same Cossacks who, though well organized since the October Revolution as an independent State, had never expressed the desire of separating from the Russian Empire.

642 727 423 The internal policy of the new Government, completely at the service of the forces of occupation, was characterized by the support of private property and particularly of the landowners. This policy led to the proclamation of new laws regarding the return of estates to the landowners, of which they had been deprived by the peasants during the agrarian troubles of 1917.

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[1] The name which was officially used by the White Army which, at the beginning, did not resort to any mobilization and only filled its ranks with volunteers.

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

deprived by the peasants during the agrarian troubles 642
of 1917. The application of these laws was followed 727
by violent repressions on the part of the Austro-German Army. Punitive expeditions against the peasants became very frequent and summary executions became general throughout the country. The hate of the peasant population was directed against the Austro-Germans and soon reached its peak. The soldiers of the armies of occupation no longer dared to go out after sunset, except in groups. Knives, directed by mysterious hands, frequently found the backs of Austro-German infantry men. The Civil War was in full blast. The Government, incapable of acting without looking for the support of the military forces of the invader, did not escape either hate or contempt and could only maintain itself until the complete reversal of the situation, which was not slow to come. The defeat of the German forces and the armistice forced the troops of occupation to leave Ukrainian territory. It is unnecessary to say that, hated by the popular masses, deprived of all support, and with a doubtful ideology of Ukrainian independence,
the Hetman could not continue to govern. Also, as 668
soon as the Austro-German forces began to retire, revolutionary propaganda began to flood the Ukrainian country-side. The former Ukrainian politicians, dismissed from their posts after the establishment of the Hetmanate, put themselves at the head of this movement and received, at first, the unconditional support of the peasants and even of certain military units of the Austro-Germany Army in which the Galician element predominated. Thus, led by Simon Petlioura, the peasants 669
marched on Kiev in order to depose the Hetman. Received everywhere with enthusiasm, they had no difficulty in precipitating the retreat of the Austro-German troops, and rapidly occupied the greater part

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Poles. First the Galician question was raised immediately 648
after the fall of the Habsburg Monarchy (in October
1918). Following the example of all the nationalities
which had been a part of it, the Ukrainians of Galicia [642]
formed a national council at Lvov, which proclaimed the
independence of the Western Ukrainian Republic. After
the fall of Skoropadsky this new republic was eager to
unite with the Directorate of Petlioura. The Act of
Union was proclaimed in January 1919. But the Poles
did not think on the same lines. During the same 726
January 1919, Poles and Ukrainians already fought 648
each other furiously in the streets of Lvov. The arrival
of the Polish troops of General Haller, formed in
France, quickly turned the tide. A regular army of
80,000 men represented a very important force in
Eastern Europe where, from the Carpathians to the
Pacific, an immense territory was plunged into anarchy.
For General Haller there was no question of a Western
Ukrainian Republic, but only one of a Little Poland, a
simple province of the reborn Great Poland. As we
had already seen, the detachments of the Polish Army
of Haller threw themselves, in April of the same year,
against the vanguards of the Red Army. Recently
restored, the Polish State already claimed the frontiers
applying before the first partition, that is to say the
annexation of White Russia and the Ukraine up to the
Dnieper. While the Petliourians, the Reds, and the
Whites faced each other on both sides of the Dnieper,
the Poles seized the greater part of Volynia and of
White Russia and entered Minsk. But the Poles did not
seem to exploit their success, most probably in order
to give the Red Army the chance to destroy the White
Army which, in case of victory, might transform itself
into a national Russian Army, dangerous from the
point of the territorial pretensions of Great Poland.

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

728 Government, hostile in principle to everything connected with Russian national tradition, could put its signature on such a document, considered as an even greater national humiliation than the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The Ukrainian separatist movement, doubly compromised by its agreements with the central empires and with Poland, foundered as a result of general contempt.

648 728 Soon the Allied Powers recognized the Polish domination over the whole of Galicia, at first as a temporary measure. It became definite on 15 March 1923. Poland agreed to establish an autonomous regime here, but this promise had never been honoured. From this date, too, Poland exercised her absolute power over a considerable part of the Ukrainian people.

000 The Soviet attitude to the Ukrainian question at that time is not of great interest and does not furnish new factors which could throw new light on the problem.

If Soviet policy with regard to this problem seems confused and inconsequent, this is so because it is not determined by a firm and well-established point of view, but by two factors which are outside this question: by the reaction of the Ukrainian population to the 'social experience' to which it is subjected and by the attitude of Germany and Poland to the Ukrainian problem.

642 Immediately after the establishment of Soviet rule on Ukrainian territory, and in full agreement with Marxist theories, the right of peoples to determine their own fate was proclaimed and naturally also affected the Ukraine, as every other member of the Soviet Union. Thus the Socialist Soviet Republic of the Ukraine was founded. The Constitution even gave it the official right of ceding from the U.S.S.R. This is the official aspect. In practice the Ukraine became an integral part of the Soviet Union and completely dependent on the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party.

175 people deteriorated also in consequence of the religious persecutions of Ukrainians by the Polish State. For these reasons, in 1648 the great Ukrainian revolution against Poland broke out under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnitsky (1648—1657), the Hetman of the Cossack Army.

[642] In consequence of the revolution of 1648 the Ukrainian Cossack
175 Republic was created headed by an elected Chief of State (Hetman).
648 The official name of this State was 'Zaporovian Army' (Exercitus Zaporoviensis) with Tchyhyryn as Capital. Leaning upon the Cossacks and the free peasantry, the Ukrainian Republic could defend itself against the united forces of Poland and the Crimean Horde for several years. Having lost the hope for a settlement with Poland on the principle of equality, the Ukrainian Government concluded a treaty with the Muscovite Tsar in Pereyaslav, in 1654. The Muscovite Tsar promised the Ukrainians assistance against Poland and the Tartars. The treaty of Pereyaslav secured for Ukraine its own army, administration, and an independent foreign policy.

The transition of Ukraine towards Moscow in the 17th century provided the basis for the rise of the Muscovite state. The Ukrainian revolution of 1648 weakened Poland considerably.

Under the protectorate of the Tsar of Moscow Ukraine did not find security for its liberty, prosperity and progress. The Swedish King Charles X. Gustav understood this well when he wrote to his Ambassador to the Ukrainian Government, in 1657: "Moscow does not tolerate a free nation"*). When it had become evident that the Tsar of Moscow tried to reduce or to abolish the rights of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Government of B. Khmelnitsky planned the annulment of the alliance with Moscow, and concluded treaties with Sweden and Transylvania to secure the independence of Ukraine (1656 and 1657). The Ukrainian Government put forward the demand for the frontiers of the Ukrainian State as '*ius totius Ukrainae antiquae vel Roxolaniae*' up to the Vistula, the Ukrainian ethnographic frontier of that time. In the treaty with Sweden of 1657, Ukraine was recognised as a free nation dependent on no one *('gens libera, nulli subiecta')*.

Against the Ukrainian aspirations for independence Poland and Moscow acted in common. By the treaty of Andrusov of 1667, Ukraine was divided among these countries on the Dnieper line. Turkey and the Crimean Horde interfered with the struggle in Ukraine. In these wars, lasting nearly 30 years, Ukraine on the western bank of the Dnieper River was disastrously devastated. In

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*) *Archives of South-West Russia*, Part III, Vol. VI: Kiev 1908.

66? Government' was window-dressing for the further advance of the Russian Communist troops in Ukraine.

At this time the Russian and Jewish Socialist parties in Ukraine issued protests against the attack of the Soviet Russian troops on the democratic Ukraine. In December 1917, a conference of the Russian Social-Democrat organisations in Ukraine (the so-called Mensheviks) in Kiev declared that it "brands with indignation the new infamous deed of the Bolshevik Government, that in its blunt fanaticism and irresponsibility came to declare war on Ukraine".

In the session of the All-Ukrainian Congress of the Councils of the Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies in Kiev on December 18, 1917, the delegate of the Jewish Social-Democrat 'Bund', Zolotarev, declared that "the Jewish proletariat will defend Ukraine together with the Ukrainian nation against the attack of the violators".

At the same Congress the leader of the Jewish Socialist Labour Party, Schatz, in his speech laid stress on the fact that "now in Russia only one organising force has remained — the Ukrainian democracy and its organ — the Central Council"

Ukraine refused to accept Soviet dictatorship and entered an unequal struggle with overwhelming Communist forces invading [642] from Russia. The Ukrainian Central Council proclaimed the independence of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic by a special Act ('*IV. Universal*') of January 22, 1918. It is significant that even some Russian Communist organisations in Ukraine declared against the attack of Soviet Russia on Ukraine.

One of the commanders of the Russian invasion in Ukraine, the Communist Antonov-Ovseyenko, writes in his memoirs that in December 1917, the leader of the Communsit organisations in Kharkov demanded that he should not make war against the Ukrainian Government, with regard to the "special situation in Ukraine in connection with the national problem" (*Comments on the Civil War*, vol. I, p. 55). On this disposition of the Communists in Ukraine Antonov remarks:

"The local Communists are very irresolute, are looking for coalition with opportunists, do not want and do not try to give our troops any assistance" *(Comments on the Civil War).*

Another commander of the Soviet Russian troops in Ukraine, Colonel Muravyev, wired Antonov from Odessa on February 21, 1918, about the disposition of the workers: "I do not want to carry responsibility for anything that is happening here, if the local Soviets do not want to defend the revolution, their own government" (Antonov, *Comments*, p. 169).

727 565 state. On the contrary, they wished to suppress the Ukrainian movement and to make Ukraine a centre for the restoration of 'indivisible Russia', of course, headed by a Tsar. About these plans Ludendorff wrote in his memoirs after World War I. He hoped that a restored Russian Empire would be a reliable ally of Germany out of gratitide for the abolition of the Bolshevik régime.

●642 727 565 On April 28, 1918, a detachment of German troops entered the hall where the sessions of the Ukrainian Central Council took place in order to arrest some Ukrainian Ministers. On the next day, on April 29, under the protection of the German troops, a congress of big landowners was called. At this congress General Paul Skoropadsky was declared Hetman of Ukraine, with the prior consent of the German authorities.

Skoropadsky belonged to the class of the big landowners, and, though he was of Ukrainian descent, had had no connections with the Ukrainian national movement before the revolution of 1917.

In his first order Skoropadsky wrote: "I declare myself Hetman of the whole Ukraine". He announced the abolition of the Ukrainian Central Council and replaced the name 'Ukrainian Democratic Republic' by 'Ukrainian State'. Skoropadsky repealed all laws and orders of the Ukrainian Central Council and the Russian Provisional Government; thus Ukraine had in this respect returned to the conditions before the Revolution.

The reactionary ways of the Skoropadsky Government that favoured the big landowners had disastrous consequences for the Ukrainian people; the masses of peasants and workers, that recently had fought with arms the terror of the Russian Communists under the banner of the independent Ukrainian Democratic Republic, were placed by the policy of the Skoropadsky Government into [221] a desperate situation. The big landowners who belonged almost exclusively to the Russian and Polish nationalities organised 'punitive expeditions' against the Ukrainian peasantry with their armed gangs having support from German and Austrian army detachments. Heavy contributions, looting, and destruction of the peasants' property, together with mass executions of Ukrainian peasants and workers, caused immense indignation against the Skoropadsky régime and the German and Austrian occupation forces among the Ukrainian people. Against the reactionary régime which dominated in Ukraine, Communist propaganda met with approbation among the Ukrainian masses, unexpected even by Moscow.

727 642 The Chief of Staff of the German armies in Ukraine, General Groener, in order to appease Ukrainian public opinion had declared after the putsch of April 29, 1918, that "the Hetman was given in-

structions that the government he formed had to stand entirely by 227
the principle of a Ukrainian state, without any orientation towards 642
Moscow or Poland". Nevertheless, Skoropadsky's Government consisted in its majority of Russians of reactionary trends who distinguished themselves by a hostile attitude towards the Ukrainian national movement.

The Ukrainian political parties had no confidence in the Skoropadsky régime, they considered it to be an outrage upon the Ukrainian national independence.

Against the Skoropadsky régime and the German and Austro- [669]
Hungarian troops which supported it, mass uprisings began in order to restore the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. Of course, the reaction in Ukraine was 'water to the mill' of Communist propaganda. Moscow knew how to use this situation for its advantage.

At the end of the summer of 1918, the members of the Skoropadsky Government prepared to restore 'indivisible Russia'. Skoropadsky issued an order on November 14, 1918, in which he stated that Ukraine "had the duty to fight first for the creation of an All-Russian Federation, the principal aim of which will be the restoration of Great Russia".

10. The Restoration of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic (November 1918) — The Government of the Directory 669

Against the federation of Ukraine with Russia proclaimed by Skoropadsky, and against the reactionary régime in general, the masses of the Ukrainian people arose under the leadership of the Directory, which was elected by the Ukrainian National League (15. 11. 1918). The Ukrainian National League was created by the Ukrainian democratic parties in summer 1918. The principal aim of the League was the struggle against the Russian reaction in Ukraine which prevailed there under Skoropadsky's rule. When the League received news on Skoropadsky's plans for the 'Federation' with the Russia of the White Generals, it began to prepare armed forces in due time. The National League and the Directory had as their members prominent leaders of the Ukrainian Central Council like V. Vynnychenko, S. Petlura, both members of the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Labour Party, M. Shapoval, Socialist-Revolutionary, and others. Summoned by the Directory, hundreds of thousands of the Ukrainian population in cities and villages joined the uprising. Only in Kiev the Skoropadsky Government held out for some time, leaning upon small detachments of Russian Monarchists and the decisive support of the German troops. On

669 December 12, 1918, a treaty was signed between the Directory of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic and the command of the German troops in Kiev that the German troops had to leave the Ukrainian capital. After this Skoropadsky abdicated and fled abroad with the German troops, having no one to lean upon.

642 The Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic was restored in Ukraine. The five member Directory and the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic were headed by the representatives of Ukrainian Socialist parties (President — Volodymyr Vynnychenko). The first Government of the Directory was formed by Volodymyr Chekhivsky.

11. The Ukrainians in Austria Declare their Independence (1. 11. 1918)

563 The Ukrainians in Austria (Galicia and Bukovina) had had heavy losses during World War I from the Tsarist occupation which tried to destroy the Ukrainian movement. On the other hand, the Poles who had the control of the administration in Galicia instigated the Austrian military authorities against the Ukrainians as
[661] against 'Russian followers'. In consequence of this provocation thousands of innocent Ukrainians were put to death in Galicia.

563 In October 1918, the Ukrainian deputies to the Austrian Parlia-
668 ment and the Diets of Galicia and Bukovina created the Ukrainian
National Council as the political representation of the Ukrainians
186 in Austro-Hungary.

On October 18, 1918, the Ukrainian National Council declared its resolve to create a Ukrainian state in the Ukrainian territories of Austro-Hungary. When Austro-Hungary fell asunder the Ukrainians declared the independent Western Ukrainian Democratic Republic (November 1, 1918, in Lviw).

Though the Ukrainian National Council of the former Austrian territories had passed a resolution on the preparation of the union of all Ukrainian territories in one state, the Ukrainians of Galicia and Bukovina distrusted the Skoropadsky régime in Kiev. Just at that time the Ukrainian democratic parties made their preparations for the overthrow of the Skoropadsky régime in Kiev. At the beginning of this action the key position was held by the regiment of the Galician Sich Riflemen which consisted of former Austrian Ukrainian prisoners of war taken by the Russian troops. This was the vanguard of the Ukrainian democratic movement against the Skoropadsky régime.

186 After the overthrow of the Skoropadsky régime in Kiev the
642 favourable moment came for the union of the Ukrainian terri-

tories that had been formerly under Russian and Austrian rule. 186
The Directory of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic issued a 642
special Act on January 22, 1919, in Kiev which declared:

"From this day, the parts of Ukraine — the Western-Ukrainian Democratic Republic, Galicia, Bukovina and Hungarian Ruthenia (Carpatho-Ukraine) and the Great Ukraine on the Dnieper, unite. The ancient hopes which the best sons of Ukraine had lived and died for become reality. From now there is one indivisible independent Ukrainian Democratic Republic".

Relying on this Act, the delegation from Western Ukraine, numbering 65 people, took part in the Congress of Ukraine which had been called to Kiev on January 23, 1919.

The Western-Ukrainian Republic, from the first days of its [726]
existence, had to fight in a heavy struggle against the Poles who 728
pretended to rule in Galicia even after the dissolution of Austria. The Poles invaded the Western Ukrainian Republic after having concentrated large forces on this front. The Ukrainian Government asked the Entente Powers and the Paris Peace Conference for mediation in the Polish-Ukrainian war. In February 1919, a Mission of the Peace Conference arrived in Galicia headed by the French General Berthélemy, and with the participation of the representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and Italy. This Mission presented to the Poles and Ukrainians a plan for an armistice on February 28, 1919. According to this plan, until the final decision of the Peace Conference, the territory of Galicia eastwards of the Bug and Stryj Rivers should remain under Ukrainian administration, while the Western part of Galicia should be administered by the Polish authorities. The Galician territory which remained under Ukrainian administration should be recognised by the Big Powers 'de facto' as an independent state, and the Ukrainian Army should be recognised and trained with the assistance of the Entente Powers. The Ukrainian Government did not accept the demarcation line proposed by the Mission of General Berthélemy as unfavourable for Ukraine. In May 1919, a new Mission of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference arrived in Galicia, headed by General Botha (South Africa). General Botha's Mission altered the previous armistice draft, and the Ukrainian Government agreed to accept it. However, the Poles rejected this plan.

The small country — Ukrainian Galicia — had to strain all her 726
forces in order to hold the front against the whole might of Poland. From Eastern Ukraine Galicia could not receive any considerable help, because the Ukrainian forces had to fight the Skoropadsky

confusion among the masses of the Ukrainian people. The Ukrai- 669
nians who had overthrown the reactionary Skoropadsky Govern- 726
ment installed by the Germans, looked at the French troops with great distrust, for they might renew the rule of the big landowners in Ukraine. In the meantime the policy of the leaders of the French Army in Ukraine was hostile to the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. The attempts of the Ukrainian Government to come to an agreement with the French were fruitless. These negotiations produced only material for Communist propaganda, that the Ukrainian Government 'sold the interests of the Ukrainian nation to the Western imperialists'. The Communist propaganda spread among the Ukrainian Army too. The consequences of this propaganda were disastrous; Ukrainian soldiers deserted the front against the Russian Red Army and some detachments even went over to the side of the Soviet Army. ***Thus the French intervention supported only the growth of Communist influence in Ukraine.***

The Government of Ukraine also made attempts to come to an agreement with the Soviet Government. But Moscow remained, as always, hostile to an independent democratic Ukraine and had only
one aim — to take possession of the rich Ukrainian territory. The [642]
Ukrainian Government, formed in December 1918, was headed by the Social-Democrat Volodymyr Chekhivsky. This Government consisted predominantly of Socialists and had also a representative of the Jewish Social-Democratic Party (Poale-Zion), A. Revutsky, as Minister for the Affairs of the Jewish Minority. All that did not restrain Moscow from calling the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic 'capitalist'.

To the protests of the Ukrainian Government against the attack of the Russian Red Army on Ukraine the Russian Commissar of Foreign Affairs Chicherin replied hypocritically: "The military actions on Ukrainian territory are a matter for the Army of the Directory and the Army of the Ukrainian Soviet Government which is entirely independent."

Against this statement the Directory of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic in its wire of January 9, 1919, declared.

"The Directory sees clearly the aim of the Government of the People's Commissars; it wants to bring Ukraine, rich in grain, coal and other products, with the aid of the 'Bolshevik Soviets', under its rule and turn her into its colony."

Before the advance of the Russian Red Army the Ukrainian 726
Government was forced to leave Kiev, its capital, at the beginning 669
of February 1919. In Vinnitsa the Socialist members of the 642
Directory quitted the Government. The member of the Directory

669 and Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Army, S. Petlura,
726 Social-Democrat, retired from the Party. He was elected President of the Directory in place of Vynnychenko. A Government was
642 formed without the participation of Socialists with Prof. Serhy Ostapenko as Premier. In Ukrainian political circles there was a hope that Ostapenko's 'bourgeois' Government might more easily succeed in coming to an agreement with the French Command in Odessa than a Socialist one. But these hopes failed. The French representatives offered the Ukrainians the choice to become a part of the front of the 'White' Russians against Bolshevism. They refused to discuss the national rights of Ukraine.

The disregard of the Ukrainian national movement revanged itself gravely in the fate of the Franco-Greek troops landing on the coast of the Black Sea. The parts of the Ukrainian Army which had joined the Soviets under the command of Hrihoriev and J. Tyutyunnyk, attacked the Franco-Greek landing forces. These detachments took, on March 1, 1919, Kherson, and on March, 15, Nikolayev, and in the first days of April, Odessa, forcing the French to embark. Thus, because of not fully understanding the Ukrainian problem, the French representatives, through their orientation towards 'White Russia', in spring 1919, helped actually Soviet Russia to occupy Ukrainian territory. By this they strengthened the hopes of the Russian Communists for 'world revolution'. Russian Communists thought that in Ukraine 'the fate of world revolution is being decided'; the title of a book published in 1919 in Moscow was *Where the Fate of World Revolution Is Being Decided*. From Ukraine the Soviet Russian Government planned to send aid through Rumania to the Hungarian Communists, who had proclaimed a Soviet Rupublic in Budapest on 21. 3. 1919. These plans of the Soviet Russian Government failed, for a that very time mass risings and the struggle of the Army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic stopped the advance of the Soviet Russian troops to the West.

642 The Government of Ostapenko, without the participation of
669 Socialists, called 'Cabinet of Agreement with the Entente', was replaced on April 9, 1919, by a new Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic composed of Socialists headed by the Social-Democrat Borys Martos. This Government announced its intention to depend on the own forces of the Ukrainian nation itself. At that time, when the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic remained in the Western provinces of Ukraine (Podolia, Volhynia, Galicia), in Central Ukraine, on the Dnieper River mass uprisings against the Russian Communists developed. Even groups of Ukrai-

nian Communists who wished to create an independent Soviet 642 Ukraine participated in these uprisings. The policy of the Russian 669 Communists in Ukraine had a clearly predatory character. The Communist Commissar Schlicher said of the tasks of the Soviet Russian campaign at a session of the Moscow Soviet on March 22, 1919:

"You all remember that when Ukraine was becoming Soviet with every day of the advance of the Red Army we became easier in our minds; the rich-in-bread Ukraine is ours! . . . We have four central supply detachments. We set all hopes on them. We have a lot of workers we have sent out who will be able to overflow all Ukrainian villages. We shall always remember that the looks of the proletariat of Russia are turned towards Ukraine" (*Annals of Revolution*, No. 2: Kharkov, 1928).

Not only by the ruthless pillage were the Ukrainian people put [186] against the Russian Communist dictatorship; by its nationalist 656 policy, too, it roused great dissatisfaction among the Ukrainians. 191 The Rumanian Communist Rakovsky, who was appointed by Moscow as Premier of the Soviet Government of Ukraine, declared that the Ukrainian language and culture were 'petty bourgeois' and that the use of the Ukrainian language in public institutions was necessary only for 'Ukrainian counter-revolutionaries'.

For this reason the 'dictatorship of the Russian culture' was introduced in Ukraine by the Russian Communists as a 'proletarian' one. "The Soviet Government in Ukraine in 1918 made in fact Russian the official language", — writes the Communist N. Popov in his *History of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine* (1929). Against the declarations of an 'independent Soviet Ukraine', the Rakovsky Government proclaimed the 'federation' of Ukraine with Russia. There could not be free elections to the Soviets in Ukraine. The power in the villages was given to the 'Comittees of Poor Peasants' consisting often of people sent from Russia. According to the instruction these Comittees were given they had the duty — "to fulfil precisely and relentlessly all orders of the supply authorities . . ."

13. Risings in Ukraine

In spring 1919, when the Soviet Army had reached the Dniester 669 River, Moscow prepared its forces for the support of Soviet Hungary. But at that time the same troops who had fought against the Franco-Greek forces under the command of Hrihoriev, Tyutyunnyk and others, started the fight against the Russian Communists. Of the strength of this movement Rakovsky, Premier of nian territories. This Polish policy held the Ukrainian 726 military forces that were fighting against the Russian Red Army constantly in tension, and hindered the work of the Ukrainian Government.

The Ukrainian Galician Army took part in the struggle against the Soviet Russian occupation immediately after the termination of the war with the Poles. The Galician Ukrainians wanted to strengthen the Ukrainian state on the Dnieper, together with the forces of Eastern Ukraine, in order to decide later the historic quarrel for Galicia with Poland.

15. Ukraine between 'Red' and 'White' Russia (1919)

In June 1919, the Ukrainian Government, headed by the Social- 642 Democrat Martos (from August Isaac Mazepa, Social-Democrat, 563 was Prime Minister), took up its residence in Kamenets in Podolia. The united Ukrainian Armies were under the command of General Yunakiw, former Professor of the Military Academy in Petersburg. The Government of Ukraine made efforts to secure legality and order in its territory, particularly it resolutely fought the excesses of various dark elements against the Jewish population. In the Government of theUkrainian Democratic Republic there was a special Minister for the Affairs of the Jewish Minority — Pinkhos Krasny (Jewish People's Party); the deputy Minister of Labour was the Jewish Social-Democrat Prof. Salomon Goldelman.

The struggle of the Ukrainian nation against Russian Bolshevism 669 as well as the entire Ukrainian problem were in 1919 unknown to the world. Against the Ukrainian liberation movement Communist propaganda was made throughout the world, trying to describe the Ukrainian Democratic Republic as a reactionary state. On the other hand, the propaganda of the Russian 'Whites' and of the Poles permeated decisive political circles abroad resulting in the conviction that the Ukrainian movement was the same as Russian Bolshevism. Therefore the Ukrainian Republic which had led a heroic struggle against Soviet Russia was blockaded by the Western Great Powers as 'infected by Bolshevism'. Because of this [1105] blockade the Ukrainian Army was in want of arms, supplies, medicaments. Only by contraband from Rumania was it possible to receive something for the Ukrainian armed forces. Under these circumstances it happened frequently that the Ukrainian Army fought with arms captured on the front from the enemy. But in spite of all these difficulties the united Army of the Ukrainian Republic had considerable successes in the battles with the Soviet Russian troops and, on August 31, 1919, took Kiev, the capital of

though this population had accepted in a friendly manner the Soviet 728
rule, hoping for an improvement of their situation. When Rumania 661
in alliance with Germany joined the war against USSR in 1941, the [726]
Rumanian authorities on their part terrorised the Ukrainian population of Bukovina and Bessarabia. At the end of the war Bukovina and Bessarabia were joined with USSR again. The Communist terror turned with even greater vehemence against the Ukrainians there. Especially from Bukovina a great part of the Ukrainian population had been deported into the Eastern regions of the USSR. The cities were filled with foreign elements, colonists from Russia were brought into the villages.

3. The Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia (Carpatho-Ukraine)

After 1919 Carpatho-Ukraine, which had been for centuries 563
under Hungarian rule, was attached to Czechoslovakia. The Ukrainian population of this country consists mostly of peasants. The towns had a Jewish and Hungarian population. The Czech authorities in Carpatho-Ukraine (official name Carpatho-Ruthenia) favoured for some time the development of Ukrainian schools. But [191]
from 1925 the Prague Government began to support the Russophile group that despised the Ukrainian language as 'peasant' and used a strange mixture of the Church-Slavonic, Ukrainian, and Russian languages. In reality, these 'Russophiles' were adherents of Hungary and received support from Budapost too. The entire administration in Carpatho-Ukraine came into the hands of the Czech bureaucracy. According to the Treaty of Saint Germain, Carpatho-Ukraine was guaranteed autonomy inside the boundaries of CSR, but the Czechoslovakian Government permanently deferred its realisation.

At the end of 1938 Germany launched strong pressure against Czechoslovakia exploiting the national problem of this country, (Sudeten Germans, Slovaks, Hungarians, Ukrainians). The Prague Government changed the centralistic Constitution to a federative one. For the Carpathian Ukraine the Prague Government recognised an autonomous statute with a separate Diet and Government. Against this the neighbour states — Hungary and
Poland — reacted vehemently. In February 1939, the elections to 642
the Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine took place. After the separation of 726
Slovakia from Bohemia the Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine proclaimed the independence of this country (March 16, 1939). But with Hitler's and Mussolini's consent the Hungarian troops occupied Carpatho-Ukraine after stubborn fighting against the Ukrainian volunteers.

phils) of being the result of German intrigue.[1] This 175
again gave rise to a pamphlet, by L. Tschelski, issued in Sofia (1915) by the League for the Liberation of the Ukraine, entitled *Is the Ukrainian Movement a German Intrigue?* The Russian Government took severe measures against the members of the League for the Liberation of the Ukraine, who, including the chief leader, Hrushevski, were banished to Siberia, or were forbidden to enter Russia from abroad.

(D) FOURTH PERIOD: SINCE THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION OF 1917

(*a*) *The Ukraine becomes independent.*—One of the 662
~~first qu~~estions which faced the Provisional Government 642
at the beginning of the Russian Revolution was the demand for an amnesty for the Ukrainian Nationalist offenders, who were allowed to return from Siberia and abroad. Next came the demand for Ukrainian autonomy and the appointment of a special Minister for Ukrainian Affairs, presented by a deputation sent from Kiev to Petrograd on April 6, 1917. Soon afterwards [646]
the first Ukrainian National Congress was convened at Kiev (April 19–22), at which some 800 members representative of the *intelligentsia* and the Social Revolutionaries were present. They elected a Central Rada, and declared for an autonomous Ukrainian republic under a Russian federal republic. Professor Hrushevski was elected President. The territory [131]
claimed for the Ukrainian state corresponded roughly to the western parts of the Governments of Lublin and Grodno, and the whole of the Governments of Kiev, Poltava, Kherson, Volhynia, Kharkov, Podolia, Yekaterinoslav, and Chernigov, and excluded the Austrian Ukraine. The Congresses of the Ukrainian Soldiers (May 5–7) and of the Ukrainian Peasants (May–June) supported the Rada at this time. But the Petrograd

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[1] In answer to a pamphlet by Tschelski, *No Liberator, but an Oppressor of Nations: How Russia freed the Ukraine.* L.L.U., Sofia, 1914.

668 Government refused to recognize the decisions of the
642 Rada, and thereby strengthened a group of separatists hitherto supported only by the second Ukrainian Soldiers' Congress (June 7). The Rada now issued (June 24) a *Universale*, proclaiming that henceforth the Ukrainian Rada would control Ukrainian affairs and work in federation with the All-Russian Parliament when this should be established; and on June 30 an executive body of the Rada, called the General Secretariat, was appointed.

This step caused anxiety to the Petrograd Government; and on July 12–14 two members of the Duma, Tereschenko and Tseretelli, and subsequently Kerenski, went to Kiev. While granting most of the Ukrainian demands, Kerenski opposed the demand for the formation of a Ukrainian army on the ground that it would mean the break-up of the Russian army. The favourable attitude adopted by Kerenski towards Ukrainian demands caused a split in the Provisional Government of Petrograd; and the Cadets left the Cabinet on July 16.

The reorganized Provisional Government decided to
[669] grant autonomy to the Ukraine, but on July 19 a social revolution broke out in Kiev, and the help of the Provisional Government was sought by the Rada for the restoration of order. But before the formal recognition of Ukrainian autonomy by the Provisional Government, which took place on August 17, other riots broke out in Kiev, this time among the Russian or russified town population, who protested against the 'ukrainization' of South Russia. The recognition of the Provisional Government meant that, until the summoning of the Constituent Assembly, the General Secretariat of the Ukraine was the recognized authority controlling finance, commerce, industry, agriculture, labour, and other domestic affairs. All measures had to be submitted to the Provisional Government. The Ukraine was to consist of the Governments of Kiev, Volhynia, Podolia, Poltava, and Chernigov; the other Governments mentioned above could be included if

their *zemstvos* so desired. But this measure of autonomy 668
was not accepted. The Rada on August 24 declined 642
to send representatives to the National Council at Moscow, expressed the wish for a separate Ukrainian Constituent Assembly, and asked the Provisional Government to define more clearly its own position.

Meanwhile Russian public opinion, even in revolutionary circles, strongly resented the Ukrainian movement. The resentment was expressed in the communication of the Russian War Office to the *Russkoye-Slovo* of September 2, 1917, in which it was alleged that the League for the Liberation of the Ukraine was conducting espionage in Russia on behalf of Germany, and a separatist Ukrainian propaganda among the Russian prisoners of war, that it was in the pay of the German Foreign Office, and that it was giving help to the German armies. To this communication a reply was given by MM. Melenevski and A. Skoropis-Yelturovski, members of the League for the Liberation of the Ukraine, on October 25, 1917, in Stockholm, in which it was stated that the Austrian and German Governments had no part in the foundation of the League, which had been created in Eastern Galicia with the help of the Ukrainian immigrants; that the League based its hopes on the victory of the Central Powers over Russia; that they expressed the wish that the Central Powers should occupy the Ukraine; that they hoped the Ukraine would be fully independent and essentially democratic; that they carried on a cultural war among the Ukrainian prisoners of war in Germany without the help of the Germans; that the German spy of Ukrainian nationality, Yermolenko, had no connexion with the League; and lastly, that the League accepted money from all friends of the Ukraine, including the German Government, and intended to raise a loan from the German Government.

Then came the fall of the Provisional Government. In the Kerenski-Kornilov affair of 1917 the General Secretariat as well as the Soldiers' and Workmen's Councils of the Ukraine sent their loyal assurances to

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

668 the Provisional Government. The idea of forming
642 part of a Russian federal republic was still powerful
in the Rada; and on September 26, 1917, a conference
of forty different nationalities had met at Kiev to
discuss the question of local autonomies under a federal
system. Preparations for a Constituent Assembly,
which was to include 22 members from the Ukraine
and 17 from the Don Cossacks, were set on foot; while
propaganda was carried on by the ultra-nationalists
and the internationalists, i.e. the Soviets, with a view
to boycotting the Russian Constituent Assembly.

642 In November 1917, after Kerenski's Government
had been replaced by the Bolshevik Soviets, the
Ukraine on the whole was much more in favour of
the latter than were the Don Cossacks, who formed on
November 9 a confederation of a more conservative
character. To save its position among the masses, the
Rada underwent a rapid process of evolution, and on
November 20 published a *Universale* of a radical
character. It proclaimed the 'Ukrainian People's
Republic', abolished all private ownership of land,
introduced State control of production and an eight-hour
day in all factories, removed the death penalty
from the statute book, and finally expressed a hope
that the Ukrainian National Republic would be
federated with the Russian Republic. By doing this
the Rada hoped to check Soviet interference; it failed
to do so; and from December 19 serious differences
between the Rada and the Soviet Government in
642 Petrograd became apparent. The Soviet Government
726 at Petrograd accused the Rada of giving support to
the Cadets and of siding with the Don Cossacks in
their hostility to the Bolsheviks; while the Rada
declared itself a body elected by Revolutionary Democrats
in the Ukraine, and refused to co-operate with
the Bolsheviks or to send delegates with them to Brest-Litovsk.
It finally declared, on December 24, that, as
the Russian army was disorganized, it would take
military measures for the defence of its borders. Some
of the Ukrainian forces mobilized at that time joined

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

the Russian armies on the Rumanian and south- 642
western fronts. The Soviet Government therefore 728
began to organize the Red Guards against the Rada, which by that time had completed its negotiations with Germany, and on December 27 had sent the delegation of the Ukrainian Central Rada to Brest-Litovsk. The delegation was composed of Hrushevski, Holubowich, Vinnitchenko, and Petlura, while the intermediary between them and the Austro-German authorities was Wassilko, a member of the Reichsrat and Count Czernin's adviser on Ukrainian affairs.

On January 11, 1918, the delegates of the Ukrainian Republic were formally recognized at Brest by the Central Powers. This recognition was interpreted by the Rada as meaning the recognition of Ukrainian independence. Vinnitchenko boasted that the French Government had made a gold loan and printed paper money for the Ukraine, and that the Western allies would soon recognize its independence. (The Allied Mission to the Ukraine, sent in December 1917, was interpreted by the Ukrainians as implying such a recognition.) But, while successful at Brest, the Rada's authority in Kiev was shaken by the frequent risings of the Ukrainians of the Soviets (especially at Odessa on January 17 and 28); and the Petrograd Soviets supported the latter, demanding that they should be represented in the Ukrainian delegation. On January 26 the Government at Petrograd broke off relations with the Rada, 'until it is replaced by a Rada of Soviets'. To strengthen its position at Brest, the Rada, on January 28, declared, by 508 votes to 4, for the complete independence of the Ukraine.

(b) *German Occupation.*—On February 9 the 'Bread' 727
peace of Brest-Litovsk was signed between Germany, 142
Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey on the one hand, and the 'Ukrainian People's Republic' (the Rada) on the other. At the same time, however, the report arrived that the Rada had been suppressed by Soviet troops, who declared it to be 'but a sad memory'. On February 20 the British Chargé-d'affaires in Russia

642 denied that Great Britain had recognized the Ukraine
727 as an independent state; while Mr. Balfour gave the same assurance to a member of the Polish National Committee in London, that body having protested against the boundaries of the new state, and against the assigning of Cholm to the Ukraine.

Meanwhile the Russian Soviet army was supporting the Ukrainian Soviets; it forced the Rada to take refuge (March 1) in Jitomir (Volhynia). The Rada now sought protection from the Central Powers. Dr. Seidler made a statement to this effect on March 2 in the Austrian Reichsrat, and soon afterwards the Germans occupied the north-eastern and the Austrians the southern Ukraine. On March 14 the *Vossische Zeitung* declared the Rada to be re-established at Kiev, and ready to ratify the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. But in fact, although the Rada wanted German support in their fight against the Soviets, they could not act against their own people and agree to all the German demands. From the end of March the Germans fought the Soviet troops in the Ukraine, while on the other hand they seized the food supplies of the non-Soviet Ukrainians. The food crisis reached its climax in the middle of April, when the Rada ceased to support the armies of occupation.

Consequently, on April 28, the Ukrainian Rada Government was overthrown by the armies of occupation; and General Skoropadski, a Russian of Ukrainian descent, was placed at the head of affairs, with the title of Hetman. The Rada having refused to abdicate, the Germans on May 7 arrested its members, and attempted to secure the support of the great landowners in their efforts to obtain food. The German Field-Marshal von Eichhorn published a decree re-establishing private ownership of land on a large scale, disarmed the Ukrainian regiments, and organized an army obedient to himself. The opposition to the Germans and to the Hetman Skoropadski, who had dictatorial power and was supported by all who were in favour of the pre-revolutionary regime or were afraid of social strife, inspired such desperate acts as burning stores of grain, and aroused Socialist protests in the Austrian Reichsrat. Meanwhile the Moscow Soviet Government came to an agreement with the Ukrainian Rada (May 23), and recognized the Ukraine as an independent state. On June 13–14 the Russo-Ukrainian armistice was formally signed. 642 727

On May 24 a peasant rising broke out all over the Ukraine owing to the drastic measures of the German military officials, who declared the country in a state of siege; the rising was directed against the Germans and the big landowners, who regarded the German army as militia to be used against social disturbances and anarchy. The objects of this rising were stated in the manifesto of the Peasants' Congress at Kiev on June 7. The congress demanded (1) that a Hetman chosen by landowners should be deposed; (2) that the Ukraine should be a 'People's Republic'; (3) that no land should be returned to proprietors; and (4) that a Legislative Assembly should be convoked. This assembly the peasants agreed to support, appealing to the Germans not to oppose the People's Republic. However, the German troops in occupation continued to suppress strife among the peasants and to collect food by severe means, the result being that Von Eichhorn was assassinated in Kiev on July 30. 642 727 669

The Ukraine now became the battleground of five propagandist forces—pro-German, pro-Ally, pro-Russian Federalist, Bolshevik, and Separatist-Nationalist. The Austrian authorities arranged for the evacuation of Lvov by the Polish troops, and the Ukrainians (Ruthenians) seized the city (October 31) and held it for about a month, during which they are said to have had the help of the Ukrainians from Volhynia as well as of the Austrian officers. The Ukrainian (Ruthenian) National Council stated that it had taken over the administration of Eastern Galicia. The Polish Galician Liquidation Commission, established after the retirement of the Austrian authorities, opposed the Ukrainian claims.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

727 642 669 (c) *The Ukraine since the Armistice.*—The government of Skoropadski lasted for a short time after the signing of the armistice in Western Europe; and the conservative elements in the Ukraine, whether Ukrainians, Poles, or Russians, wished that the Western Allies should support Skoropadski and send a fresh army of occupation to replace the German army. Hoping for an Allied recognition, and under pressure from the peasants, Skoropadski introduced some democratic reforms, and dissolved the Germanophil cabinet of Lyssogub. The old Rada, however, reorganized itself into a Directory with Vinnitchenko and Petlura at its head, and replaced Skoropadski's government on December 14, 1918.

as its center. It dealt heavy blows to the Polish- U 175
Lithuanian state in the middle of the seventeenth C 712
century. The arrows leading from Bazadenk to Lwów 726
point out the direction taken by the army of Hetman Bogdan Chmielnicki to Poland./ /Key inside map: -.-.-. National boundaries. ‐‐‐‐Provincial boundaries. +++++ Western boundaries of the Ukrainian voivodeships in Poland. ←←← Campaign of Bogdan Chmielnicki against Poland in the year 1648. ◈ Cossack regimental command. * Seat of the military order "sech".

/57/ In the "Death Quadrangle"

"In a piercing, frosty north wind" on November 16, 1919 there marched passed each other in 'the quadrangle of death, silently, without a military salute, the fragmentary, wretched, barefoot detachments of the West Ukrainian supporting troops and the likewise fragmentary, wretched, barefoot East Ukrainian front-rank troops. The former were going east into the East Podolian area of concentration where the remnants of the West Ukrainian army were to capitulate before the 'Pan-Russians'; the others were going west to Central Volhynia where they were to surrender to the Poles. Both left behind the same landmarks along their way: frozen corpses in the ditches." (39) This was the funeral march of the last soldiers of the West Ukrainian People's Republic and the Ukrainian People's Republic. U 726

The episode of the new Ukrainian statehood began with the March Revolution in Russia in 1917. On March 22, 1917, a few days after the revolution in Moscow, the "Ukrainian Central Council" was formed in Kiyev, consisting of representatives of U 668 642 ● 175

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39. Kuchabskyj: Western Ukraine in the Struggle with Poland and Bolshevism in the Years 1918 to 1923, page 389.

668 the parties. At the same time the process of making
642 Ukrainians of the various divisions of the troops on
the front began, so that within a few months the
175 Central Council had about one and one-half to two
million Ukrainian soldiers at their disposal. But
in spite of this enormous army, the Central Council
by and large yielded to the orders of the Kerenskii
government of Moscow. Its further policy is characterized
by the four manifestoes which it issued up
to the time of its dissolution in April 1919. On
June 23, 1917 the first manifesto of the Central
Council announced the autonomy of the Ukraine. It
was to maintain its own parliament, the Central
Council, and a /58/ government, the general secretariat.
On July sixteenth the second manifesto followed,
giving particulars as to what was meant by
autonomy, and containing an emphatic declaration
for confederacy. In its manifesto of November 19,
1917 after Lenin had already stepped into power, the
Central Council still clung to the union with Moscow.
Again in this "Universal"-that was what the manifestoes
were called - which proclaimed the Ukrainian
People's Republic, there was mention of federation
with Moscow. On December fourteenth the Council of
648 People's Commissars in Moscow recognized "the
175 Ukrainian People's Republic and its right to separate
completely from Russia or to enter negotiations for
a federation or similar relationships." But in the
same document of recognition the Council of People's
Commissars laid down the condition that the disarming
of Red troops in the Ukraine would have to cease and
that the Central Council would have to desist from
its "counter-revolutionary activity". Should the
People's Commissars fail to obtain a satisfactory
answer to this demand within 48 hours, "the Council
of People's Commissars would assume that the Central
Council was in a state of open warfare against the
Soviet government." A few days after this recognition
coupled with an ultimatum Bolshevik troops
broke into the Ukraine. In Khar'kov there was formed
a Ukrainian-Bolshevik counter-government, and Moscow's

destitute mass of humanity, as yet incapable of
668 self-administration, a much too small middle class
175 and a corrupt reactionary society at the head,-
these were the elements of the hetman state. But
it was the hetman's doom that, for lack of a
national Ukrainian conservative stratum, he was
obliged to lean more and more on the old domiciled
Russian circles who in the end completely won over
the Ukrainian head of the state to their reactionary plans. On November 14, 1918 Skoropadskyj set
642 up an Old Russian government in Kiyev and announced
648 the federation of the Ukraine with a czarist Russia
175 which, however, was never again to arise. Twenty-four hours after the announcement of the annexation of the Ukraine to this fictitious czarist Russia, the revolt of the "Ukrainian National League" against Skoropadskyj and the Old Russian counter-revolutionaries broke out. There begins the period of the second Ukrainian People's Republic, at the head of which is a five-man governing board. At the end of the /61/ seven-month rule of Skoropadskyj, after his flight from the new Ukrainian government, he made the following confession in his last manifesto of December 14, 1918: "God did not give me the strength to attain my goal."

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In the meantime Austria-Hungary also approached its dissolution. On October 10, 1918 in the Imperial Council of Vienna, the Ukrainian parliamentarians from Galicia demanded the right of self-government for the Ukrainians of Austria-Hungary; it was only a few days before the collapse of the Empire. On the eighteenth of October the Ukrainian members of the Imperial Council and the Diet in Lwów founded the Ukrainian National Council which on the following day proclaimed the union of all Ukrainian territories in Austria-Hungary. The National Council set up three executive committees and therewith imagined it had done all that

was necessary. Then they believed a telegram of 642
the Western powers containing the confirmation or 648
the order to make use of self-government and found 175
the West Ukrainian state would come fluttering into the house. The parliamentarians who received their political education in the lobbies of the Imperial Council building had complete faith in the magic formula of self-government and were waiting to see what the Western powers would have to say. Action was taken only by several companies of East Galician-Ukrainian troops who in the night of the first of November seized Lwów in a surprise attack. The Galician capital was predominantly inhabited by Poles and Jews, and the Poles immediately countered with a revolt. The Ukrainian National Council was still waiting patiently; it had made no real preparations to take over power in Galicia. Thus its appeals must be directed to the anonymous masses, "To everyone", with the request that they lend a helping hand everywhere and intervene everywhere. Finally on November ninth the government, the temporary state secretariat, was formed and the division of governmental power very neatly handled. The /62/ National Council was to make the laws, the State Secretariat was to see that they were enforced. Then the order was given that all "necessary steps be taken to unite all the Ukrainian provinces into one state". The new state called itself the "West Ukrainian People's Republic". Its alliance with the East "Ukrainian People's Republic" was solemnly announced on January 22, 1919 in Kiyev. The West Ukrainian People's Republic was given the name "Western Territory of the Ukrainian People's Republic". In reality, however, conditions remained as before between the West Ukrainian and the East Ukrainian state, in spite of formal amalgamation. Both states continued to be independent allies, small West Ukraine being the stronger.

The West Ukrainian state was obliged from the beginning to reckon with opponents who were

642 bent on the most extreme measures. Roman Dmovski,
chairman of the Polish National Committee founded
648 in Paris during the war and leader of the Polish
175 delegation at the peace negotiations, was the most bitter enemy of any kind of Ukrainian state. He countered the partition of Great Russia at Brest Litovsk with the partitioning of the Ukraine. It was completely in accordance with his ideas when as early as February 28, 1918, after Brest Litovsk, the Paris National Committee decided completely to destroy Ukrainian state in East Europe at any cost. To this end Polish agents in Paris, London and Washington used all their powers of persuasion on leading politicians and newspapers. They wisely suppressed the fact that Polish plans secretly included the entire Ukraine west of the Dniepr which had fallen to Russia in the partitions of Poland. These opponents of independent Ukrainian state were augmented: the Polish army of General Haller, which was formed in the summer of 1918 on French soil and which was recognized as the "confederate army" on the twenty-eighth of September, arrived in Poland.

West Ukraine could be nothing more than booty or a tool in the hands of the Allies. Inasmuch as France /63/ wanted to build up against Germany a Poland that was as strong as possible, it was best that Poland subjugate West Ukraine and thus exclude any threat from the rear. Only Foch for a time entertained the plan of erecting a Ukrainian vassal state and of throwing in its soldiers against the Bolsheviks. For the English Liberals, West Ukraine was an object of barter which could be used as an extortionary measure against the French, or, if there was no other way, could be made into a mandate state under the supervision of the League of Nations.

The fiercest enemies of the East Ukrainian
648 statehood, however, were the Bolsheviks who, fully
175 aware of the fateful significance of a loss of the

648 175 Ukraine for the Muscovite realm, strained every effort to fight for the country. The Pan-Russian counter-revolutionary armies also proved themselves opponents not to be underestimated. "The campaigns of Denikin, Kolchak, Iudenich and other Russian generals clearly proved that there were only two forces fighting in the Russian civil war: the old Czarist absolutism against the new Bolshevik despotism. And both of them fought with equal ferocity against the Ukraine." (41)

41. Danko: The Nation in Soviet Chains, page 25.

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726 175 A surprise attack of the Ukrainian troops on Lwów set off the Polish-West Ukrainian War. For weeks wild fighting raged in the streets of the city; finally the Poles succeeded in bringing in troops and forcing the Ukrainians out of Lwów during the night of November 22, 1918. The victors exercised bloody reprisals on the Ukrainian population; they destroyed Ukrainian property and dragged many respected citizens into concentration camps from which they were never to return. The Jews expiated for their neutrality with a three-day pogrom, during which whole blocks of houses went up in flames.

[631] •642 648 726 175 After the loss of Lwów, the West Ukrainian state included about 40,000 square kilometers with four million /64/ inhabitants,among them three million Ukrainians. To destroy this dwarf state was the firm intention of the leaders of the Polish state of eighteen million. The Ukrainian government now had its seat at Stanislawów; Dr. Ievgen Petrushevych was the head of the state. He and many other men who were responsible for the fate of West Ukraine still regarded it as "an incident, a misunderstanding, an error" that there was any fighting at all between Poles and Ukrainians. Heedless of the front which was expanding day by

642 day and of the increasingly bloody battles, they
648 abandoned themselves to the illusion that these
misunderstandings would merely have to be cleared
726 up and all would be well. They believed that
175 patience was required until the Allies carried out
the right of self-government for which the Ukrain-
ians alone were obliged to fight with weapons.
"The fact that individual destinies must be det-
ermined by the will of the individual - such
points of view which are so familiar to conquer-
ing nations, were completely foreign to the 'Uk-
rainian National Council', all the more since
there was not a single, in any way outstanding,
personality in leading political circles, who
would have been capable in a critical situation
to grasp the reins and direct events." (42)

42. Kuchabskyj: West Ukraine in the Struggle with Poland and Bolshevism, page 52.

175 The war which at the beginning was carried
726 on with a few thousand men on both sides was in
full force by the end of December. At this time
the Ukrainians successfully mobilized their fight-
ing manpower up to 35 years of age. Then, how-
ever, they made the mistake of abandoning warfare
in the open country and of leaving the initiative
to the Poles who, in keeping with their reckless
methods, made use of it. In spite of the fact
that the Ukrainian front which ran northward from
the Carpathians presented considerable deficiencies
along its approximately 250-kilometer length, that
the battalions, for example, were strung together
loosely and without a unified supreme command,
nevertheless the Polish troops which arrived from
mid-January on suffered heavy defeats. Thus Gen-
000 eral Romer /Facing page 64/ /Above: A typical
Ukrainian church made of wood, in the Carpathians.
Below: Ukrainian peasant woman baking bread./[1]
/Facing page 65/ /The Ukrainian landscape is full

[1] [This plate not processed for files — Analyst]

[Ruthenians]

728 ies in Austria and boundaries of the various gub-
631 ermyas in Russia./

/81/ **Fair Play**

186 In the winter of 1938/39 the Ukrainian peasants in Poland were no longer recognizable. If after the pacification of 1930 they went about for many years bent and timid like beaten dogs, they now carried their heads higher. It was as though they felt a fresh breeze, and whenever they had business with Polish officials they omitted expressions of due respect, in fact they became cynical. They stood around in groups, talked in the most animated fashion, nudged each other meaningfully and sometimes laughed out loud.

[186] 101 •642 What happened? Since the end of October 1938, there was the "Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy" beyond the Carpathians. There on the southern slopes of the Carpathians live the Ukrainian tribes of Lemki, Boyki and the Huzul. On poor soil they eke out a precarious living as small farmers, woodsmen and shepherds. In the warmer season many of them hire themselves out as harvest workers in the fertile Hungarian lowlands, and there they also trade in carriage grease. Before the First World War they shipped salt to Warsaw and fruit even as far as Moscow. Ruthenia, as their little country was once called, always belonged to the Kingdom bearing the crown of Stephen. After the downfall of the Hapsburg monarchy Czech insatiability succeeded in having "Carpatho-Russia" - that is what Ruthenia was now called - assigned to the Czechs by the edict of Saint-Germain. The "autonomy" which the little country was promised on paper in the edict remained an unfulfilled dream for its inhabitants. "Carpatho-Russia" was a province abounding in forests, which Prague could and would exploit. It was only after the solution of the Sudeten

[Ruthenians]

101 642 crisis when the centralistic /82/power of the Czechs slackened and the Slovaks stubbornly insisted on their autonomy, that the "Carpatho-Ukrainians" - this is the name they henceforth adopted - were also granted a certain autonomy.

186 This seeming independence, nothing more than a weak, short-lived light which the Hungarian storm was to blow out only a few months later, in March 1939, sufficed, however to nourish vigorously the hopes of West Ukrainians north of the Carpathians. Therefore Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy was more important to them than sunshine and rain. This was the great event which they were discussing and on account of which they even neglected their fields. Just as all Ukrainians from the Kuban to the Carpathians honor the same heroes in their common folksongs, the seafarers of the Rus and the Cossacks of the sech, just as they shared the experience and the suffering of the wars of liberation between 1917 and 1923, so they now regarded as their own good fortune the fact that a piece of land, if only a small one, was apparently under independent Ukrainian administration.

In Ruska Lane and on the "Ring" in Lwów the newly-awakened Ukrainian self-awareness made itself felt in demonstrations. In the middle of October and the beginning of November 1938, the Ukrainians of Lwów protested against the foes of the "Silver Land". Not only in the Galician metropolis, but also in Przemysl, in Stryj, in all of West Ukrainia, the Ukrainians mustered: cries of abuse against Poland and cries of "Slava Ukrajini!" - "Glory to - the Ukraine!" - were heard, and the national anthem was repeated innumerable times. It did not cool the hot passions to have Poles on these occasions beat to death a few Ukrainians or shoot them down. The fever of hope that they might shake off Polish domination seized them. Ukrainian daily papers filled their front pages exclusively with reports from Carpatho-Ukraine.

661 general secretary of the KPU, Kossier, was appar-
665 ently justified in saying: "The fact that we have
000 shattered nationalism, /Facing page 120/ /Ukrainian girl drawing water./7/Facing page 121/ /What a wealth of imagination and highly developed skill is disclosed in these pretty handmade national costumes!/7/121/ that we have organized our work properly in the country, this has determined our successes in the year 1933." (67)

67. Izvestiia" Number 19 and Number 20, 1934, in Nation und Staat, page 107.

000 Several years later these fierce foes of the Ukrainian people were themselves to be "unmasked". They were, for example, the friend of Postyshev, Ioina Iakir, at that time supreme commander of the Red Army in the Ukraine who had raged furiously against the nationalists at the Seventeenth Congress, and the People's Commissar Tsatonskyj who was shot in 1937 because of counterrevolutionary activities. Tastonskyj's successor, Khomenko, was relieved of his office on April 9, 1939.

642 From the time that Moscow once more obtained for itself, with bullet and bayonet, a separatist Ukraine, the freedom of the country has been constantly curtailed. When the period of "integral centralization" with the Five Year Plans, began the branch office of the Foreign Commissariat in Khar'kov was eliminated, the Ukrainians were removed from leading positions in economy and the government, and the individual commissariats and whatever important commanding positions there were, were little by little turned over to Moscow.

The democratic Constitution of November 1936 tops the skyscraper of integral centralism. Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution are merely a gesture, according to which "every Soviet republic exercises supreme power quite as a matter of course"

7[For plates, cf. pp. 221-222, category 116 -Analyst]

642 and "every republic of the Union has its constitution which takes into consideration the peculiarities of this republic..."; and Article 17 which avers that "every republic of the Union retains the right of voluntary withdrawal from the USSR" is merely an empty phrase, for the laws of the entire Bolshevik realm have equal power in all the federated republics and take precedence over the laws of the federated republics. Anyone who would dare to put into effect in his federated state the "right of voluntary withdrawal" from the Union, would be presented with Article 133 of the same Constitution, which says: "Defending his country is the /122/ most sacred duty of every citizen of the USSR. Treason like violating an oath, going over to the enemy, damaging the military forces of the state and espionage will be avenged as the greatest crime with all the force of the law." If it should occur to a Ukrainian to agitate for the right of voluntary withdrawal from the Union of his federated republic, which is "guaranteed" him in Article 17, Article 123 could be cited to prevent him from doing so, which makes punishable "any propaganda of a racial or nationally exclusive nature".

642 Now, what is the "independent exercise of
645 supreme power" in the Ukraine like? Article 77 of the Constitution[1] clarifies this point, the People's Commissariats of Moscow are alone competent in matters pertaining to defense, foreign policy, foreign trade, traffic, the entire postal system, heavy industry and defense industry. But since the Constitution went into effect further commissariats of the Federated Republics have been subordinated to the Moscow offices, so that only education, local industry, municipal economy and social welfare have remained in Ukrainian hands. These are subject to the supervision of the national office. Under such circumstances it does not matter how the administrative system of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic is built up,

[1] [i.e. of November 1936 – Analyst]

642 inasmuch as the entire governmental hierarchy
645 from the village council /soviet/to the head of the state is merely a body of sheriffs whose duty is to see that the orders from Moscow are carried out.

000 In place of the nationalization of non-Russian peoples, which was given up in 1930, there have come up since 1936 the slogans about the "common socialistic fatherland", the "great Soviet people", the "love of the Soviet homeland". Besides that, the theory of the Russian people as the "leading people of the Revolution" is being quite systematically disseminated. The chauvinism of Great Russia which Stalin so mercilessly exposed to shame at the Party Congress of 1930 bids fair /123/ to recapturing for the Great Russian people the same position it had at the time of the White Czars.

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871 Since Ukrainization was discontinued,[2] the education of Ukrainian youth goes on strictly according to the principles of the Marx-Lenin doctrine. Woe to the educator against whom it can be proved that he is departing from this course. Thousands of scholars and pedagogues had to give up their lives because of such mistakes.

The basic type of school in Soviet Ukraine, just as throughout the Soviet realm, is the "seven-grade work school" which roughly corresponds to an elementary school. Attendance in the four lower grades is obligatory, in the three higher ones, voluntary. The young Ukrainian, after he has graduated from the work school, may enter the "professional school" (a sort of technical school) or the "workers' school" for factory apprentices. The adult worker may enroll as auditor in the "workers' academy". There are also "Party schools", such as the "Pan-Ukrainian Institute for Communist Education", and, in place

[2] [At the 16th All-Union Communist Party Congress of the Soviet Union in June 1930—Analyst]

474 attempt has been made to increase the /158/comrades' interest in the kolhosp by means of prizes.

The most recent development of the Communist village group is characterized by the fact that the farmers tacitly divide up the collective land among themselves. Such a thing is possible only if the kolhosp officials and the village Soviets are in collusion, and if there are free acres besides the lands that are cultivated by the MTS. The Communist is January 29, 1939 confirms this development when it says that in the district of Shmerynka 145 farmers owned more animals than are permissible according to law, and 135 farmers more land than is allowed. The farmers work very industriously on their own land, whereas they neglect the collective farms. At the conference of the Central Committee of the KPU the law passed in April 1939, limiting the ownership of property of the collective farmers - "law against the waste of land" - was discussed, and it was noted that in many districts collective land was divided up. It was said that in this way private ownership of land had reappeared in hidden form. Finally the Visti of June 22, 1939 announced that the "regulation of peasant property" was to take place by November 15, 1939; "regulation", however, means a recent curtailment of peasant private ownership which had been permitted since 1934. This curtailment was also in the interests of the industrial section of Soviet economy, after many workers, mostly peasant sons, went back to their native villages from the industrial areas, because they found better living conditions there.

/159/ Coal, Ore, Petroleum, Workers

642 All the conditions which, according to the teachings of Karl Marx, ought to contribute to the happiness of the workers are fulfilled in the Soviet Union and therefore also in Soviet Ukraine.

11: Obermaier--169 J-3(no date)1942 RD1UkraineRD1

242 On one-sixth of the world all the treasures within the earth and all that grows on top of it belong to the workers, as well as all mines, factories, and means of communication. The workers distribute the goods, they make the laws, determine the working hours, wages and prices; they also establish the deductions from wages and salaries and make out the taxes. Everyone must work, there are no persons of independent means and no capitalistic employers who can fatten on profits. The workers are the sovereign lords in the Soviet Union, and nothing prevents them from enjoying the enormous wealth of their country. Stalin had this theory in mind when he stated in his introduction to the new constitution in November 1936: "... in the field of political economy of the Soviet Union we now have a new socialistic economy which knows no depressions and no unemployment, no misery and no profit, and which grants its citizens every possibility for a life of comfort and civilization."

According to this definition, life in the Ukraine should be the most attractive; here is the country richest in natural resources in eastern Europe, with a pleasant, sunny climate. The raw 135 materials are happily balanced and are found within favorable distances between each other. There is coal, iron ore, manganese ore, water power, oil, turf, salt, potassium salts, phosphate and kaolin. There is lacking, with the exception of a certain amount of mercury and nickle, only colored metals.

361 /160/ The exploitation of Ukrainian natural resources is comparatively recent. The Englishman Hughes John established industry in the 1870s in the Donets region, and shortly thereafter Frenchmen and Belgians founded the ore industry near Krivoy Rog. The present-day industrial cities developed from the barracks of the first workers' 000 settlements. The tremendous increase in popula-

648 Hetman of the Ukraine (April 29, 1918) did not change the situation, since a large majority of the people considered him head of a puppet government created with the help of German bayonets and, therefore, subservient to German dictation.

After the defeat of the Central powers by the Western allies at the end of 1918, the German sponsored Government was replaced by a new Ukrainian Government called "Directorium" under the leadership of Simon Petliura. At the same time, the Soviet Government annulled the Brest-Litovsk treaty and ordered its military forces to enter the Ukraine. A new war between the Ukraine and Soviet Russia began. Since the Germans had prevented the formation of a Ukrainian army, the Bolsheviks were at an advantage. In desperation, Petliura made a last attempt to combat Bolshevik aggression by concluding a very unfavorable military alliance with the Polish Government under Pilsudski's leadership.[20] The advance of the United Polish-Ukrainian Army during the summer of 1920 was reversed by a Bolshevik counter offensive. As a result, the allied forces were driven out of the Ukraine. Subsequently, the Soviet and Polish Governments agreed, in the treaty of Riga of March 18, 1921, to divide the Ukrainian territories between themselves.

* * *

642 668 After the destruction of Ukrainian statehood, Bolsheviks formed an "independent" Soviet Ukrainian Government, the members of which, directly appointed by the Kremlin, were totally subordinated to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. At this time, Stalin was in a position to openly reveal the true meaning of the Bolshevik proclamations concerning the right of non-Russian nations to self-determination when he wrote:

> We are in favor of the separation of India, Arabia, Egypt, Morocco, and the other colonies from the entente, for here separation implies the liberation of these oppressed countries from Imperialism, thus undermining the position of Imperialism and strengthening the position of revolution. We are against the separation of the border regions from Russia since separation would here involve Imperialist servitude for the border regions, thus undermining the revolutionary power of Russia and strengthening the position of Imperialism.[21]

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[20] Winston S. Churchill attached great importance to this alliance as is obvious from his book, *The Aftermath* (New York, 1929), pp. 277-278.

[21] Stalin's preface to his "Sbornik statei," 1920. Cf. *Sotchineniya*, Vol. IV (Moscow, 1947), p. 372.

15: Pap S-4, 5 (no date) 1952 RD1 Ukraine RD

668 the Ukrainian people. This was especially obvious when the Congress adopted a resolution calling for the liquidation of the "independence" of various Soviet Republics because, the Soviet leaders claimed, "not a single Soviet Republic, taken alone, can regard itself as secure against economic exhaustion and military destruction on the part of world Imperialism."[24] In order to eliminate the potential opposition and distrust among the non-Russian Communists, the Congress formally condemned Great Russian chauvinism as harmful, because of its colonizing spirit, to the cause of Communism. This condemnation, however, did not have any practical significance. The Soviet Commissars in the Ukraine continued the policy of strict centralization and Russification. The Ukrainian Communists could not tolerate this policy without losing face; and they demanded that the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party recall its Commissars. This demand was flatly rejected by the Kremlin with an admonition: the Soviet officials in the Ukraine must be accepted as the only executive force. Much to Lenin's surprise, the Ukrainian Communist Party at the end of 1921 dismissed the Kremlin-appointed Commissars from their duties and elected members from their own ranks for the important positions. This independent attitude of the Ukrainian Communists annoyed the Russian leaders so much that Lenin was obliged to intervene personally in the matter. In his speech at the eleventh Congress of the All-Russian Communist Party, Lenin warned that, despite the recognition of the Ukraine as an independent Soviet Republic, the Bolsheviks would not permit Ukrainian leaders to deviate from the Party principles. Lenin further informed the Congress that he had assigned "Comrade" Ordzonikidze and the Central Committee to investigate the whole matter. He admitted that, according to them, it would require ten years to compile a detailed report on the events in the Ukraine. "One thing," Lenin said, "is clear, that despite the unanimously-adopted instructions of the Central Committee, the group (appointed by the Kremlin) was replaced by the local group."[25]

• 642 668 The internal difficulties and independent attitude taken by the non-Russian Communists forced the Soviet leaders in Moscow to press their original plan of more centralization. On December 29, 1922, the plenipotentiary delegates of the Russian (R.S.F.S.R.), the Ukrain-

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[24] "The Immediate Tasks of the Party in Connection with the National Problem" Resolution adopted by the Tenth Congress.

[25] *XI. Sjezd Rossijskoji Communistichekoji Partiyi (B) March 27-April 1922, Stenograficheskij otchet* (Partizdat, Moscow), p. 31.

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ian (UKR.S.S.R.), the Byelo-Russian (W.R.S.S.R.) and the Transcaucasian (T.S.F.S.R.—Georgia, Azerbaidzan and Armenia) Socialist Republics concluded, under Moscow's auspices, a treaty providing amalgamation into a single federated state—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The terms of the treaty gave the Central Soviet Government in Moscow practically unlimited power.[26] The Russian Communist Party secured its legal right to intervene in the internal affairs of the member States and to suppress the opposition against Moscow among the non-Russian Communists. However, the non-Russian leaders of the Soviet Republics were reluctant to surrender their positions and the struggle between Russian and non-Russian Communists continued with even more fervor. 642 668

The controversy over the national policy reached its climax at the twelfth Congress of the All-Russian Communist Party. In his report, Stalin spoke at length on the internal and international significance of the national question.[27] For the first time he attacked not only Great Russian chauvinism but also local nationalism as an equal danger to the Soviet regime. Referring to the penetration of elements with a Great Russian spirit into the highest ranks of the Communist Party, Stalin said: 668

> It is not accidental, comrades, that the Smenovekhists[28] have recruited a large number of supporters from among the Soviet officials. That is by no means accidental. Nor is it accidental that Messrs. the Smenovekhists are lauding the Bolshevik Communists, saying, as it were, 'You may talk as much as you like about Bolshevism, you may prate as much as you like about your internationalist tendencies, but we know that what Denikin failed to do, you will do; that you, Bolsheviks have resurrected, or at least are going to resurrect the great idea of a Great Russia.'[29]

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[26] The Russian Communist Party was in a position to adopt any resolution, since the great majority of the Party members were Russians. At the eleventh Congress, for example, when the question of amalgamation of the republics was raised and the resolution for strict centralization approved, the delegates consisted of 341 Russians, 77 Jews, 10 Tartars, 12 Armenians, 9 Georgians, 19 Latvians, 8 Kirghizs and 46 others.

[27] *XII. Sjezd Rossijskoji Communisticheskoji Partiyi (B), op. cit.*, p. 441.

[28] ". . . Smenovechovzy—former members of the White Army who now recognized the victory of the Red Army as a national victory, the deliverance of Russia from western Europe, and the birth of a new Russian empire of Asiatic orientation . . . (p. 137). . . . The name 'Smenovechovzy' has been coined after a collection of essays entitled 'Smena Vech,' 'the change of signposts' (Prague, 1931). A collection of essays published in 1909, called 'Vechi' advocated a change of policy by the Russian intelligentsia. In the 'Smena Vech' the change was to take the form of recognizing Bolshevism as a national government." (pp. 386-387) W. Gurian, *Bolshevism: Theory and Practice* (New York, 1932).

[29] *XII. Sjezd Rossijskoji Communisticheskoji Partiyi (B), op. cit.*, p. 442.

16: American Russian Institute RD1 Ukraine RD1
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[For the complete text of the Constitution of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic of January 30, 1937 as amended through November 21, 1949, see category 116, entire source.]

16: Amer. Russ. Inst. (no date) 1950 RD1 Ukraine RD1

CONSTITUTION
(Fundamental Law)
of the
UKRAINIAN
SOVIET SOCIALIST
REPUBLIC
of January 30, 1937
As amended through November 21, 1949

Chapter I. The Social Structure

642 Art. 1. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic is a socialist state of workers and peasants.

Art. 2. The Soviets of Working People's Deputies which grew and attained strength as a result of the overthrow of the power of the landlords and capitalists, the setting up of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the liberation of the Ukrainian people from national oppression by Tsarism and by the Russian imperialist bourgeoisie and the defeat of the nationalist counter-revolution constitute the political foundation of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 3. In the Ukrainian SSR all power belongs to the working people of town and country as represented by the Soviets of Working People's Deputies.

471 Art. 4. The economic foundation of the Ukrainian SSR is the socialist system of economy and the socialist ownership of the means and instruments of production established as the result of the abolition of the capitalist system of economy, the abrogation of private ownership of the means and instruments of production and the elimination of the exploitation of man by man.

Art. 5. Socialist property in the Ukrainian SSR exists either in the form of State property (the possession of the whole people), or in the form of co-operative and collective farm property (the possession of collective farms or co-operative associations).

475 421 Art. 6. The land, its natural deposits, waters, forests, mills, factories, mines, rail, water and air transport, banks, communications, large State-organized agricultural enterprises (State farms, machine and tractor stations and the like), as well as municipal enterprises and the bulk of houses in the cities and industrial localities, are State property, that is belong to the whole people.

474 421 Art. 7. The common enterprises of collective farms and co-operative organizations with their livestock and implements, and the products of the collective farms and co-operative organizations, as well as their common buildings, constitute the common, socialist property of collective farms and co-operative organizations.

[472] In addition to its basic income from the common collective farm enterprise, every household in a collective farm has for its personal use a small plot of household land and, as its personal property, a subsidiary husbandry on the plot, a dwelling house, livestock, poultry and minor agricultural implements — in accordance with the regulations of the agricultural artel.

[Ukrainian Constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

423 Art. 8. The land occupied by collective farms is secured to them free of charge
474 and for an unlimited time, that is, in perpetuity.

472 Art. 9. Alongside the socialist system of economy in the Ukrainian SSR the law permits the private economy of individual peasants and artisans based on their own work and precluding the exploitation of the labour of others.

421 Art. 10. The right of citizens to personal ownership of their incomes from work and of their savings, of their dwelling houses and subsidiary household economy, their household furniture and utensils, articles of personal use and convenience, as well as the right of inheritance of personal property of citizens, is protected by law.

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471 Art. 11. The economic life of the Ukrainian SSR is determined and directed by the State National Economic Plan with the aim of increasing the public wealth, of steadily improving the material and cultural level of the working people and of consolidating the independence of the socialist country and strengthening its defensive capacity.

461 Art. 12. In the Ukrainian SSR work is a duty and a matter of honour for every able-bodied citizen, in accordance with the principle: "He who does not work, neither shall he eat."

The principle applied in the Ukrainian SSR is that of socialism: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his work."

Chapter II. The State Structure

642 Art. 13. For the purpose of mutual assistance among the Union Republics along economic and political lines, as well as along the line of defence, the Ukrainian SSR voluntarily united with the other equal Soviet Socialist Republics, namely:

The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic,
The Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic,
The Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic and
The Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic

in a federal state, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Proceeding from the aforesaid, the Ukrainian SSR ensures to the USSR, as represented by its higher organs of state power and organs of state administration, the rights defined in Article 14 of the Constitution of the USSR.

Outside of the spheres set forth in Article 14 of the Constitution of the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR exercises state authority independently, retaining its sovereign rights in full.

16: Amer. Russ. Inst. (no date) 1950 RDl Ukraine RDl

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

642 Art. 14. The Ukrainian SSR reserves the right freely to secede from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Art. 15. The territory of the Ukrainian SSR may not be altered without its consent.

[601] Art. 15a. The Ukrainian SSR has its own Republican military formations.

[648] Art. 15b. The Ukrainian SSR has the right to enter into direct relations with foreign states and to conclude agreements and exchange diplomatic and consular representatives with them.

Art. 16. The laws of the USSR are binding within the territory of the Ukrainian SSR.

[641] Art. 17. Every citizen of the Ukrainian SSR is a citizen of the USSR.

Citizens of all other Union Republics enjoy on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR equal rights with citizens of the Ukrainian SSR.

631 Art. 18. The Ukrainian SSR consists of the Vinnitsa, Volhynia, Voroshilovgrad, Dniepropetrovsk, Drohobych, Zhitomir, Transcarpathian, Zaporozhye, Izmail, Kamenets-Podolsk, Kiev, Kirovograd, Lvov, Nikolayev, Odessa, Poltava, Rovno, Stalino, Stanislav, Sumi, Ternopol, Kharkov, Kherson, Chernigov and Chernovitsi Regions.

Art. 19. The jurisdiction of the Ukrainian SSR, as represented by its higher organs of state power and organs of state administration, embraces:

a) Adoption of the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR and control over its observance;

b) Submission of the formation of new regions constituting part of the Ukrainian SSR to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for confirmation;

c) Establishment of the boundaries, and of the division into districts, of regions;

d) Legislation of the Ukrainian SSR;

e) Maintenance of public order and safeguarding the rights of citizens;

f) Approval of the national-economic plan of the Ukrainian SSR;

g) Approval of the state budget of the Ukrainian SSR and of the report on its fulfilment;

h) Determination of state and local taxes, imposts and non-tax revenues in conformity with the laws of the USSR;

i) Direction of the fulfilment of the local budgets of the regions;

j) Direction of insurance and savings;

k) Administration of the banks, industrial, agricultural and trading enterprises and organizations subordinate to the Republic, as well as direction of local industry;

l) Control and superintendence of the condition and administration of enterprises subordinate to the Union;

m) Establishment of the procedure governing the use of land, mineral wealth, forests and waters;

n) Direction of dwelling houses and the municipal economy, dwelling house construction and the modernization of cities and other inhabited places;

o) Road building; direction of local transport and communications;

p) Labour legislation;

q) Direction of social maintenance;

r) Direction of elementary, secondary and higher education;

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

642 s) Direction of the cultural, educational and scientific organizations and institutions of the Ukrainian SSR, and administration of the cultural, educational and scientific organizations and institutions of all-Republican importance;

t) Direction of public health and administration of institutions of public health of all-Republican importance;

u) Direction and organization of physical culture and sports;

v) Organization of the judicial organs of the Ukrainian SSR;

w) Granting the rights of citizenship of the Ukrainian SSR;

x) Legislation concerning marriage and the family:

y) Amnesty and pardon of citizens convicted by judicial organs of the Ukrainian SSR;

z) Organization of the military formations of the Ukrainian SSR;

aa) Establishment of the representation of the Ukrainian SSR in international relations.

Chapter III. The Higher Organs of State Power of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic

646 Art. 20. The highest organ of state power in the Ukrainian SSR is the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 21. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR is elected for a term of four years by the citizens of the Ukrainian SSR voting by election districts on the basis of one deputy for every 100,000 of the population.

Art. 22. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR exercises all rights vested in the Ukrainian SSR in accordance with Articles 13 and 19[1] of the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR, in so far as they do not, by virtue of the Constitution, come within the jurisdiction of organs of the Ukrainian SSR that are accountable to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, that is, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, and the Ministries of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 23. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR is the sole legislative organ of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 24. A law is considered adopted if passed by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR by a simple majority vote.

[643] Art. 25. Laws passed by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR are published over the signatures of the President and Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 26. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR elects a Chairman of the Supreme Soviet and two Vice-Chairmen.

Art. 27. The Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR presides at the sittings of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainain SSR and has charge of the conduct of its business and proceedings.

643 Art. 28. The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR elects the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, consisting of a President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, two Vice-Presidents, a Secretary of the Presidium and fifteen members of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

[1] [Cf, cat. 116, p. 2-1--Analyst]

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov 21, 1949]

666 Art. 121. Elections of deputies to Soviets of Working People's Deputies of the Ukrainian SSR are held by election districts on the following bases:

[234] in elections to regional Soviets – one deputy for every 15,000 to 30,000 of the population, depending upon its size;

[230] in elections to district and area Soviets – one deputy for every 1,000 of the population; in a district or area whose population does not exceed 25,000, twenty-five deputies are elected, and in a district or area whose population exceeds 60,000, not more than sixty deputies are elected;

[232] in elections to city Soviets or city district Soviets – one deputy for every 350 to 900 of the population, depending upon its size; in a city or city district whose population does not exceed 12,000, thirty-five deputies are elected;

in elections to the Kiev and Kharkov city Soviets – one deputy for every 1,000 of the population;

[623] in elections to village or settlement Soviets – one deputy for every 100 of the population; in a village or settlement whose population does not exceed 1,000, nine deputies are elected, and where the population exceeds 2,500, not more than twenty-five deputies.

The basis of representation for each regional, district, city, village and settlement Soviet of Working People's Deputies is fixed in the "Ordinance Concerning Elections to Regional, District, City, Village and Settlement Soviets of Working People's Deputies of the Ukrainian SSR," within the range of the bases of representation indicated in the present article.

Art. 122. Candidates for elections are nominated according to electoral district.

The right to nominate candidates is secured to public organizations and societies of the working people: Communist Party organizations, trade unions, co-operatives, youth organizations and cultural societies.

Art. 123. It is the duty of every deputy to report to his electors on his work and on the work of the Soviet of Working People's Deputies, and he is liable to be recalled at any time upon decision of the majority of the electors in the manner established by law.

Chapter X. Arms, Flag, Capital

186 Art. 124. The state arms of the Ukrainian SSR are a sickle and hammer of gold in relief, placed crosswise, handles down against a red background in the rays of the rising sun, and surrounded by ears of wheat, which are placed symmetrically, from bottom to top, forming a circle. Between the tops of the ears of wheat is a red star. At the bottom of the wreath are the words, "Ukrainian SSR" on a red band, and at the bottom of the ears of corn the words, "Workers of all Countries Unite!" in the Russian language on the right, and in the Ukrainian language on the left.

Art. 125. The state flag of the Ukrainian SSR is of cloth divided into two horizontal bands of color: the upper band, in red, is two-thirds of the width of the flag, and the lower band, in azure, is one-third of the width of the flag. In the upper part of the flag, about one-third of the distance from the staff, are a hammer and sickle of gold and above them a five-pointed star with a gold border.

The relation of width to length of the flag is 1:2.

Art. 126. The Capital of the Ukrainian SSR is the City of Kiev.

Chapter XI. Procedure for Amending the Constitution

642 646 Art. 127. The Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR may be amended only by decision of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR adopted by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the votes of the Supreme Soviet.

131 [728] constituent autonomous republic, the Moldavian A.S.S.R.[1] On November 1, 1939, 88,000 square kilometres were added when Western Ukraine, which in 1920 had been annexed by Poland, was re-joined to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic.

131 728 Another 21,300 square kilometres were added in June 1940 when Bessarabia (annexed by Rumania in 1913) and Northern Bukovina (another part of Rumania) also were incorporated, making the Ukraine's total area then about 579,000 square kilometres. However, a small decrease occurred in August 1940 when the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. granted the petition of the Moldavian people in Bessarabia to join with a part of the Moldavian Autonomous Republic to form the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Before the outbreak of the German-Soviet war the area of the Ukraine was 575,000 square kilometres ($2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the territory of the Soviet Union); and the population was over 40 millions. After the addition of the Transcarpathian region in June 1945, the Ukraine's total area was 587,700 square kilometres; it is approximately the same today. The following table summarizes the changes in the area and population of the Ukrainian S.S.R. from 1939 to June 1941.

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635 642 The U.S.S.R. is composed of sixteen Union Soviet Socialist Republics. Within this framework there exist a number of autonomous provinces, national regions and autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics. Before August 1940 the Ukrainian S.S.R. included one autonomous republic, the Moldavian A.S.S.R. which was subsequently given full status and became the sixteenth Union Republic. According to Professor Trainin, the Soviet authority on legal questions, the main distinction between autonomous and union republics is that the latter are guaranteed the right of free secession from the U.S.S.R. - a right which is not incorporated in the constitutions of the autonomous republics. Another difference regarding status is that whereas in the Soviet of Nationalities (one of the two chambers of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.) every Union republic is represented by 25 deputies, the autonomous republic is represented by only 11.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1

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THE UKRAINE

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According to the 1926 census there were but 8 per cent Great Russians in the Ukraine, but these were mostly town-dwellers and proletarian elements and thus were able to play a considerable part in the political history of the Ukrainian S.S.R. since, according to Bolshevik principles, city workers necessarily lead the peasants, and the towns the countryside.

The towns of the Ukraine during the inter-war period had been not only bi-national Russian-Ukrainian but tri-national Russian-Ukrainian-Jewish, with the Jews frequently gravitating culturally to the Russian side. In Kiev, the largest Ukrainian city, the Ukrainians were originally the smallest ethnical group of the three. The 1926 census showed that Kiev's population consisted of 25·4 per cent Ukrainians, 36·2 per cent Russians, 32·1 per cent Jews and 3 per cent Poles. After 1926 the balance improved in favour of the Ukrainians but basically Kiev remained a Ukrainian-Russian-Jewish city. Kharkov, almost equal in size to Kiev, had in 1933 48 per cent Ukrainian inhabitants, whilst there were 30·3 per cent Russians and 17·7 per cent Jews. Of all the big cities of the Ukraine, Odessa, the capital of 'New Russia' has always been the least Ukrainian. Even including Odessa's country district the Ukrainians accounted for only 41 per cent of the total population against 23 per cent Russians and 20 per cent Jews. In the city of Odessa there were 17·5 per cent Ukrainians against 38·6 per cent Russians and 36·4 per cent Jews. Dniepropetrovsk, the fourth largest city of the Ukraine, in 1933 comprised 36 per cent Ukrainians, 31·5 per cent Russians and 26·6 per cent Jews.

The drastic reduction in the number of Jews through Hitlerite massacres and evacuation during the war improved the position of the Ukrainians in the cities of the Western and Central Ukraine, but in the industrial regions of the Eastern Ukraine the Ukrainians cannot keep pace with the tempo of urbanization and the needs of manpower. The two eastern border provinces of the Ukraine, Voroshilovgrad and Stalino, making up the Donets Basin, are inhabited by an international working-class, in particular by a strong Russian element, and are steadily growing in importance in relation to the Ukraine as a whole. The population of the Stalino Province rose by 91 per cent between 1926 and 1939 and that of the Voroshilovgrad Province by 37 per cent during the same period. The growth of the Stalino Province can be even better assessed by comparing the numbers of inhabitants of its three largest towns in 1926 and 1939. Stalino, the provincial centre rose from 174,000 to 462,000, Makeyevka from 79,421 to 240,000, Mariupol from 64,000 to 222,000.

STALINIST CENTRALISM VERSUS UKRAINIAN AUTONOMY

S.U. 631 186

UK. 186 642

The fact that Russians and Ukrainians are from the historical, geographical and ethnical point of view objectively inseparable calls for a certain

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
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co-ordination of the affairs of the two peoples. The Bolshevik régime has failed to bring about this co-ordination. The Russian-Ukrainian union as determined by the constitutions of 1923 and 1936 amounted to a subordination of the Ukraine to Moscow and indirectly to the Great Russians.

The foundation of the U.S.S.R. on December 30th, 1922, constituted in itself a triumph for the Russian people and a defeat for the Ukrainians. It signified the end of the loose constitutional ties which during the first years of the Soviet régime existed between Great Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians and the peoples of Transcaucasia. A firm centralistic organization – the U.S.S.R. – took the place of the treaty relations between the R.S.F.S.R. and the Soviet Republics of the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaidzhan. Stalin, in his capacity of Peoples Commissar for Nationalities, played a leading part in this process of transformation which rendered a great service to Russian nationalism but ignored the aspirations of the non-Russian peoples.

It is easy to understand why Stalin followed in the footsteps of Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great in his desire for a strong centralistic Russian State. He knew the strength of local nationalism and distrusted many of the local Communists. He thought that the future of the Soviet Union could not be left in their hands and that Moscow, the capital of the Russian people, was the only suitable centre of gravity of the Soviet State. This is the psychological background against which the foundation of the U.S.S.R. has to be considered. Lenin was still alive when the U.S.S.R. was proclaimed and Stalin was then by no means all-powerful. That is why the discussions preceding the foundation of the Soviet Union took place in an atmosphere of comparative freedom. Both Stalin and his opponents clearly showed their cards.

The opposition to the formation of a centralized Soviet Union, as Stalin conceived it, was led by the Ukraine with the prominent participation of Georgia. The principal spokesman of the Ukraine in the discussion on constitutional issues was Khristian Rakovsky, an old Bolshevik, whom Stalin later on never ceased to consider as a dangerous 'wrecker'. Rakovsky was no Ukrainian himself, but a Bulgarian who at the First Congress of the Comintern in March 1919 represented the 'Revolutionary Balkan Federation'. There is no doubt that Rakovsky, strongly aided by the old Ukrainian Bolshevik, Mikola Skrypnik, proved to be an excellent defender of the interests of the Ukrainian and indirectly of all non-Russian communists of Soviet Russia.

Rakovsky and Skrypnik wanted to preserve the statehood of the Ukraine and opposed to Stalin's 'Union', a loose 'confederation' of Soviet Republics. Instead of Stalin's 'Soviet of Nationalities' Rakovsky proposed a 'Council of States'. He further rejected the establishment of the 'Presidium of the Central Executive Committee', which until the new Stalin Constitution of 1936 was the most powerful constitutional organ

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of the Soviet State and served the purposes of a centralistic leadership. S.U. 631
The Ukrainians, led by Rakovsky and Skrypnik, also made efforts to 186
keep their own Commissariats for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, to UK.
maintain at least some degree of control over the railway system and 186
postal services in their territory and in general to curtail the prerogatives 642
conferred on the all-Union Peoples Commissariats.[3]

The Ukrainians were defeated and Stalin got his centralistic constitution accepted which, in the long run, enabled him to rule in Kharkov and Kiev almost in the same way as in Moscow and Leningrad.

COMMUNIST IRREDENTA AND 'UKRAINIZATION' POLICY

Though ignoring the wishes of the Ukrainians regarding their constitutional status within the U.S.S.R., Stalin offered them a glittering consolation prize; the promise of a future Ukrainian State, to include all the Ukrainian lands which the peace settlement after the First World War had allocated to Rumania, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

This aim was to be achieved with the help of the Comintern and its policy on the national question. Many Ukrainians, though anti-Soviet 'bourgeois nationalists' at heart, were inclined to make peace outwardly with Bolshevism in the first years of the Soviet régime, because world-Communism stood for the most far-reaching fulfilment of Ukrainian national aspirations.

The Fifth World Congress of the Comintern in 1924 included ~~in~~ its resolution on the 'National Question in Central Europe and the Balkans' the following passage 'The Congress . . . considers it necessary for the Communist Parties of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania to launch the general slogan of separation of the Ukrainian lands from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania, and their union with the Soviet Ukraine and through it, with the U.S.S.R.'. The congress was satisfied that the Communist Parties of Poland and Rumania had successfully promoted the demand for Ukrainian self-determination. From the details of the resolution it appeared that the frontiers of a future united Ukraine were to be drawn slightly to the west of the Russian-Polish border as fixed in 1945.[4]

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The wish of certain groups of Ukrainian nationalists to come to terms with the Soviet régime was reinforced by an apparent readiness of the Soviet Government to grant to the Ukrainians a certain measure of freedom in the cultural field, provided that they recognized the totalitarian aspirations of the Communist Party. An expression of this policy of communist-nationalist co-operation was the fact that the historian of Ukrainian nationalism, Mikhail Hrushevsky, returned to Kiev in 1924 to take over the direction of the historical section of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.